Title | The draft program of the Communist International |
Alternative Title | The draft program of the Communist International: a criticism of fundamentals |
Creator (LCNAF) |
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Contributor (LCNAF) |
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Publisher | "The Militant" |
Place of Creation (TGN) |
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Date | 1929 |
Subject.Topical (Local) |
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Subject.Name (LCNAF) |
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Subject.Geographic (TGN) |
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Genre (AAT) |
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Language | English |
Type (DCMI) |
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Original Item Extent | 139 pages; 20 cm |
Original Item Location | HX11.I5T73 |
Original Item URL | http://library.uh.edu/record=b8304416~S5 |
Original Collection | Socialist and Communist Pamphlets |
Digital Collection | Socialist and Communist Pamphlets |
Digital Collection URL | http://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/scpamp |
Repository | Special Collections, University of Houston Libraries |
Repository URL | http://libraries.uh.edu/branches/special-collections |
Use and Reproduction | In Copyright: This item is protected by copyright. Copyright to this resource is held by the creator or current rights holder, and the resource is provided here for educational purposes. It may not be reproduced or distributed in any format without permission of the copyright owner. Users assume full responsibility for any infringement of copyright or related rights. |
File Name | index.cpd |
Title | Image 108 |
Format (IMT) |
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File Name | uhlib_1984506_107.jpg |
Transcript | 94 THE DRAFT PROGRAM OF had not urged them to do so. Had the Comintern pursued a more or less correct policy, the outcome of the struggle of the Communist Party for the masses was predetermined—the Chinese proletariat would have supported the Communists, while the peasants would have supported the revolutionary proletariat. If, at the beginning of the northern campaign we had begun to organize Soviets in the "liberated" districts (and the masses were instinctively fighting for that) we would have secured the necessary basis and revolutionary sentiment, we would have rallied to our side the agrarian uprisings, we would have built OUR OWN army, we would have undermined the opposing armies and—notwithstanding the youthfulness of the Communist Party of China—it would have been able with proper Comintern guidance, to mature in these stressful years and come to power, if not in the whole of China at once, then at least in a considerable part of China. And chiefly, we would have had a party. But precisely in the sphere of leadership something absolutely monstrous has occurred—a direct historical catastrophe. The authority of the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party and the Comintern came to the support at first of Chiang Kai-shek against an independent policy of the Communist Party and then to the support of Wang Chin-wei as the leader of the agrarian revolution. Having trampled upon the very basis of Lenin's policy and paralysed the young Communist Party of China, the E.C.C.I. led to a victory of the Chinese Kerenskys over Bolshevism, the Chinese Miliukovs over the Kerenskys and of Japanese and British imperialism over the Chinese Miliukovs. In this and only in this lies the meaning of what has happened in China in the course of 1925-1927. |