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University of Houston. Sevin, John. March 25, 2010. Special Collections, University of Houston Libraries. University of Houston Digital Library. Web. October 22, 2021. https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/houhistory/item/2355.

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University of Houston. (March 25, 2010). Sevin, John. Oral Histories from the Houston History Project. Special Collections, University of Houston Libraries. Retrieved from https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/houhistory/item/2355

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University of Houston, Sevin, John, March 25, 2010, Oral Histories from the Houston History Project, Special Collections, University of Houston Libraries, accessed October 22, 2021, https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/houhistory/item/2355.

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Title Sevin, John
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  • University of Houston
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  • Houston History Project
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  • Theriot, Jason P., 1975-, interviewer
Date March 25, 2010
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  • Energy development
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  • Sevin, John
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  • Amelia, Louisiana
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  • interviews
Language English
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Original Item Location ID 2006-005, HHA 01026
Original Collection Oral Histories - Houston History Project
Digital Collection Oral Histories from the Houston History Project
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Transcript HHA# 01026 Page 1 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 1 Houston History Archives BOEM DEEPWATER GULF OF MEXICO HISTORY PROJECT Interviewee: John Sevin Date: March 25, 2010 Place: Amelia, LA Interviewer: Jason Theriot Ethnographic preface: John Sevin graduated from high school in 1982, took a degree in petroleum engineering technology from Nichols State University, and began working for McDermott in 1988 at its Amelia yard. Seven worked on some of the pipe machining for Shell Oil’s landmark Auger tension-leg platform in the early 1990s. When Shell began to fabricate the even larger Mars tension-leg platform, Sevin was appointed as head engineer for one of the facility’s five topsides modules—the process module. Sevin also worked on Shell’s Ram-Powell, Ursa, and Brutus TLPs, rounding out his career with Bay Offshore. HHA# 01026 Page 2 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 2 Houston History Archives JT: This is an interview with John Sevin, S-e-v-i-n. We’re at McDermott. It’s the 25th March 2010. This is Jason Theriot. This is for the MMS Deepwater History Project. John has been at McDermott for how many years? JS: Twenty-two years. JT: Twenty-two years, and your role on the Mars project was a production engineer. JS: I was a production engineer on one of the assigned modules, one of the five modules that was part of the project. JT: We’re going to talk a good bit about that, but let’s go back in time, John. Tell me where you’re from, your educational background, life growing up in Thibodaux, those kind of good things. JS: Grew up in Shriever, some family land, attended H.L. Bourgeois High School, graduated in ’82, attended Nichols in petroleum engineering technology, graduated May of ’87 and then started here February of ’88. After looking for a job, obviously, with the downturn in the eighties, McDermott was just starting to pick back up and hired on at that point. JT: So were you second-guessing yourself when the price of oil went to ten dollars in ’86 and everybody was laid off and moved out of South Louisiana? JS: It was really second-guessing whether I should stay in that field or not, but the way Nichols had it set up, you were educated in other engineering backgrounds: electrical, civil, mechanical, as well as my major in petroleum. So it did give me some other oversights in other engineering. But, no, I stuck with it, and glad I did. JT: Were you married? Did you have a family then while you were in school? JS: No. I’ve actually been married thirteen years now, and I got married in my early thirties. So I was at McDermott just under ten years before I got married. JT: So when you got here, give me just kind of, in your own opinion, your own perspective, what this yard was like, what Amelia was like, what this area was like as a result of that tremendous downturn that really swept through the whole eighties when you showed up. What are some of your thoughts on how the decline in the industry had impacted this area and this yard? JS: Well, when I hired on, there was still a lot of guys that had a lot of years with McDermott. I hired on and actually went to work in one of the shops, a brace-cutting facility. At that time when an engineer hired on, he actually went on the HHA# 01026 Page 3 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 3 Houston History Archives shop floors to get some experience, versus coming in the office environment and doing some of the engineering roles. Engineers here at McDermott are mainly in charge of distribution of drawings or in all of the materials and working with the planning department to plan the project and come up with a schedule to construct the project. So the engineer’s kind of a director that falls under a senior engineer and a project manager to work directly with the foreman and the leader man during the construction of the project. JT: So were you involved in Auger? JS: Only in the shop environment. I was working in one of pipe shops at the time during Auger, so I was instrumental in kind of helping the flow of a lot of the piping that was being fabricated for the Auger project. That was after about a three-year stay in New Iberia as a production engineer. Much smaller environment in New Iberia, but it was some valuable experience in the working of McDermott. JT: So they were really just trying to polish you, giving you a lot of experience in a bunch of different areas? JS: Right, right. JT: Maybe knowing that some big-time work was coming up through the nineties and they were going to need experienced guys like young guys like you. JS: Right. Unfortunately, I don’t think it happens to that level these days, but back when they had a lot more resources available and they had sufficient production engineers, they saw the need to get some guys coming in on the bottom level to get the experience to come in and start managing the projects. So I really enjoyed it. I got to see the brace-cutting area from the shop floor, our west yard rolling mill where actually formed plate into tubulars, which in the fabrication of jackets was one of the instrumental pieces of the material, and then from there had an opportunity to go to New Iberia. Being single, didn’t have to relocate any family, so took on that for about three years. JT: Then back here for Mars? JS: Back here for Auger in the pipe shop, and then from there became from an engineer tech to a production engineer, took on maybe one or two projects until the start of the Shell Mars project, in which I was one of five engineers that was assigned to one of the modules. JT: There were five modules? HHA# 01026 Page 4 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 4 Houston History Archives JS: Yes. JT: And you were on the production module? JS: Process module. I have an org chart. We had the power module, process module, well bay module, drilling module, and quarters module. All were five distinctive topsides. JT: And y’all had built modules for Auger. You all had built modules before. This was not a new thing for McDermott, right? JS: Right. Now, the difference in Auger, those components were all joined here on site, versus on the Mars we had five individual modules that were loaded out onto barges and were shipped on integration site [unclear] Texas. JT: So that was a little different, then. JS: Yes, different methodology from Auger. JT: So you probably had one big team working on the Auger modules. JS: Right. JT: That’s interesting. I can see here how the team-building really would have worked as a per team per module. I mean, it almost seems like it’s a perfect fit for that, right? JS: Yes. You had a much smaller group, concentrated group, just on one of five components, versus on Auger it was such a massive integration of all of that. It was just almost overwhelming for the size team. So from the team on the respective of McDermott, you had a much larger team on Mars because of the five different components, versus on Auger you probably had half of the project team than what you saw on Mars. JT: But the same amount of work. JS: Yes. JT: So I’m guessing that Denis [Weber] hired you as one of his team members. Is that right? JS: Yes. The project manager went in. I mean, we had other work going on at the yard at the time, and they selected several project engineers and assigned them, along with a McDermott foreman. We were joined, our group, with a foreman HHA# 01026 Page 5 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 5 Houston History Archives from McDermott that we worked hand in hand. The foreman directly supervised the leader man and craftsman on the— JT: Okay, so he was a liaison with the guys on the ground. JS: Right. And we worked hand in hand with the foreman where we were liaison with the Shell folks and our other different departments on the needs of the yard. JT: So where did the concept for this structure come from? Is this something that McDermott had worked on in the past? What was new at Mars about this process, about the team-building and separating responsibilities and integrating? JS: I think because of the separate components, it just made it a good fit, and then with Shell playing a role and said, “Okay, we want to—,” I think Shell had a big part in determining the structure. I mean, it was a risk-reward-type contract. Obviously, you needed a lot more project management to set up this structure. So with Shell coming to the table and allowing this type of team and being a part in forming what teams we needed, I think jointly McDermott and Shell played a collective role in coming up with the type of team. There was also specific subcontractors that played a role, and they were considered part of the team as well. We had our electrical and instrumentation subcontractor that did all that scope of work, so they had a representative for each team as well. Piping subcontractor, Bay out of Texas, played a role in doing all the process work, the piping. Broadmoor, their main focus was on the quarters module, but they did the architectural outfitting of the quarter. So you have a listing of the major subcontractors here. Yes, Bay Fabricators, actually I have here they’re out of Corpus Christi. Seaco Industries, which I don’t think—currently they’re under a different name. JT: But that was the engineering and electrical? JS: No, Seaco [unclear] electrical and instrumentation, purchasing of all the components as well as the installation of them. Broadmoor out of New Orleans was the architectural outfitter. Then we had a group, Sipco, S-i-p-c-o, out of Prairieville, Louisiana. They were instrumental in doing the fireproofing application. It was a lot of specific fireproofing that had to go on certain blast walls or firewalls for fire protection, that they had the expertise in doing the application. So it was Shell, along with McDermott, and those major players all formed individual teams to construct each one of the modules. JT: So those teams were called MIST, or TACT? I have those two acronyms written down. HHA# 01026 Page 6 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 6 Houston History Archives JS: Initially, we called the entire team the MIST, the Mars Integrated Site Team. That kind of held through the construction of Mars until the next project came along, Ram-Powell. Then they said, “Well, we can’t really call ourselves the Mars Integrated Site Team anymore,” so at that time, after a team-building we had, where we came up with a mission statement and a vision statement similar to what we did on the Mars project, we all agreed to the TACT, Topsides Alliance Construction Team, and that acronym for the team held through the remaining of the three topsides projects. JT: So you guys had mission statements? JS: We sure did. We had a mission, vision, and guiding principles in which every one of the team members that were in attendance in that team-building session, that was conducted with a facilitator— JT: Mike Cushman and his— JS: I don’t know if Mike initially started on the Mars project. I can’t recall specifically, but, yes, when we had some problems to iron out, Mike would come in or our facilitator would come in and bring all the parties together, and we would sit down and hash whatever issues we had to work out. So the environment, having us all together instead of grouped in different company roles, really—well, we like to say a lot of times, as well as other parts of McDermott, they would tease us, saying we drank the Kool-Aid. Actually, we’d have a pitcher of Kool-Aid, and we’d say to join the team we had to drink the Kool-Aid. [laughs] JT: Because, another thing, it was completely different from what had ever been done before. JS: Right. JT: In the industry at large. JS: Yes. JT: No one had considered working hand in hand with the operators, with the client, quite like what had been done in the nineties with Shell. JS: Yes. When you did normal construction fabrication, you have your construction fabrication team for McDermott housed in one area, and your client is normally segregated, and you’re not interacting day to day. JT: This was day to day? HHA# 01026 Page 7 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 7 Houston History Archives JS: Yes. I mean, we’d be in the same complex. JT: So the team that you were on was assigned to one module? JS: Yes. JT: So you had the five team members, yourself included. JS: Right. JT: You had the other subcontractors who would participate, and then your foreman. Did you have a Shell guy that was part of your team? JS: Yes, we sure did. Some of the Shell that may have had more than one module, but each one had an assignment. Daryll Trosclair was with Shell. He was responsible for the power and the process module, where in the case of McDermott, we had separate foremen and separate engineers and leader men that was assigned. We had Jack Rozelle [phonetic] at the time. He was in charge of the well bay and drilling module. JT: He now works here, right? JS: He is now a McDermott employee. He is a quality manager over our marine fabrication yard. Then we had Dale Norman for Shell, was overseeing the quarters module fabrication. So each one of the modules, we had a counterpart with both Shell, McDermott, as well as the major subcontractors we had mentioned earlier. JT: So this was something that was developed prior to bidding, in the course of the bidding, in the course of being granted the contract? These team org charts, when were these people chosen? Any idea? JS: I really wasn’t involved at the bid point, but I think when we actually was awarded the work in getting all the planning done, I think this was in development already in place, the structure that had been agreed upon prior to the construction. Just a little background. I had some notes. McDermott and Shell had entered into this risk-sharing agreement where a contract had been signed December of 1993. Planning took place following that, and the fabrication actually began June of 1994. So there was a six-month lag between. JT: When this stuff was ironed out. JS: Right. So we didn’t just jump right into the fabrication. There was some prep work that was done prior to the actual construction starting here on site. HHA# 01026 Page 8 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 8 Houston History Archives JT: So one of the things that I’m beginning to really understand today is the difference between deepwater TLPs and building them and what occurred prior to that as project management, and the sophistication that is required in project management to manage these type of projects because of the expense, because of the technology, because of the experience in the past. It just seemed like project management is much more important now—“now” meaning 1993, ’94—than it had ever been before, which would explain all the time put into the meetings, the steering committees, the scheduling, the software that managed the scheduling, and all those things. JS: Right. The focus of the construction was to put as much of all the equipment and have as much of the fabrication done to where when the modules are integrated onto the hull, there’s the least amount of connection which shortens up the time from the installation onto the hull, to going out and setting the project on site and trying to come up with first oil. So that’s been a big focus of the oil companies is how much, within the weight limitations, can we put on these projects, still keeping it within some weight limits, because obviously you’re limited to how much you can put on a crane or the hook of a piece of equipment to actually pick it up. So there’s a lot of engineering going on, looking at the weights, looking at the footprint and what we can actually get done in the fabrication yard to minimize the time offshore. So I think that along the nineties that was a big focus. I think Denis had mentioned that earlier, where the crane capacities of both the derrick barges and the onshore equipment, the capacities went up, allowing the fabrication yards, as well as offshore to set much heavier loads. JT: Limiting the amount of interconnectivity amongst the modules and the time to put that stuff together either at the integrating site or offshore, was that the role of the designing engineers, and would that have included yourself as part of your particular module? JS: No, pretty much the design was done. The designation of what was inter-connect pretty well came to us on drawings. But we were responsible for taking those design drawings, the limits of what we installed on the module, and what was shipped offshore, fabricating all that, bundling it to recognize, basically having it all properly tagged to where when they went offshore, they knew what they had, what we call ship-loose components that are not part or installed on the module. JT: Ship loose, l-o-o-s-e? JS: Right. That’s our terminology for anything that’s not actually put and installed on the project. So normally on a barge going offshore or shipping out, you’ll have a lot of pieces of pipe, what we call inter-connect, that’s ship-loose along with bolting and all the different components. There’s a lot of identification and coordination that has to be done to where when they receive what we’ve shipped HHA# 01026 Page 9 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 9 Houston History Archives to them, they know what they have, it’s identified, and they can pick that up and put in its proper location. JT: And do it in a short amount of time, because it costs more money longer. JS: Right. JT: So the design plans came to y’all? I’m assuming that those designs were done by Waldemar Nelson or one of the other engineering design firms? JS: Yes. I had some notes as part of our post-job analysis. Shell Offshore, Inc. provided the main steel engineering, the actual main structure. Waldemar Nelson and Company out of New Orleans, as well as W.H. Linder and Associates of Metairie, had a joint venture for the remaining steel, the piping, the process piping, as well as the electrical and instrumentation engineering. So from time to time, I remember making a few trips there as part of what we call constructability, meeting with some of the design engineers. This project was a design-while-build. It was not completely designed at the time we started construction. Obviously, the construction starts with your main structure. While that was going on, they were designing all the components of piping and electrical, as well as what we call the interconnect steel to receive the piping and the supports. So from time to time, we would visit the engineering office, look at where they were at, offer constructability advice or review that would allow us to fabricate quicker and to give them some advice on connections that were basically fabricator-friendly is what we tried to relay in our erection sequence, that the way we plan on putting this thing together, giving the engineer company the insight on how we’re going to do it made a difference in the way they would design certain connections. JT: You said something interesting: fabricator-friendly. Give me an example or two of that. I kind of have an idea what you’re talking about, but I would prefer if you can give me an example on one of your modules, maybe. JS: Knowing how the sequence of putting together, we have sections of steel which we call pancakes, which span between two major what we call trusses. The engineers, knowing how we plan on doing the erection, sometimes made differences on the types of connections, whether we did the connection on the shop floor and then did a lift and made the connection, versus all building it together as one piece. So knowing how our plans were as a fabricator to do that allowed them to have some insight when we were designing connections of main steel to say, “Okay, I know how they plan on putting it together.” They may have had some options of certain types of connections they were opting to do. JT: And that’s all to improve time, man hours, and quality here. HHA# 01026 Page 10 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 10 Houston History Archives JS: Correct. JT: Which saves everybody money, cost sharing, risk sharing. JS: Yes. A lot of times the engineer company, knowing how it’s going to go together, versus them not having that information, may make a big difference on the way they may think it has to go together. Or their mindset, “Well, I think it needs to go together this way,” could be totally opposite of what happens in actual construction. JT: It could depend on what kind of equipment y’all have here to move stuff around, your yard setup. Is that something new in Mars, John, you guys working with the structural engineers from Waldemar Nelson and those guys? JS: This project lent itself real well to constructability. In a lot of construction-type projects the design is already done, so you don’t have the advantage. If you get a job and it’s already designed and you have the drawings, you basically don’t have any say-so, or to give the engineering company an insight in how it needs to go together. JT: Okay, I see what you’re saying. JS: So a design-while-build, they’re still putting the details together. We had the teams looking at the way we were going to build it. We were able to go there, give them insight as to our methods, and give them some feedback, which in some cases may have changed the design. JT: Walk me through like a typical day of the kind of work that you guys were doing as a team, as this construction in progress is going on with your particular module, and particularly with emphasis on how you’re interacting with Shell and the foremen. In other words, how did this actually work from a real-world understanding of a person who was actually doing it? JS: During the construction of a project, you’re always going to have interferences and things that based on the drawings just don’t work, or just things they may have missed during the design, during the putting it together, because you have all different kinds of views that the designers—you have some designers that work on just the structural, other designers that work just piping, other designers that just work E&I. So all of that has to come together. From time to time you have interferences. So the team environment we had allowed us to timely get with the Shell counterparts, look at the issues we were having with the construction, possibly going back to the designers almost immediately, and basically just that environment allowed the corrections to certain problems to be resolved very quickly. HHA# 01026 Page 11 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 11 Houston History Archives JT: Right, instead of letting them linger and then putting everybody back a week or two weeks or however long it would be. JS: Yes. We had things called site queries, which we would document what the issues were, and from there whatever resolution we got, we documented that site. So we had volumes of problems for the construction that we documented, got the response, actually may have put drawings with some of these write-ups we had, and everyone would sign off that that was the solution. So we maintained a pretty good volume of what we called site queries in order to document our corrections to the issues to the design. JT: That was done on the software program? JS: No. At that time, that was basically done hardcopy. But whatever we had—let’s see. This was back in ’95. I think e-mail and that type of stuff was coming about to where we could share between companies. Before, the type of communication you had was just limited within your company. So I think we were just starting with the e-mail communication outside of your company, so I think that helped as well. Now, another thing that helped, don’t know at what point in came in on Mars, but we had a modeling software and operator that was here on site that would actually bring up the model, the designed software drawings, and what we call PDMS, an operator could go in and we could actually do a walkthrough of the design with the module form, anyone from the field that was trying to get a good picture of actually what they were trying to construct. So that was kind of something we hadn’t seen before also that aided in putting the construction together, putting the project together. JT: What was the name of that software? JS: PDMS. JT: Did you have a little man, a little worker guy, like a production engineer walking through the simulation to make sure that this pipe doesn’t hit him in the head and that kind of thing? JS: That’s right. That’s some of the type of things that Shell and some of the designers will work with. I think that was just in its infancy, that type of walkthrough. But I know as we did the TLP projects, that type of information became more easily accessible to actually have the modeling software that the engineers used and designed to, and that was continually updated as they were designing. So that was a first for us as well, is having that on-site information available, versus having to go to the designers to get a better view of what we were doing. HHA# 01026 Page 12 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 12 Houston History Archives They actually, I think, using that software or using that modeling program, put together a little laminated pamphlet that showed the project in a modeling form and had some details of each one of the projects, which I kept from ’95. There was a color-coordinated model view of what we were building and then how we had laid out the project with all the major components to put it together. JT: Wow. But this is an end product? In other words, this is what it looked like at the end? JS: Yes. We actually had that software to develop what we call erection sequences, where we start with just different sections that we were building and how each section planned to come together in order to come up with a final erected product. JT: That’s really a technological marvel, isn’t it? JS: Yes, it sure is. We did building layouts based upon the limitations of the areas we had under roof, so we did a lot of planning on what components of the project would fit. It’s almost like a jigsaw puzzle. Each module had a specific location it was being constructed in. So based on that real-estate size, we actually did little paper layouts, called paper dolls, and based on the dimensions of the bays that we had to construct them in, we’d place those paper dolls in the most efficient layout, and then that’s how we attacked putting the thing together. JT: Essentially managing the yard. JS: Right. Managing the area, the assigned area we had, and then based on the erection sequence, we tried to keep the fabrication under roof as long as possible. That was some of the things we got with the designers as well. What was our limitations on the width and the construction base, and it allowed us—we just barely snuck through with the size we had allotted to us to get the thing pretty well constructed in the bays, and then what we did is we skidded them out into the open area to allow us to put more stuff on where it exceeded the limitations of the size of the bays. JT: So that would be another example of fabricator-friendly, having as much of it built in the shop. JS: Under roof. That’s pretty massive construction bays. As I say, using the paper dolls allowed us dimensionally to figure out do we have enough size to put as much as we can. We tried to do the same thing they do offshore, stack as much as you can onto a section before you lift it and put it in position onto one of the major structures. We build in what we called a pancake-type fabrication, where we build flat sections, horizontal sections. We’ll go as far as putting equipment on it as HHA# 01026 Page 13 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 13 Houston History Archives well, and from there we’ll lift that section and then install it onto its supporting structure, its vertical structure. JT: So for these, for example, what is your process? So pancake would be like the levels here? JS: The different levels, right, what we call the lower level, the mezzanine or middle level, and the upper level. Most of your topsides are arranged in multiple horizontal levels. They have a name for them. But those levels have different pieces of equipment. That was another part of the coordination we did with Shell. All of the equipment that had to go on, you couldn’t put the equipment on after you had the next section stacked. So all the equipment was bought by Shell, and a lot of these had anywhere—you can go from just a few weeks’ delivery to sixteen to eighteen months’ delivery, depending on the type of equipment. So we came up with some requested on-site dates for certain pieces of equipment, and not all the time the equipment made it for the time we were ready to go with the next level. So there was a lot of coordination with the massive pieces of process of equipment that we had to coordinate and work out the schedules with the client, with Shell, to make sure that piece was going to be in, in time, when we needed it in order to continue with the fabrication. JT: The office where all of this was happening is your five team members, I’m assuming, in one area. JS: Right. We had some old offshore quarters buildings that had been retired from offshore but were in still pretty good shape. We actually had two of those complexes on shore and were joined with walkways. So all five project teams, along with the subcontractors, were basically isolated from the rest of the yard in our own complex, our own office facilities. JT: Like I said, it was the five and the Shell guy was in there too? JS: Yes, right across the hall. JT: Wow. Had that been done at Auger? JS: No. JT: Or at any time before? JS: Normally you would see on a fabrication project your client housed in a separate building from your fabrication team, as well as the subcontractors are normally housed office-wise in a different location. JT: So when you came to work every day, it was these guys. HHA# 01026 Page 14 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 14 Houston History Archives JS: Yes. I saw the faces of the Shell guys, all the different subcontractor personnel, so we were within shouting distance of each other. Not that we shouted. [laughs] But we could holler across the hall and get the other guy to come at any time to work together to iron out any issues we had. JT: That’s part of the team-building. Was that something that McDermott had come up with, maybe Mike Cushman and his group had come with? That seems to be pretty logical now, but it would have been pretty innovative back then, right? JS: Yes. I don’t know where the team-building initiated, but basically we planned every quarter to have some type of get-together. We had crawfish boils offsite. We even had a get-together. We called it team-building. We had our on-site team-building, where we had all the different on-site representatives. We’d go into a team-building. But also besides that, we had a quarterly social, which involved the families of all of the different members. So we got to know the family and the wife and the kids of the Shell personnel, of all the other McDermott personnel, as well as the subcontractors. So we had get-togethers, I think at Oak Alley, some of the plantations. Obviously, there was an expense, but that was shared between McDermott and Shell and the other subcontractors, and they actually saw a benefit from it. JT: I’ll bet they did. JS: Getting to know everyone’s family really makes the environment that much better to work in. I’ve had Jack Rozelle, who at the time worked for Shell, who’s with McDermott now, said looking back in his career, that was one of the most rewarding set of years on construction that he had. JT: I’ll bet. JS: So you get to know the families, know the person real well that you’re working with, and you come to appreciate each other. It’s not an adversarial environment at all. JT: As it had been in years past. JS: Right. And if it did become adversarial, then we’d bring in Mike Cushman or someone and say, “Look, we got an issue. We’re not going to let this thing linger.” JT: Right. Get it solved quickly. JS: Exactly. HHA# 01026 Page 15 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 15 Houston History Archives JT: Before we move on to what happens with you after Mars, maybe give me some anecdotal stories if you remember them or maybe some incidences where you personally saw the big advantage of this, some real particulars, maybe some good stories that came out of your relationship in the team-building and in the team with the Mars modules. JS: I can’t think of anything specific. I know there’s just a day-to-day working with all the individuals. I will say one of the things that really became rewarding that we normally don’t do on a fabrication project, you may hear of these type of celebrations at the christening of a ship. Either with the launch or the christening, they have a big celebration. A lot of the people get together. We normally don’t have that on fabrication projects. You build the project, you load it out on the barge, the next day it’s gone, it’s done. JT: You’re on another project. JS: Exactly. What was done on Mars and then with the remaining TLP projects as well, Shell proposed to have an Open House, and we created committees and teams to put on this big undertaking. What the mindset there was, we bring in the families, invite the designers, everyone that had a role in putting together the projects. Before they were loaded out on the barges, we had an Open House where we actually made some walking tours through each one of the modules, and one of the team members was assigned as a tour guide. Obviously we took turns. We had tours of families, children, relatives that were invited and actually got to go tour what we had accomplished. JT: That’s amazing. JS: From the office personnel, say, the designers, to the craftsmen and the welder was also allowed to bring his family and was invited and basically show off what they had been working on for the last sixteen months. We got some pictures of it, and it was almost like a festival atmosphere. We served food. We had, I think, hamburgers, and we had different foods that were cooked by some of the team members that were there, served soft drinks, had balloons and stuff for the kids, had a DJ, and it was just a real nice celebration-type atmosphere. Really, once you look back on it, getting into the day-in and day-out details, you really don’t have an opportunity to stand back and really think about what you’ve accomplished, and I think that putting on the Open House really gave everybody appreciation of what we came together to do. JT: Gave justification to some sense of all the hard work of the project management, putting all the hours into managing, not necessarily building. I mean, building is a big component of it. JS: Right. HHA# 01026 Page 16 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 16 Houston History Archives JT: As we were talking about earlier, the management side of this. JS: Obviously, in trying to meet a certain schedule, there’s a lot of weekend work that takes place, obviously for the craftsmen as well, more on the craftsmen than the project team, but we had a lot of weekend work. We were away from our families. I have a few pictures for the Open House. My two children were born during the fabrication of the TLP, so I’ve got pictures of my kids when they were first born, attending the Open House. So they kind of grew up with the—actually, I got married during the course of one of the projects. I was single at the time when it started. I invited some of the team members to my wedding. So it was definitely a tight-knit group, and I was fortunate to start at the very beginning of the Mars project, and I was able to go all the way through the four TLP projects on the team. JT: Did they have parties like this for each one of them? JS: Yes. I don’t know if the quarterly took place every quarter. I know we did have celebrations and off-site gatherings. It may not have been each quarter as we went through the projects, but having it each quarter for the first one, for Mars, really, really gave us a good—allowed the teams to gel even more. JT: The end result had already occurred, I’m sure, by Ram-Powell, Brutus, this cultural change in the industry, between Shell and McDermott and the other contractors, that the relationship had already been established. JS: Right. JT: There was really no need to continue to create one that was already there. JS: Yes. One of the reoccurring themes or words that always came out of the meetings we had and the team-buildings was trust. We had to trust that each one of the players was focusing on the common goal. “Fit for Purpose” was one of the acronyms we had for the project. JT: Fit for Purpose? JS: Fit for Purpose. JT: What does mean? JS: You didn’t go overboard with trying to—obviously you had to follow the design drawings, but if there was an issue that took place, the mindset was, we’re not building a Cadillac. It’s an offshore structure. We’re going to make it HHA# 01026 Page 17 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 17 Houston History Archives structurally sound, but the resolution or the solution for it is to be fit for purpose, fit for the design and the structure we’re building, meaning that the client is not going to go out and make you spend exorbitant amount of man hours or hurry up to do something that we know we can do it in the course of time and not spend a whole lot of extra overtime, man hours, or dollars. JT: Make it a Chevy truck. JS: Exactly. JT: Not a fancy Cadillac car. JS: Right. JT: Durable. You just make sure it works. JS: Yes, make sure that the solution we’re coming up with fits the purpose of what we’re doing, no more, no less. So that mindset allowed a lot of things to say, well, we can do it like this, but it costs us a whole bunch more, take us a whole bunch more hours. Looking at this other solution fits a lot more to meet the schedule, the dollars for the project, keeping the cost low, so everything was evaluated what we called Fit for Purpose every time we came across an issue. JT: So what happens after Mars? You were there from the beginning to the end. JS: Yes. JT: Did you get on Ram-Powell? JS: Got on Ram-Powell, Ursa, and finally Brutus. JT: At some point, I’m sure, you were no longer a production engineer. You got involved in cost estimating, right? You got involved in areas. JS: Started as a structural engineer on the process module. During the course of, I think, Mars, towards the latter part of Mars, they needed someone to go in on the piping side. Obviously, with some of my background, I’d worked in the shop floor on Auger doing some of the piping. So I was asked. There was a need, and the project manager, I think Rick Johnson at the time, said, “We know you enjoy the role you’re playing right now, but really have a need in the piping side.” Would I consider moving to that scope of work versus what I’ve been doing before? So I moved on to working with Bay Offshore, who had the piping, and worked on the process or the piping side to, I think, the last project, I think through Ursa. Then there was a need for a contract administrator, working with HHA# 01026 Page 18 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 18 Houston History Archives the billing. I think one of the contract administrators had moved on. So, again, I was approached. There was an opening in a role they thought that might have a good fit. So each time they asked was basically another opportunity for me, and it worked out positively. JT: Tell me about the evolution of project controls. That was one of the things that Denis suggested that I throw in there. JS: Okay. Back in the nineties, I think they were more called contract administrators, knew the ins and outs of the contract, the terms, assisted with the billing, the forecasting of the project. Obviously it’s very important to know how much money you’ve spent to date, forecast what you’re going to spend over time, and what you think the final number’s going to be on the project. So got involved, obviously had some exposure as a project engineer doing forecasting, because the way it’s set up, the project engineer forecasted his own individual module that he knows about. All of the forecast or a cost, both actual and projected, are rolled together into a total contract. So the role as a contract administrator at the time kind of got to see the bigger picture versus just focused in on one particular module. McDermott over the years has kind of changed and gone into what we call the project controls type of department, which includes both scheduling, planning and scheduling, and cost engineering, which right now I’m in the cost engineering role, again, dealing a lot with what we’ve spent to date, projecting what’s going to be spent to be the final number on the project, as well as assisting with the billing and interacting with the client on any issues regarding the billing. Some of these contracts can be very—what’s the word I’m looking for—complicated as to what’s our responsibility of cost for the project, what may be lump sum, what the client pays for directly as far as what we call time and material. JT: The risk-sharing alliance established at Mars, how much has that contributed or influenced the direction of McDermott with respect to creating its own project controls department? It seems like something very different than just regular estimating. JS: Right. Project control, estimating, in our world here, is involved strictly with the bid of a project. At the award of a project, estimating will hand off all of those details to project controls, to the project manager as well as project controls. At that point, it’s up to the project manager of project controls to take what has been bid and then go forward with any changes, documenting any changes, any increases to the contract value, but all of those roles, once it becomes an awarded contract, stays within the control of the project manager and project controls. JT: That was something that was started with the TLPs? HHA# 01026 Page 19 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 19 Houston History Archives JS: It kind of migrated over time, because prior to that, our estimating group used to play a role throughout the project. Everything used to go through the estimating group, who oversaw both bids and awarded projects. Through the course of the TLP projects, the changes and everything became more a project-specific or project role versus going back to estimating. So future estimating type of work on an awarded project mainly became part of the project team and not part of the estimating group that was set up just to do bids. So we’ve kind of adopted the estimating role within a project team for organization. JT: I’m just thinking out loud, but estimating the price of a three-ton jacket that is going to go in 400 foot of water was something that wasn’t known that you could easily bid on, not easily, but you bid on. JS: Yes, history. JT: But with these massive topside TLP projects where cutting costs, reducing man hours, limiting the costs involved for both McDermott and the client is paramount to making these projects a success. So I can see how from just estimating a cost of this, here, let’s bid on it, to forecasting where we’re going to be at the end of the quarter at the end of the project can be an important tool, as Denis was talking about tools, all these new tools that Mars brought about, that the Mars project needed, required, to make it a success. JS: All the changes from the original view of the project and, again, as this project was a design-while-build, we didn’t have the full picture of what it looked like. So what we had was, we had designated numbers for certain scopes of work. So as the design matured and the details came out, we took what we had allocated for that scope of work, did an estimate based upon the targets or unit rates we had established, applied them to a scope of work and then had a buy-in with Shell that “This is what we think this scope of work is going to take.” So that’s how we established what we called our target, what number we were shooting to hit with regards to this risk reward, where if we went over, we shared in the payment of that overrun, where if we went under, we shared in the savings. JT: This was all open to Shell so they could come in— JS: All what we call open book. Everything we estimated was documented, was submitted to Shell, the client rep, for the proper applications of what we had did, and then blessing off. So instead of the reserve of both man hours and costs for that scope, we turned it in from an S—an order of magnitude, just kind of a good shot at what it should be, to a targeted “Here’s what we will set as our budget to do the work and measure ourself against.” So you were always working with approved budgets and reserved budgets. We had to work with two different buckets along the course of this project, and you kept replacing one and replacing the reserve which you had came up with. So HHA# 01026 Page 20 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 20 Houston History Archives the whole thing, the whole view of what it was going to take and cost, continually evolved with the project as it was maturing in design. JT: Instead of just doing a lump sum and “Here’s our change order,” and sending it in? JS: Well, again, we didn’t have a complete design. This was a design-while-build, so we had mainly the concept what it was going to look like, but nowhere near what the beam sizes were, what the material types were. There were none of those specifics available when they started. JT: So there would be a target number. JS: Right. JT: Then Shell and McDermott would have to sit down and agree. Shell may say, “No, it needs to be a little less or it needs to be a little more.” JS: Right. JT: And that’s where the risk-sharing factor would take in place. “Okay, we’re a month away, X number of man hours from reaching that target. We’re going to try to reach it or do better than that. Let’s go at it,” and then, “Here are the steps to make that happen.” JS: The target was made up of multiple components. Once those multiple components were agreed to that that was the target, then that got added up into one big number. The risk reward was set against the final number. JT: All of this was into a computer? Was there like an equation established? Was there a formula of some kind? JS: They had what we called unit rates, certain amount of man-hours and material cost based on a certain types of material, certain types of construction. In fabrication, we have history built for different types of components we build, where we can pick out historical factors. This is what it will take to build it both for labor, and then based on the current material pricing, we would apply that as well. Basically, that’s how we come up with the target. The risk reward was set to the final number, but that final number was always changing because we were developing all the different pieces and parts that rolled up into that final number. JT: The final number per quarter or the end of the project? JS: The end of the project. The risk reward was at the final outset or completion of the project. Now, we were billing and receiving revenue every month, but there HHA# 01026 Page 21 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 21 Houston History Archives was a reconciliation at the very end when the risk reward. So it wasn’t ongoing, the risk rewards for the project. We were being compensated for what our expenditures were to run the yard, and then our profit was really all keyed at the end on whether we came in above the target or below the target. JT: It’s a big risk. JS: Yes. But they allowed us to be compensated enough to keep the yard in a neutral or at least a little positive cash flow. JT: Deepwater is risky. JS: Yes, it is. JT: This is one way to limit the risk, I guess, or spread the risk. JS: Right. Not knowing, not having the project designed, what Shell tried to do with the design-while-build is shorten the engineering window. Lot of times you have a certain window you have to design the project, and traditionally you have it designed, you send it out to be fabricated. What Shell did was marry those two or overlap the fabrication with the design. So they shortened the overall construction window because fabrication was starting and the design was not complete. So by doing that and allowing the constructability to take place really had some positive benefits to shortening your window of first oil from concept to being offshore. JT: Very interesting. We interviewed Dan Godfrey, and we were at his house for many, many hours, and it was the first time that I was hearing about what you’re talking about, not in the detail that you’re talking about, but trying to understand and follow him as he was understanding what it was he was hoping to create, something totally new. But to hear it from you guys who were actually here, it cleared a whole lot of things up for me and for my other counterpart. I speak for myself. But it’s all about managing that risk and how to make it possible and economically viable and profitable to go and do this. JS: There’s really no way you could have gotten a lump sum at the stage the design was, and obviously this was a new concept from what they had experienced on Auger. So they had a new concept of fabrication, breaking it up into five distinctive modules and then setting it offsite. So then with the foresight and wanting to shorten the window as much as possible, this was one of the ways they could bring on a contractor such as McDermott. The risk sharing was also tied with our subcontractors, not just McDermott. The subcontractors had a scope of work and had a target just like McDermott. So not only was McDermott tied in with the risk reward, our subcontractors played the same type of role as well. So it gave them the incentive HHA# 01026 Page 22 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 22 Houston History Archives to come on board and do things with the common goal of getting the project finished on time, the least expenditures and least cost as possible. JT: This concept was applied to the next group, to Ram-Powell? JS: Yes. JT: Maybe minor tweaks here and there? JS: Well, what Shell tried to do with the future projects is say, “Okay, we’ve got a benchmark now, based on what it’s going to take, all these changes that came about with the design as we were building. So now we’ve got a good benchmark. Let’s cut this 5, 10 percent and do better, both on schedule.” I don’t know if the schedule was cut very much, because there’s some other things on setting the project, how long the hull was going to take to be built, but definitely on costs and man hours, figuring out, okay, we’ve done it for this. We know we’ve had some challenges. We’ve learned from it. Let’s shoot for a lesser target with the same risk reward. JT: That was for Ram-Powell, Brutus? JS: Ursa and Brutus. I can’t really—they kind of all go together. I’m not sure if we had any differences in the risk reward, but I think that concept maintained throughout the course of the four. JT: Who would you think—because that’s an interesting point, let’s improve 5 percent every time, or at least the first time with Ram-Powell. Who might be someone here, other than Denis, that can kind of speak on how the changes implemented for Mars carried over into Ram/Powell to make it even more of a profitable venture? JS: The only other guy, Rick Johnson was also project manager on the Mars project, along with Denis Weber. They kind of had to switch out during the course, so they both played a role. I’m trying to remember if Rick was on Ram/Powell or not. We do have post-job analysis where I probably could see contractually what the goals were, going from Mars to Ram-Powell to Ursa. I’d just have to do some research, but just off the top of my head, I’m not sure what the differences were from project to project contractually. But we do have some resources we could probably dig up that type of information. JT: That would be great, because that’s one of the things I want to track, is how Mars influenced the other TLP projects, and from McDermott’s perspective, because all we have is Shell, really, because we’ve interviewed all the guys from Shell and now you guys. But how did that change over time impact other clients? In other words, did you guys utilize this for the Chevron projects, for the BP projects later, HHA# 01026 Page 23 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 23 Houston History Archives considering BP was a partner on Mars? To what degree did BP look at this risk sharing as a viable option for their deepwater, to maybe chart to see how it phased down into the rest of the industry? JS: Right. Lot of times as a fabricator, we don’t have a lot of say in the type of contract. That’s basically agreed upon with the client, with other respective partners, as to what contract they’re going to go out on to get a project built. JT: It would appear to me that from a BP perspective, being a joint venture, not having any operating experience in the Gulf, seeing the benefit of something like this, the cost benefit and the profit benefit, would want to apply that to its future deepwater Gulf of Mexico operations. So I’ll be curious to know if they did. JS: BP had kind of a different—when they were on the yard, had what they called a program. They had a number of major projects in the yard, but theirs were basically reimbursable. They had full use of the yard, which was somewhat different than Shell. Shell, at the time, we had other major projects going on, so we were sharing resources within the yard. When BP came on, they basically bought the exclusive rights for the fabrication of their five major projects. So there was very little else going on at the time of BP, and the way the contract was agreed upon with BP, they basically paid all the costs for the operation of the yard, which is quite a bit different from the way that Shell did it, where Shell generated a target agreeable between the two parties, and then based upon the way you performed on it, you either shared or you paid part of the cost overrun or the savings. JT: So these BP projects, were they construct as you go? JS: To a certain degree, I think they were a little bit further along in design than what we experienced in Shell. I think it went a little further along. JT: Denis talked about this. It changed his whole perspective on the way he runs his job, the way he manages people, the scheduling, the management, the forecasting. Can you speak on that, John? This will wrap it up. But how did your experience with all this stuff with Mars impact the way that you go about your day-to-day activities at your job through subsequent other projects, not just with Shell, but up till today with other clients? JT: Clients have had a lot of influence on the way we look at schedules, the way we break certain things out, so I think if I had to say, that’s probably one of the influences. We shared planning meetings weekly with the client, and they brought to the table some things, I guess through their experience, that we could improve on as far as scheduling the projects and focusing in on what is the major items or the critical items we need to concentrate on. HHA# 01026 Page 24 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 24 Houston History Archives So I think all of us have taken from that some experience, some learnings that have allowed us to improve the way we do our work. Obviously, the software and the way we can interact with a lot of systems now, downloading things in Excel and just being able to give a different view. We didn’t quite have that back in those days. We were somewhat limited to the interactions with Microsoft. Our legacy systems basically operate our takeoff system, our accounting system. So I think as a role interacting with the client, I think I can give them a lot more information that they may be used to seeing, versus just getting what our systems can produce without modification. They gave us some ideas of just improvements and focusing in on, let’s say, direct man-hours, versus all these support activities. Segregate. I think that’s probably one of the biggest learnings we’ve had, is separate your direct hands-on craftwork from your support work, what are called direct and indirect. JT: Explain that a little bit more. JS: What we call direct man-hours and labor is the welder, the fitter, the painter, that has hands-on doing the construction. Your support roles such as material, handling, scaffolding, some other things that assist these guys in doing their work are all needed and all part of the work, but when it comes to knowing how many people you need to do the construction, hands-on construction, it’s better to focus on your direct craft, and your support craft tracked separately. JT: Why is that? JS: If you track them separately, you can always roll them in and get a big view, but it allows you to determine how many welders you need, how many fitters, how many painters, where the supporting roles may dilute how many true craft people you need to do the work. JT: Getting right down to the man hour and estimating and forecasting for that man hour is critical to getting these projects on budget. JS: Yes. Now, we track man hours to pretty good detail, pretty detailed what we call by account, by work activity, but this is just another way of rolling it up to get a better picture, versus just putting everything into a bucket that’s been spent, and say, “Okay, I spent this many hours for the week,” focusing in on your hands-on people, and being able to project how many you need is a big advantage. JT: What about any hands out in the yard that might—not that they would have any time, but maybe some guys who were retired or who were maybe leader men or yard foremen? Do you think anybody out there might have an interesting view on actually implementing what you guys were coming up in the meetings and actually working on a tight schedule to build these topsides? I have a list that HHA# 01026 Page 25 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 25 Houston History Archives actually Woody gave me, some guys who worked on Cognac, but I think they’re older and retired. They’re welders and crane operators. JS: Probably one is Denis’ father, who was a welder foreman. He played a role in the topsides as well. JT: I wonder if it wouldn’t be worth us maybe asking the head office if it would be okay if those guys ever had the time or wanted to talk with us about actually physically building a pancake topside structure and show how this process worked on the ground. JS: Probably Denis and Rick would probably be the better resources, because they know who was working as a project manager on the projects, knew a lot of craftsmen and leader men, because one of the roles of a project engineer was weekly progress. I found myself on the job site a lot more in that role than the role I have now in cost engineering. JT: So you’re still driving back and forth to Thibodaux? JS: Yes. We carpool these days with some neighbors, but it makes it a lot easier. JT: How old are your kids now, John? JS: Twelve and nine. JT: We have a two-year-old. We have one child. She came with me on this trip to visit with the grandparents. Well, good, man, I appreciate your time. Do you have any questions for me? JS: No, I think covered it pretty good. I don’t know if I had any in the statements we had prepared for our Houston office. I think we pretty well covered. One thing we didn’t talk about that was a big, big part was the emphasis on safety. JT: Yes, I had wanted to cover some of that with Denis, and I didn’t. I would imagine, especially working with Shell, that there was a lot of changes in safety for building these things that had to be implemented. That must have been a priority. JS: Yes. Our safety performance has just been improving all the time. I think we might have had it in our mission statement, the guiding principles, one of the top ones, that we would recognize that every accident is preventable and proactively strive to achieve an injury-free workplace. Everyone pretty much worked to that mindset. We wanted everyone going home at the end of the day. HHA# 01026 Page 26 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 26 Houston History Archives JT: So in your team, in your particular team for your module, did you all have like a weekly—I imagine you had a weekly safety component to y’all’s meetings? Was that part of it? JS: Yes, we always started with some type of safety moment at meetings. In the field, I don’t know if it was a daily occurrence. It eventually evolved to a daily safety meeting. Today we have safety meetings at the start of work every day. But there was a big culture change with regards to safety that Shell played a big role in, focused in on. I think at that time we started the behavioral-based safety. We’re focused in on the behavior and what causes accidents, versus just focusing on the accident itself. And then trying to educate the guys to think beforehand, “What will be the results of my action? What is the risk?” and think about it before doing it. So that’s we call behavioral-based safety management, is thinking before you do an activity, identify the hazards so you can avoid them. JT: That’s interesting. I’ve worked on a shop floor before, and it’s often intense and you’re in small spaces. You’ve got a lot of heavy cranes moving over your head. You’re moving a lot of heavy, hot equipment. JS: Right. JT: So what you’re saying is, to have the guy, before he ties up that beam, “Okay, what is the risk factor if I bring it over there? Is it high? Is it low? If it’s too high, maybe I—.” JS: Yes. JT: Is that what you mean by behavior? JS: Is everyone clear from the area? If I’m working up here and something were to fall, is that area clear? Have I cordoned off that area while I’m working overhead and would happen to drop something, or I’m cutting a piece of steel, is my co-worker down there out of harm’s way? It’s also looking out for your fellow worker. Will my actions hurt someone down the line from me? So the emphasis on safety and the improvement in safety was a real emphasis we had on the project, and it really had a positive effect. JT: I think there was a fatality on Auger. There was a fatality on Auger; a subcontractor had fallen from one of the modules. I’d interviewed a—what’s that guy’s name? Anyway, it was in [unclear], Louisiana. His name slips me for the moment. But there was a fatality in a yard for Auger and Shell said, “Never again. We can never let that happen.” So I’m sure part of the restructuring of making safety changes here in the yard where stuff is being constructed was prominent on the minds of the planners. HHA# 01026 Page 27 of 26 Interviewee: John Sevin Interview: March 25, 2010 University of Houston 27 Houston History Archives JS: Yes, it definitely was. And everyone played a role in the safety, both going as an observer, looking for any hazards that maybe the worker—the mindset of just “blow and go” these days is not the mindset of the fabricator. I mean, you want to do it as productively as possible, but the days of just blowing wide open is no longer the case. JT: That must have been a challenge to take those old hands who were probably still around in the nineties and say, “Look, we got to get those man hours up because we got to reach these targets, but you’ve got to be more conscientious than you’ve ever been.” That must have been a challenge. JS: Now you need to wear a safety harness when you go above six feet, and you need to tie off a ladder. All things have come based on learnings of accidents, but things industry-wide that both that Shell shared with us on instances that happened worldwide in their company as well as what we did. Safety is a worldwide learning of any incidents that happen, and that is a very quick communication when something like that happens, to try to help everyone learn from it and avoid that from happening somewhere else. JT: Good. Shall I turn this off? JS: Yes. [End of interview]