it. Because of the presumption of Klausen's change of
heart, and his free confession, the Japanese court gave
him only life imprisonment.
OzAki had never really feared the consequences of his
treason. If he were discovered, he was prepared to die.
Actually, he did not find this so simple. Affection for his
family, who never suspected this treason, and loyalty to
the innocent friends whom lie had involved, weighed
heavily upon him.
After full and unhurried investigation the various members of the Sorge ring were brought to trial, separately,
in camera. Only the briefest mention of the case was
released to the press in May, 1942. In this release the
Japanese Intelligence deliberately connected the accused
with the Comintern although they had established that
the ring worked for the Red Army. There was no point
in telling the Russians all they knew.
Sentences were handed down by the Tokyo District
Court in September, 1943. Both Sorge and Ozaki appealed
to the Supreme Court. Both claimed that they had not
done anything illegal. Their theory of defense was that
they had not used force to acquire their secrets and that
they had passed to Moscow only information normally
available to any discerning person. The Supreme Court
was not impressed by this logic. Sorge's appeal was dismissed in January, and Ozaki's in April, 1944.
It is an interesting and perhaps surprising commentary
on the quality of Japanese civil justice to note that in the
midst of a bitter war, dangerous spies were given the
benefit of every protection offered by Japanese law. It
also seems surprising that of the nearly twenty guilty men
and women only two were sentenced to death, although
under Japanese law every one of them had incurred the
death penalty. [Of 17 convicted prisoners, we list what
happened to six, as follows:]
Nov. 7, 1944
Nov. 7, 1944
Jan. 13, 1945
Aug. 2, 1945
Oct. 9, 1945
The Sorge case is much more than an interesting spy
story. Like the Canadian espionage case it presents
detailed information on methods of Soviet espionage, summarized [in part] as follows:
Communist parties and known Communist cardholders
are not used for high-level, highly sensitive Soviet espionage. True, they are used as channels, but they are not
included in the important net work. They are too vulnerable.
Communist sympathizers or fellow-travellers on the
other hand, are the persons recruited for basic espionage.
I hey have loyalty and devotion to the Soviet Union,
through their devotion to the abstract cause of Marxian
communism, a sort of indued hypnosis which is beyond
American author, used
by Sorge extensively
in espionage nets
in China. This was inconsistent since Sorge
always contended that
women were valueless
in espionage work.
Later, in 1949, Smedley
became the "front
woman" in the effort
of the American Communist party to discredit MacArthur.
WIDI WOR1 " PHOTO
I'vi is Fori \i Ni
Study groups of economic, social, and Marxian subjects
are common sources of recruits both for the Communist
party and for active Soviet espionage. A very useful cover
consists of a research institute devoted to some problem
of general interest — the typical "front" organization.
Persons not members of the Communist party, merely
sympathetic to it through reading and participating in
study groups, show an extraordinary willingness to work
for the Soviet Union. They are ready to betray their
country through espionage with very little urging. They
do not seem to care what the channel of command or
information may be, so long as it relates to Communist
activity in general.
There is a very sharp dividing line between Soviet intelligence agencies, and there is little if any intercourse
between members of different agencies. For example, after
Ozaki started working for Sorge in Japan he was forbidden
to have further communications with Agnes Smedley who
was running a Soviet intelligence agency in Peiping. Yet
previously the three had worked closely together in
Shanghai in complete social harmony.
As another example, Sorge was forbidden to communicate with Guenther Stein after Stein left Japan in 19.38, and
apparently did not look him up when thev were both in
Hong Kong in 1939. There is some doubt about this.
Sorge's memoirs were written at a time when he had
hopes to escape and he was not likely to expose his
associates or reveal too many details. Stein appeared in
the United States, obviously a link with the I.P.R. until
the War Department release of a part of the Sorge files,
drove him out. He certainly was in touch with Smedley.
Soviet Russians are rarely used as field agents: they are
too likely to be under surveillance. Only after necessity
drove him to it, did Sorge deal with a representative of
the Soviet Embassy. The American and Canadian experience is slightly different: The Russian Embassies controlled and directed espionage nets and Embassy personnel was very active; Judith Koplon was in contact with a
UN or Consular official, peddling FBI records.
The best agent is a person who not only has "cover" but
is a bona fide expert on a general subject, preferably