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Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1956
File 031
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Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1956 - File 031. 1956-03. University of Houston Libraries. University of Houston Digital Library. Web. November 15, 2019. https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/979/show/940.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum. (1956-03). Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1956 - File 031. Facts Forum News, 1955-1956. University of Houston Libraries. Retrieved from https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/979/show/940

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum, Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1956 - File 031, 1956-03, Facts Forum News, 1955-1956, University of Houston Libraries, accessed November 15, 2019, https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/979/show/940.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

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Title Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1956
Series Title Facts Forum News
Creator
  • Facts Forum
Publisher Facts Forum
Date March 1956
Language eng
Subject
  • Anti-communist movements
  • Conservatism
  • Politics and government
  • Hunt, H. L.
Place
  • Dallas, Texas
Genre
  • journals (periodicals)
Type
  • Text
Identifier AP2.F146 v. 5 1956; OCLC: 1352973
Collection
  • University of Houston Libraries
  • Facts Forum News
Rights No Copyright - United States: This item is in the public domain in the United States and may be used freely in the United States. The item may not be in the public domain under the copyright laws of other countries.
Item Description
Title File 031
Transcript SHANGHAI CONSPIRACY The total cost of the Sorge ring was estimated at about 3.000 yen (or U. S. $1,500) a month to pay for the extremely valuable work of nearly twenty agents; with °ne exception they seemed to have worked for love of the cause and not for money. The information which Sorge sent after June 22, 1941, was worth many millions of dol- ■ars to the Soviet Union, since it had a profound effect on 'he Soviet deployment of troops. Hence on the stopping of the Germans at the most critical phase of the war, its tostorical value is literally incalcuable. Surge made reports on intentions and operations in North China after July, 1936, as well as on the nature of Japanese mobilization. He transmitted Ozaki's estimate 'hat Japan would fail in her plan to solve her North China Problem by a fast campaign, and that the war was bound '0 develop into a long struggle. Throughout the rest of J"e China War, Sorge kept a steady flow of fundamental "formation to the USSR. j n February 16, 1940, Sorge sent a reliable account of Japanese output of munitions, aircraft, and motorcars, fong with reports on the factories making these items s Well as iron and steel. From time to time he brought lese figures up to date. In August, 1941, he reported on Japanese petroleum resources, a top secret bit of informa- °n of the most vital importance. He reported that there internal politics were sub- Dated to answering that vital question. Without an *as ,Se by the navy, half a year by the army, and half a year y the nation at large. His sources were the German tr«bassy and Miyagi. the crucial year was 1941. On Max 20. Sorge flashed the r Sent warning that thi' Heichswelir would concentrate Orn 170/190 divisions on the Soviet border and on June u ^ould attack along the whole frontier. The attack did °ur on June 22. Thereafter, the possibility of a Japanese j, a°k from the East became the most vital mission of the rSe ring. All questions, whether of Japanese-American ations, the war in China or in °tdi! g Urate answer the Red Army could not call on their Far OM n ^rrny f°r 'le'P 'n the West and, as events showed, o V the employment of additional troops made possible a stopping of the violent German thrusts. By the end of i gust Surge reported that the German Embassy had lost ■j, Pe of Japan's joining in the war against Russia in 1941. s removed the Japanese threat to Siberia, u .0rge maintained a steady watch and reported on anl States-Japanese negotiations during the summer sjn u'i of 1941. His informaion was full and accurate, of f Ozaki was so close to Prince Konoye, the key man ^e negotiations. His connection with this Secretary of was through Prince Sayonji, a member of one of the Vv„ Prominent Japanese families: significantly Sayonji 'n'al ° ilssociated with the I.P.R.; he narrowly escaped t(, °n account of Sorge but survived to again become lira recent head of the Japanese branch, I.P.R., one more n the endless chain of Red infiltration everywhere. c|u . c'tober 15, Sorge had transmitted his final sober con- Htat°?s that the Japanese had decided to move south; trie l- re w;ls now no serious danger of an attack by Mantling Army across the Siberian frontier and that Pom \i News, March, 1956 Sta,e, this decision would bring on war with the United States. He felt that his mission was completed and drafted a dispatch suggesting his recall to the Soviet Union; Klausen argued that this request was premature, and the message was never sent. Once the Japanese decision was made to move south, the collision with the U. S. in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor was unavoidable. Sorge warned his Russian masters — but no such warning reached Washington in spite of Sorge's association in Shanghai with many Americans, on treasonable business. Next to Sorge, Ozaki Hozumi was the most important member of the ring. Although he used all of his sources for the gathering of information for Sorge, and utilized his intimacy with highly placed friends to obtain documents and news, he never passed on casual, undigested information. He stored up his knowledge, weighed it against other relevant data, and made a preliminary evaluation. Sometimes a top official like young Saionji Kinkazu would give Ozaki Hozumi top secret information to get his reaction. His political opinions were camouflaged in various ways to preserve a cloak of legality, but his real aim was to reorganize Japan into a State which would cooperate with Russia and Communist China — the aim of all devotees of coexistence. He hoped to create a new- order in East Asia as a step toward a world order and, knowing that he enjoyed the confidence of the Russian leaders and the Chinese Communists, he dreamed of becoming the head of a reorganized pro-Communist Japan. Ozaki's single allegiance was to the Communist cause. He recognized no national boundaries between the various countries or between the various Communist organizations throughout the world. The earth was one world centered in the Third International, which happened to be in Russia. The benefits which the USSR might derive from the spread of communism were merited by the assumption of leadership of world communism by the Soviet government. "zaki's close relationship with Prince Konoye's advisers gave him unsurpassed opportunities to learn the exact progress of Japanese-American negotiations during the summer and fall of 1941. He reached the conclusion that despite Japanese-American common interests, great disparity between the positions of the two powers was such that compromise was impossible. Although the upper strata of the Japanese political and financial circles were anxious to avoid war, the Japanese masses, as result of violent military propaganda since 1937, were confident that they could successfully win their "holy war" and were opposed to compromise with the United States and Great Britain. Although the economic situation in Japan as a whole was extremely bad, the fighting services, especially the navy, had never been so well equipped. By the beginning of October, Ozaki was able to give his considered opinion that Japan would embark upon a major military campaign to the south, which would include the capture of Singapore, the invasion of the Philippines and a raid on Hawaii. Retrospectively, it is clear that Ozaki made a completely sound estimate of the situation, and the Kremlin was fully informed on Japanese intentions through Sorge's radio Page 29 /
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