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Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1956
File 027
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Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1956 - File 027. 1956-03. University of Houston Libraries. University of Houston Digital Library. Web. September 23, 2019. https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/979/show/936.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum. (1956-03). Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1956 - File 027. Facts Forum News, 1955-1956. University of Houston Libraries. Retrieved from https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/979/show/936

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum, Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1956 - File 027, 1956-03, Facts Forum News, 1955-1956, University of Houston Libraries, accessed September 23, 2019, https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/979/show/936.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

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Title Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 1956
Series Title Facts Forum News
Creator
  • Facts Forum
Publisher Facts Forum
Date March 1956
Language eng
Subject
  • Anti-communist movements
  • Conservatism
  • Politics and government
  • Hunt, H. L.
Place
  • Dallas, Texas
Genre
  • journals (periodicals)
Type
  • Text
Identifier AP2.F146 v. 5 1956; OCLC: 1352973
Collection
  • University of Houston Libraries
  • Facts Forum News
Rights No Copyright - United States: This item is in the public domain in the United States and may be used freely in the United States. The item may not be in the public domain under the copyright laws of other countries.
Item Description
Title File 027
Transcript SHANGHAI CONSPIRACY A POWERFUL ring of Soviet spies was uncovered in Japan just before Pearl Harbor. I was in charge of MacArthur's intelligence and saw this drama unfold, "robably never in history has there been a ring more bold, ■"Ore successful. Although most of the principals are dead. some are still at large. Thev ran be expected to Ik- secretly Plying their trade at this very moment in the capitals of the world. Though the work of Dr. Richard Sorge and his companions belongs to history, the methods of their work are characteristic of Soviet subversion and should serve as a Mr warning for today and for the future. Thev concern J cl, 'pt just the intelligence or security officer but every good "'Zen. Some of the implications are frightening. One ''"'ns to wonder whom one can trust. for nine productive years a daring and skillful band of jj'H's worked in Japan for their spiritual fatherland, Soviet "Ssia. Despite their widespread activity and enormous , lc'C'esses, thev went unsuspected and so undetected. Led ■ Dr. Richard Surge, a German (.'oniniunist posing con- "IC|nglv as a loval Nazi official, this ring of spies almost deeded in committing the perfect crime. Discovery tne through an accident, not through an error of their own, rom the point of view of national security, the dis- (, ery ol direct links of the Sorge Spv Ring with American mmunist operators, especially in California, and ulti- ,., >' the top hierarchy of the American Communist party Wired careful investigation. The process was time con- «i.| nK and unobtrusive, since it was expected that the u "''ated elements" would sooner or later pick up the ilr''" w'tn the mainland. Even more important and '""atic tendrils ultimate!) led to Shanghai and its Inter- r, Onal Settlement. It soon became apparent that the I ge King was an integral part of the Third Communist tr Prn;'tional "apparatus" in a world-wide pattern of infil- 0j °", subversion, and sedition, which has as its ultimate rrJl'etive Soviet domination of the entire Far East. These j(j. ers> commonplace now. were not fully understood in |(, '. n,'t it took seven years to bring American Communist S0 ers m trial, though thev were clearly implicated in the *' operation. I) <4 ^S°l'gc. the head of (he ring, and Ozaki Hozui icf j Oio, apanese lieutenant, vvorke his spies for the Soviet %n\-n both China ''n<l Jai,an from iCJ29 t0 194L With l»w "f ma)or Soviet concern to Japan aft set Partes, Je invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Dr. Sorge the was «0| red to cease bis Shanghai operations, go to Tokyo and ^ 'j1 a completely new network. Having successfully ''"'ted lu's apprenticeship [long, intensive training in ^crg p, "in m News, March, 1956 Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Great Rritain, China, and Soviet Russia], he was now reach to undertake the most difficult assignment under the direction of the IVth Bureau ( Intelligence) of the Red Army. Richard Sorge returned to Moscow in December, 1932 I at age 37], and received orders. Starting from scratch in a country which he never before had even visited, he was able to develop the most complete and successful espionage operation in Japanese history. Sorgo's job was to develop and paint the big picture. What were Japanese intentions and capabilities? tpanese and Russian antagonisms were old and deep. In 1933 in the midst of the first Five-Year Plan and the bitter internal struggle over forced collectivization, the Soviets were in no condition for war with Japan. With the rise ol a powerful Nazi Germany, there was constant possibility of war on two fronts. Perhaps in Tokyo, Sorge could discover answers to questions of both German and Japanese intentions. The subsequent outbreak of the European war changed the specific but not the general intelligence targets. Overriding all was the problem of whether Japan planned to attack the Soviet Union in Siberia. Sorge amassed an amazing amount of material, and at the most critical time was able to inform his superiors that Japan did not intend to crack the USSR but instead would move South. After June, 1941. as the German armies raced into western Russia, as great Soviet military formations were smashed and destroyed, reinforcement from the Siberian garrisons became vital. But the Bed Army could not weaken their Siberian defenses if the Japanese Army would attack soon. Sorge was able to assure them that there would be no attack: the Siberian divisions appeared on the Western Front lor the successful defense of Moscow. In that advice to Moscow. Sorge can be said to have changed the course of history. Sorge laid down four conditions for this assignment which were accepted by his superiors: ( 1 ) He was to have no relations of any kind with the Japanese Communist party or its known members. (2) He must be supplied with a Caucasian assistant neither Russian nor German. (3) He must be supplied with a high-level Japanese assistant. (4) He must have as little contact with the Soviet Embassv as was conceivabl) possible. Sorge left Moscow for Berlin in May, 1933, to establish his "cover" —a prerequisite for the professional spy! In Germany he secured assignments as special correspondent in fapan for the Frankfurter ZeUung, the Bergen Kurier, the Techniselie Rundschau, and the Amsterdam llantlelshlatl. He applied for membership in the Nazi Page 25 /
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