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(a>los, in charge of underground activities, in an interview
with Louis F. Budenz in his biographical work Men Without Faces; "An American might be a Comintern man in
such countries as China and the Philippines," declared
Golos. "He will never yield to any homesickness for those
lands, nor will he think of his family there in a moment
of weakness." He added, however, that "for this country
the C.I. (Comintern) man and the CI. agents under him
will always be non-Americans — and noncitizens if at all
possible."
Moscow, the Seat of Power
In describing the Communist hierarchy from the lowest
club to the very pinnacle of power, we have endeavored
to deal with the realities of this farthing conspiracy as
disclosed by individuals formerly enmeshed therein, rather
than to take seriously the current official version of Communist organization which is foisted upon those gullible
and ignorant enough to give it credence.
Illuminating detail is found in the testimony of Joseph
Zack Kornfeder, former member of the central executive
committee of the Communist Party, USA, a former member
of the Anglo-American secretariat of the Communist International, later its representative in Colombia and Venezuela.
He testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on August 9, 1949, in regard to a dispute in
the American party between the pro-Stalinist faction headed by William Z. Foster and the anti-Stalinist faction
headed by Jay Lovestone. This dispute occurred long ago,
in 1928. Nevertheless, the pattern of behavior which it
reveals is important in helping us understand a structure
which has not changed fundamentally since then. We
quote from Mr. Kornfeder's testimony:
The reason why Stalin, as well as Molotov and other
leaders of the Russian Communist Party, spent that much
time on this faction fight in the United States, was because
Stalin, considering this country of utmost importance in the
total scheme of strategy, wanted to retain a reliable base by
Securing control, absolute control, for his faction of the Communist Party of the United States ° ° °. Stalin personally
directed all the major phases of the fight against the then
majority of the American Communist Party, ted by fay Love-
stone * ° ".In the windup of that fight, he and Molotov even
participated as members of the commission that tried Love-
stone and other members of the central committee of the
American C nninist Party siding with Lovestone * * *.
The speech was made at the Presidium on May 14, 1929.
In volume XI of the hearings of the Committee on Un-
American Activities (pp. 7112 to 7124) are printed two
speeches made by Stalin on May 6 and 14, 1929, and in
which he actively intervened in the affairs of the American
Communist Party to the point of presenting an ultimatum
to the American delegation. He declared that —
If the comrades of the American delegation accept our terms
— good and well; if they don't, so much the worse for them.
Then Stalin recommended that Comrades Lovestone and
Bittelman, leaders of the American party, "must be recalled
and placed at the disposal of the Comintern." Subsequent
to this meeting. Lovestone was summarily expelled from
his post as executive secretary of the Communist Party,
USA, and the rival faction was installed in the leadership,
despite the f.iet that his voting strength had represented
over 90 per cent of the party membership in a previous
convention. Bittelman was shifted out of the United States
to duties abroad:
Those who seek open statutory justification for Stalin's
relationship toward the Communist Party, USA, are chas-
Page 14
ing a will-o'-the-wisp. In any conspiracy, the real source
of power is not inherent in any statutes. Since the elimination of the recalcitrant faction in 1929, Stalin's power over
the Communist Party in America was sufficiently secure
and unchallenged as to make it unnecessary for him to
intervene openly. From that time on his intervention has
been more covert, operating behind a screen of agents
completely submissive to his bidding.
It may well be asked how Joseph Stalin was in a position to keep track of the activities of his Communist satellites in the United States. According to Mr. Kornfeder,
Stalin maintained a personal secretariat, each member of
which was assigned to a specific area. At the time Mr.
Kornfeder was in Moscow, affairs in America were under
the supervision of one R. Mikhailov, the secretary on American affairs, who visited the United States in 1930 under
the name of George Williams, to take charge of the purge
of Lovestoneites. In 193.3 Helena Stasova was Stalin's secretary for German questions.
According to Mr. Kornfeder, this streamlined body "'
secretaries outmoded the cumbersome machinery of the
Communist International ami thus enabled Stalin to exercise more complete and direct control over his international
Red network.
The details of this mechanism will not be found in any
public Communist pronouncement either here or abroad
The subordination of the CPUSA to Stalin personally is-
however, implicit in the telegram signed in behalf of '**
national committee by William Z. Foster as chairman, an'1
Eugene Dennis as general secretary of the Communis'
Party, USA, on the occasion of the 70th birthday of Joseph
Stalin and published in the Daily Worker as recently aS
December 21, 1949, from which we quote in part:
Dear Comrade Stalin: On your 70th birthday the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA " ° ° sends
you heartiest congratulations and wannest greetings ° ° °-
Like the Communists ' ° ' in all lands, we hail your more
than 50 years of sterling leadership ° ° °.
According to this telegram, victory in World War II **
ascribable not to the joint efforts of the Allies and partic"
larly the United States, but rather to the guidance ol ll"
"Great Bolshevik Party, built by you and Comrade I .eO'J*
and, since Lenin's death, continuing under your leaders'"'
to guide itself by the principles of Marxism-Lenin's'
which you have safeguarded and enriched." The teleti1'"
closes with the wish, "Long life to you, Comrade Sta» J
and to your great and enduring contributions to Wr
peace, democracy, and socialism."
Communist Pahiv Membership
Accustomed as we are to the method:
a K
;thods employed v\
ipenlv acknowledg j
ci>'
our traditional political parties with ope
membership, membership records and books, we Ain'
cans might expect to find documentary proof of such vne (
bership in the case of Communists. Naively unaware <>' ,|t
conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party, we "1'^"l(
demand the production of a party membership card ,
other documentary evidence before we will believe I
an individual is a Communist. Thus we might contribu* .J
our own confusion, accentuated by the consistent a®
of party membership on the part of those charged.
The Communist Party, USA, has progressively str*1
lined its membership records to the point where no A1 tj
bership cards are issued at the present time. Dues rec"
are maintained in code, with each member assigned a "
her, in accordance with the following form:
, i$
Facts Fohum News, March, l
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