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\1\0*
TRADE COOPERATION
at
can the S»
ake an 1
binds 0>
I its tee*-,
precisely '
Gener;
Trade'
tld i
'■nrnent to place another coordinate
iianeh in such an untenable position?
. . the Secretary of Stale, Mr. Dulles,
'""self enunciated the doctrine that
'as guided State Department action
nee 1945. Responding to questions
"on. Senator Byrd, Chairman of the
Senate
he
Fin
ince Committee, during
: would & "earings on the Trade Agreements
,1 \orceins11', pension bill of 1955, on March 23,
epartment ' 1J», Mr. Dulles declared:
iff rates *'«'
ation, a"'1
rt quotas ^
ds of regulj
lower 1"S
Depan
tries'
d Congre^J
■r cottnii"
and th
in of acting !
dishonoring |
means tn*X
put a toA
path of
he honor °l
j
meuvering .
inch of thej
n Tope
I would go on the tlicory that when
you g|Vx. t])(. l)rosU|t.nt iliserction t,l
negotiate tariff reductions you impliedly
'"«> due htm discretion to negotiate the
conditions and terms under which those
■"luctmns arc made, and tlie terms and
IMlditloiis under which we will get
"'cipioia! advantages.
There you have it in a nutshell! Mr
Dulles evidently did not stop to think
of the implication of this doctrine.
Its fallacy is more readily appreciated if its perils are brought home to
us in other fields. When a sheriff deputizes a citizen, for example, to help
arrest a citizen suspected of crime,
certainly there is no implied discretion vested in the deputy to do as he
likes. He is not at liberty to arrest
without a warrant, to wield a club or
brandish a gun to subdue the suspected person in the absence of strong
resistance.
The Secretary is thus obviously on
false ground in suggesting that the
President can in Itis discretion negotiate the conditions and terms under
which the tariff reductions are made.
lie should rather have said:
The President, subject to constitu
tional or other legal limitations, can in
his discretion negotiate. . . .
Certainly if the condition to be
agreed to internationally is that Congress will not legislate, will maintain
a standstill in legislative action in a
particular field, the agreement would
be a gross violation of good faith in
the international field and an abominable grasp for unjustified power, in
the domestic.
U. S. membership in the OTC
should therefore be defeated. Then
Congress should call the General
Agreement before it for a thorough
review. Alter all, that is what Congress is asked to approve, lock, stock
and barrel, without looking at it, in
approving the OTC.
END
"'"J other subsidiary body of the
yrganfzation shall have the effect of
ll'l'oiing on a member ami new obli-
^<i ion which the member lias not spe-
'I'caiiy agreed to undertake."
THE NECESSITY FOR GATT
AND THE OTC
wl IS' of course, difficult to estimate
Yjat part the General Agreement has
I u 'Vi '" tne tremendous expansion in
since I9fy ofw^ f "'"'nt years The value
rt of the 1 of W trade as a whole during each
,qei .1 e last three vears has been more
^ \SA Z double that of the best prewar
0|«","'/' aid :,','ilr aml 'ts volume has been roughly
" ''■ i,er1r£,Per Cent '"'id'cr during each of
with oth^, these years than a„v time in history.
' V-"'' /riie,re can be no question that
N ' n0* fori ,,', I, s eontribution to this develop-
"ization t< ( <'nt has been as much in what it has
'""ister \$ 'Rented as in what it has positively
., to pert" ''el'ieved. During the life of GATT
functions' ^rorn 1947 on, nothing has happened
govemmen
,s relating
ntal
,d.'
ol intern"''",
„.,l,ev .""':
\N\ ,asl occurred following the first
oiiu War when the practice of in-
tradS.lng tUri!Fs and other forms of
tn e restrictions was so universal as
create virtually a chronic state of
tion %X-l,rfare between nearly all na-
i.,',| ,rhe restrictions which have
1VVV 11 , from the dislocations of
of e '•" have been the subject
"i'1 <<"'"'"'.«jun(l,?J1Staint international consultation
g paid ! , " r"les laid down bv the General
,,f other '"• ^'eement and are now on the de-
,, l/n .''a' If GATT should be termi-
' neni' evo" "mv- a"<l "» arrange-
itnaU(n;<','l'rma<1!:t"take_its Place, the
ke rccoin"'6
,1 data re ',.
mil con,n"r,
ion s'"1" XUted' even
l""'/''",1",;;;,,f.we:
'»" "I: »" I, w 1 ,'°n after World War' I
A.s.sf" V- be repeated
th
sists of 11
onnnue
F.'/i."1
ngressional fail
ure to approve
the proposed OTC would greatly
weaken the position of the United
States in its trade relationships with
the other countries of the free world.
It would make unworkable the most
effective system ever devised by governments for cooperative reduction of
the barriers to world trade.
There can be no doubt that such a
development would be disastrous for
the free world system of alliances, for
GATT is the counterpart, in the field
of commercial relations, of the free
world's military and political alliances, formal and informal. If the tree
world should not maintain unity and
strength in the economic field there
can be little hope that our common
front in defense against the Communist bloc could endure for long. The
GATT system is an essential part of
that strength and unity.
CONTENTIONS AND ANSWERS
TO THE OPPOSERS
Opposition to the GATT is based
on protectionist and alleged legal
grounds. The protectionist contentions are similar to those that have
been put forward in opposition to the
Trade Agreements Program from the
beginning and that are advanced today in opposition to HR I. These need
not be enumerated here. The alleged
legal arguments rest on the following
contentions:
(1) That the Trade Agreements Act is
an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power;
(2) That the Trade Agn tents Act contemplated only the negotiation of bilateral agreements, not a multilateral
agreement such as GATT;
(3) That some of the authority granted
</<>«
u"'s Forum News, February. 1956
by Congress to the President has been
unconstitutionally "rcdelegated" by
him to the GATT organization.
Constitutionality of the
Trade Agreements Act
Under the separation of powers
principle of our Constitution the Congress cannot delegate any of its lawmaking powers to the President. The
Supreme Court has held, however,
that by legislating an "intelligible
principle" or standard in connection
with a grant of discretion to the President in administering an act, the
Congress has fulfilled its law-making
function. In the Trade Agreements
Act the main standard laid down to
govern the exercise by the President
of his discretion is that reductions in
the U. S. tariff shall be for the purpose
of expanding foreign markets for the
products of the U. S., and in order to
secure such benefits such reductions
shall correspond to action taken by
other countries to reduce their barriers against U. S. exports. Congress
has renewed this Act nine times since
1934 and thus has repeatedly confirmed its view that this delegation is
constitutional.
Validity of o Multilateral
Agreement
The Trade Agreements Act does not
limit the President to the negotiation
of bilateral agreements nor is there
anything in the legislative history of
the Act to indicate that Congress intended to confine the authority to the
negotiation of bilateral agreements.
The purpose of the Act was to expand
(Continued on Page 53)
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