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Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 1956
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Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 1956 - File 043. 1956-02. University of Houston Libraries. University of Houston Digital Library. Web. December 3, 2020. https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/909/show/882.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum. (1956-02). Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 1956 - File 043. Facts Forum News, 1955-1956. University of Houston Libraries. Retrieved from https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/909/show/882

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum, Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 1956 - File 043, 1956-02, Facts Forum News, 1955-1956, University of Houston Libraries, accessed December 3, 2020, https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/909/show/882.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

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Title Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 1956
Alternate Title Facts Forum News, Vol. V, No. 2, February 1956
Series Title Facts Forum News
Creator
  • Facts Forum
Publisher Facts Forum
Date February 1956
Language eng
Subject
  • Anti-communist movements
  • Conservatism
  • Politics and government
  • Hunt, H. L.
Place
  • Dallas, Texas
Genre
  • journals (periodicals)
Type
  • Text
Identifier AP2.F146 v. 5 1956; OCLC: 1352973
Collection
  • University of Houston Libraries
  • Facts Forum News
Rights No Copyright - United States
Item Description
Title File 043
Transcript ATlOtTRADE COOPERATION jnt. This « what is toi n for 'I e new orga* cyofth be dedicate! e purposes icral Agreel (GATT),*" It would a^ n Assembly; and a Seer* i State- xV J been introO* rove U. S.4 It is II. I". iring this ^ •ks a radiO1 by Congres] It rep..*1" ,f authority^ ; President iraetiee cii' stitutional f*j and thus °^ ectorate to I public A the pr"P"y'.. is in derKl VVhat is at stake here goes far be- ond the mere question of whether >e tariff on books, for example, may °f reduced; or whether what remains the manufacturing clause" of our •copyright Law maj he set aside by «ri international agreement. It involves the question ot who determines now the flow of our commerce is to be regulated: we, the American citi- ul?r>i' or an international bodv in Men there is no direct representa- ")ii of the electorate - only represen- •'t'on through a State Department "e.e'^ate and his secretariat. t lie proponents of the OTC vigorously deny that the OTC would have r."p,e_rnationa' power. This denial is a "" case of using a strong offense as clear |a means of making"the"best"drfense! by- They deny that Congress would be ^Passed. The contention is that CATTW0,lld "u''el\ call the various *U members together for consul- ration on how to adjust differences, •'nu to see that the General Agreement is carried out. say this explanation is not open "na aboveboard. The State Depart- ent has been trying for ten years to ,ln control over the tariff to use it as ' n instrument of diplomacy. The State- Department is very restive under constitutional arrangement that places the tariff and trade under the direction of Congress. The reason for this restiveness is that under congressional control the State Department cannot properly commit this country to any particular line ol future action, as the department would like to do. Any new Congress or even the same Congress can amend or repeal any law previously enacted. A new election often brings about a change in legislative sentiment, as a reflection of changed sentiment in the country. Under the Constitution such changed sentiment has the right to express itself in new laws, changes in old laws or complete repeal of existing legislation. The State Department finds that this freedom to legislate makes it very difficult to introduce stability and continuity into oui tariff and trade policies. This fact in turn makes it difficult to bargain with other countries. Therefore the State Department would like to get rid of congressional authority in this field. Also, the idea of international control of trade, such as is proposed in the OTC, would facilitate world-wide economic planning and this is one of the objectives that is deeply imbedded in the economic philosophy of the State Department. Again, congressional control of the tariff would interfere with the manageability and the ease of manipulation necessary to planning of international trade by a world body. Such planning can be successful only if the subordinate units, in this case nations, behave according to plan. It is just such manageability and subordination that the State Department wants to establish. In order to do so the American electorate must be deprived of the means of carrying out any changes it might from time to time seek in the field of tariffs and trade. The way to do this would be to put Congress into a position of helplessness — to draw its legislative teeth and thus to reduce it to the level of a debating society. How can this be done? Only by doing it without seeming to do it! Otherwise the people will not stand for it. This is exactly what the State Department is up to! How does it seek to accomplish this difficult maneuver? Let us recall that the State Depart- rieht 6aCn co,lntr>' receives as a direct is betw'eej..=' ajl concessions negotiated be- •••'•fl veen the other parties, in addition to " ■* "las itself directly neg n be no withdrawal i,„kO'1oM without the concurrence of P'T ,ir>*V Parties> excePt in exceptional cir- rCatCC ■ S ""stances (for example, the escape negotato^ause)j ^ fa ^1 ^J^ would "' n~ - Tlw iimlti1" tl, "ie other p htoi»fr * haS Uself direttlv negotiated " insure There can be no withdrawal of tar to '. „fP?.ss'ons without the ,,„„ „ the ncessions i U. S. has the Genera" with each firing so'"'' "A oris, ain"l"\j dollars. Ullage of <<»; gotiations citing 8." 1.3 bill'1"1 'Procedure is carefully laid down trie Agreement. mally, an important disadvantage 'the bilateral method lay in the cmiT^V '"' Nvritil"- '"to each agree- 1 . , the trade rules or principles '"'' Would apply and the sale- jO'ls against nullification or impair- il ''M' concessions mutually <nted by the two countries cont'd. Obviously, th: liat Ins could mean lny particular country itself .-as little st.' ,ed under "j Countries •it','.'''1 llavi' a s«>re or more of sepa- . i sets °f trading rules, varying "en or h'ttle with the trading part- s ',1 '' "'"eeined, and vet have to take iC'.o.in/a,,,,. ()f SC()r(,s ()f ^^ n||(,s cell bey rece jlm. . — ~«.« iab()np''"lC'%],<rn,n« trading relations betw_„ negotiating JjK Pairs of countries which might o their af-/"if certain commodities important iovmen. <>' ^ '"*'■ , H'iided i"1 Jh,„], General Agreement provides a two cot"l0«ye set °f rules adhered to bv all two r count'"11'' theC0Geiiera1 l1^ Forum News, February, 1956 Feb members and maintained by the combined moral suasion of thirty-four countries, each of which has formally undertaken to observe these rules in all trading relations with each other. Clearly, tin's system has an enormous advantage in stability and simplicity over the old method, especially to the United States. PROVISIONS AND FUNCTIONS The general provisions of the Agreement are divided into three parts: Part I — Tariffs and Preferences — gives legal effect to the tariff concessions set out in the Schedules of the Agreement and. in addition, lays down the basic rule of non-discrimination in tariff and custom matters generally. The schedules, one for each member country, contain over 50,000 "bound" or guaranteed tariff rates which are the result of the three major negotiations at Geneva, Annecy and Torquay, from 1947 to 1951. No product will be subject to a duty higher than this listed rate in the country to which it applies. The total in products covered by these rates amounted to 40 billion dollars in 1953 or more than half of the world's total trade. Part I also safeguards these tariff concessions against adverse changes in methods of tarill valuation or currency conversion; against changes in tariff classifications; and against unwarranted increases in rates of specific duties in event of currency depreciation. Part II — Non-tariff Trade Barriers — deals with barriers to trade other than tariffs, such as quotas, protective excise taxes, restrictive customs formalities and the like. The main purposes of the provisions of this part of the Agreement are to protect the value of the tariff concessions, to accomplish a gradual relaxation of these non-tariff trade restrictions and controls, and to assure the greatest possible observance of the principle of non-discrimination whenever these restrictions are used. In this connection probably one of the most important provisions of the General Agreement is the general prohibition against the use of quantitative restrictions or quotas. Quotas have a far more drastic effect on trade than tariffs because they set final and definite limits on imports. With tar- ills, even high tariffs, the element of competition always exists and they Page 41
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