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Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1955
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Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1955 - File 055. 1955-01. University of Houston Libraries. University of Houston Digital Library. Web. October 24, 2020. https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/839/show/824.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum. (1955-01). Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1955 - File 055. Facts Forum News, 1955-1956. University of Houston Libraries. Retrieved from https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/839/show/824

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum, Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1955 - File 055, 1955-01, Facts Forum News, 1955-1956, University of Houston Libraries, accessed October 24, 2020, https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/839/show/824.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

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Title Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1955
Series Title Facts Forum News
Creator
  • Facts Forum
Contributor
  • Evans, Medford
Publisher Facts Forum
Date January 1955
Language eng
Subject
  • Anti-communist movements
  • Conservatism
  • Politics and government
  • Hunt, H. L.
Place
  • Dallas, Texas
Genre
  • journals (periodicals)
Type
  • Text
Identifier AP2.F146 v. 4 1955; OCLC: 1352973
Collection
  • University of Houston Libraries
  • Facts Forum News
Rights No Copyright - United States
Item Description
Title File 055
Transcript pie would go and then, at the last minute, when the plane was about to leave, we suddenly discovered that some industrial scientists, namely Condon and Langmuir of General Electric, were going; and I then raised the question as ,., J) to whether they should go with iheir or maybe my =» ;. . e that . . . becausf °P'company officials. .u ,„ ;f I I Alter discussion with Oh. 1 withdrew I'cii there il » ' , . r what kind ol nn) objection to Dr. Langmuir going. ... I did not withdraw the objection to '#' ' \ I Condon going. I had the fullest support „ I from the corporations concerned. Con- rman y jdon's passport was withdrawn, and he ir?rever°yn resP"11"'1'" a terrific battle to go. That battle urity? Did you'jjwas so unrealistic and so completely n security in "lacking in appreciation of what was the 'best interest of the U.S. that you 3l in giving ariyjcouldn't help but feel that either he was ting up. He se|Slleh an utter fool that he could not be imos—at least jtrusted or else that he put his own per- re man respon-Jsonal desires above... the welfare of ided to break » the country and therefore he was in i. He was the effect disloyal, even if it was not a case responsible '°jof deliberately going out to aid the xisted. There Wenemy. my way; but th*, Q. One other question about Dr. Con- nee thai existed'don. When he left Los Alamos and tr l,n .'assumed this other relationship at Ber- ollicers wll" kelcy, did he have anv responsibility for lministrativc 0r personnel at either place? to enable the s" A. He didn't leave directly for Berke- ience—Condon jley. He was relieved from the project ill eel thai up- 'and went back to the Westinghouse Co. rr when he «""'' was 'aU'r that he was picked up to go In't do what 1 *to Berkeley because we wanted to take rk 1 nii"ht add'f man that would not hurt the project lat the work he'"1 any way. As to his responsibilities celcv was se!nle'', or personnel at Los Alamos, that was a of his capabil''?ne of his big responsibilities, to assist rst-rate physicist''" recruiting personnel. The idea was ■If ,. , n0t I'hat Dr. Condon, in my concept—and I h ■ of the ' Ve ^r' ^PPenheimer carried out <r''l lS1 We tho'Vat roncePt completely insofar as he '" i° "n IS it m1'''1 tnal il was possible to carry it out, ' t 'allow this Sb(>cause we both found out pretty soon j a (;that Condon was not competent—Oppen- Jheimer was to think the scientific prob- isl because "yiSjlems and to establish the schedule of and technical work. Condon ^j|was to run everything connected with procurement of personnel, the oper- "" were, I";1''1""'scientific ing about it. ing on lhat ""(the mors. By doin8^lion of ^ onne, ^ relatio„s ' lha »'«■ "' 'it.with the military, and all lhat. The mili- should neglect ^ty ^ ^ ^ ^ houspk ; s> , at Berkeley on i^ Condon fai|e(, in tha( 0ppenheimer raveling ha"- ajstarted to move into the personnel thing. ' l"l V K -'°UrSe' 0l'Penheimer still had at the "oil b('K'nning to get the senior personnel, ""'. l,i ''"'Wing up and getting all the ar- ■e going to I itt» rangoments was supposed to be Con- lily convenieiic vdon's responsibility Pittsburgh beca" Q. When he left,'he had no responsibil- to Berkeley o^y? n of course U" bis attempts unsat e jusl in our op That is right . . . both Dr. Oppen- 10 Aeimer and myself . . . had the utmost mil exp"f|^aste ,or °r. Condon. There was the conference i""'l late Dc-parline"1 w.|lfiJuliiiost cooperation in getting this thing (on a plane where you might say we had knowing about Tf-Corictc-n on the record in a way that "'I ""' allout fence ,TTl ti '° hJaVe " d'SC\°*i •ts told me th»l " e,—that "e had not done a good job c eh?*"'' there, ations. So we o>, JFACTS FORUM NEWS, January, 1955 NEWS, Januari' Q. My next question involves a considerable change of pace, General. A. That is all right, sir. Q. Do you think that the Russian effort to develop this kind of weapon has in any way, as you look back on history, been accelerated by any information they may have gotten one way or another from our own people? A. Oh, yes. There is no question. If I can go into that a little bit, first they got information as to our interest essentially through espionage at Berkeley. These are all conclusions. You can't prove them, of course. Q. I understand. A. They got the thought that we were interested there. They certainly had gotten before he ever came to the country — they must have gotten information from Fuchs that Britain was interested in this affair and that we were, too. because up until the time I came into control, there was a complete interchange of scientific information between Britain and America on this. If the British didn't know everything we were doing, it is because they were stupid, and they were not on the job. I don't think they did, but they knew most of it. The next disclosure outside of that particular thing is that whatever Fuchs passed during the war, and I don't think he passed too much until near the end, they undoubtedly knew certain things—they had good espionage—and they knew a lot of things that were going on. There was a great deal of loose talk ... by scientific people, as I say, breaking down my compartmentalization rules. Of course, I always knew that if you have this many people on a project, that somebody is going to be faithless and somebody is going to betray you, and that is why we had compartmentalization. Then after the war when the May case broke in Canada, that of course was pure luck, what May had done. Apparently May gave to the Russians a sample of U-233 and a sample of something else. I think it was plutonium. I don't recall now. But the U-233 was all-important because that indicated to the Russians that we were interested in thorium, which could only be produced lhat way. The result of that was most unfortunate. Then the next thing that happened was—I didn't know this until later apparently there was a diary kept up there with certain names in it. I have never been able to get the trulb of lhat. because people who were involved have clammed up. They were not people who were friendly to me in the main, anyway. They were not people who would disclose matters to me. But I believe there was a diary. I believe Fuchs' name was in that diary, a list of acquaintances or addresses, that was in the hands of somebody in that Canadian ring. I have always thought it was Fuchs. It has been told it was somebody else. Fuchs' name was in that. That list was supposedly disclosed to people in the I nited States, not in the project, but outside of the project, and the list was never shown to me, the one man who should have had it shown to him by all means. There were attempts on the part of our government to keep me from knowing about this Canadian affair. As I say, it was repeated and they knew what the story was. and yet they brought Fuchs over. Unfortunately Fuchs was in the delegation of British who came and discussed with us the gaseous diffusion process which was the one process we had that we really took our hair down and told them all about because the feeling was thai they had initiated that process and they could be helpful. There was also a very strong element, I would say 98 to 99 per cent of the scientific personnel on tin- project, who considered the gas diffusion process a mistake, including the people who were actually responsible for the development. Dr. Urey, who was the head, violently opposed it. He said il couldn't possibly work. So it was not unreasonable to let the British look al it. Of course, as you know and is well known, I was not responsible for our close cooperation with the British. 1 did everything to hold back on it. I would say perfectly frankly I did the things that I have sort of maybe by implication blamed on my scientists for doing. I did not carry out the wishes of our governmcnl with respect to cooperation with the British because I was leaning over backwards. That information that Fuchs gave was all important. The mistake that was made at Los Alamos in breaking down compartmentalization was vital to Fuchs, because Fuchs later went to Los Alamos, it was vital to Fuchs, and the information he passed to the Russians. But in doing that. I think it is important to realize this with respect to Fuchs. If we had limited it to a small group, say just the top people, Fuchs might still have been in that group. Fuchs would also have worked on the hydrogen bomb as one of the subordinates, and would have passed that information. With the British not being completely under my control, I think it would have been passed on by the British group to Fuchs. whether we had the compartmentalization strictly observed there or not. But irrespective of that, I feel that was one of the disadvantages of the breakdown of compartmentalization. Page 53
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