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to Great Britain
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ich one of then1
to identify Ibis as the culprit for failure
of our general propaganda program.
It seems to me that we, as a people,
cannot be expected — functioning democratically — to indulge in the same skillful opportunism which the Russians may
use in the series of contradictions to
which you referred. Instead, I believe
it is necessary for America to develop
a policy: and this must come from the
American people, under proper leadership, rather than in arbitrary edict from
the President of the United States or
\\C don't know what we as a people
want to do and therefore we're voiceless.
Or we speak with incoherence because
there is no actual unity of objective and
plan in the hearts and minds of our people. It seems to me that we have most of
the world still Ice fight for, in Asia and
Prof. Hodges: Don'l forget Latin
Mr. Combs: Certainly I should not
have neglected that. When we talk about
propaganda, we have to decide two or
First, what do we want these people
to do? Secondly, how are we going to
tell them and by what means are we
going to tell them what we want them to
do? And third, what idiom of expression or communication are we going to
use — because the democratic idiom is
something that may be unknown to a
lot of them? So it seems to me that we
have to start with the people and then
translate the national policy into definite terms of what we want the rest of
ihe. world to do, vis-a-vis our own policy.
I don't mean to dictate to them, but
I think we- have to have very clearly
defined ideas of what is best for the
Mr. Ill i m | i : I'll like- lee pick up a
glove that Mr. Combs threw down—
and that is what I think is the totally
gratuitous slur upon congressional investigating committees and their function in supervising the activities of the
I am a little bit weary of the argument, "Just look IniH much more efficient the government could be if it
didn't have somebody looking over its
shoulder to see if it were doing the job
right." "Sow I'm prepared to concede
that it might be; but I'm not prepared
to sacrifice, what is involved and symbolized in the fact that a congressional committee can go over there to France or
even Ice Germany and look over the
shoulders of United States information
Experts. I also think there has been
ever) reason in the world for them to
do so, because there has been scandal
after scandal after scandal emanating
from the- lack of technical competence "I
our representatives in the free world —
to say nothing of the fact that, prag-
FACTS FORUM NEWS, January, 1955
matically, they haven't gotten very far
So I would like to say that I think
Dr. Schwartz put his finger on the
problem more concisely than any of us
has and that what we've got to decide
first of all is just what it is that we
want these people to do; and having
done that, we've got to examine the
premises which would add up to an inherently attractive program.
Prof. Hodges: We've got to pay for
it: we've got to pay for it!
Do the people to whom we aim our
propaganda recognize it as such?
Do they resent it?
\lu. Combs: Well, if they can see
through it. then of course it is not
propaganda in the best or truest sense
of the word. Propaganda has an unpleasant and even sinister connotation.
Il really should mean merely the dissemination of a point of view. And if our
point of view is honest, sound, and is
one which can be accepted and embraced by those to whom it is addressed,
then it will not be seen through because
il will not be transparent. And it seems
to me that if we're going to talk as a
democracy about doing a skillfully artful job of propaganda, then we are
licked before we start, because we
haven't the guile for it.
Prof. Hodges: Well, then, you think
it's got to be the "big truth" instead of
the "big lie," which the Moscow apparatus—
Mr, Combs: Yes. but 1 think it ought
to be a selective "big truth"—
Prof. Hodges: Oh, yes.
Mr. Buckley: Let me make some
concrete proposals. I would back a
movement by the government of the
United States to inform the world at
large that we do not intend to come to
terms with the Soviet Union; that we
regard them as barbarians; that we be-
lieve that there is nothing to negotiate
with them short of their capitulation —
not to us but to their own enslaved
peoples and that we're going to follow
thai line hard; that we guarantee any
insurgence against the Soviet Union all
the support that we can possibly muster;
and lhat we're not going to spend the
interim between then and the successful
revolution in drinking cocktails with
\lololo\ an.I the other bloodletters in
the hall- of the United Nations.
What techniques could be used by
America to best combat communism?
Dr. Schwartz: I'd like to answer
lhat question and then pose one for
Mr. Buckley. I think lhat the basic thing
we've got to do is decide what we want
done — what our policy is — make a
peelicy and then use a propaganda ap
paratus to sustain that policy. Now,
what Mr. Buckley has done is to enunciate one of the possible choices before
us in terms of our policy. I think in
many ways that would be a desirable
alternative as against the present confusion, although perhaps not the most
desirable alternative. That's debatable.
The question I'd really like to pose for
Mr. Buckley is this: Are you prepared,
sir, to draw the logical conclusions from
your position? The logical conclusion,
it would seem to me, is that we must
prepare for war with the Soviet Union,
and we must be willing to spend today
I hi- amounts that will be required to provide the arms for this war to which your
Mr. Buckley: Yes, sir.
Mr. Combs: Are we getting, after
all, into a discussion of the message
which shall be carried rather than the
techniques? The thing that I think we
can do now is to begin an onslaught
on the loyalties of the uncommitted
countries which are leaning towards
communism. And I believe that can be
done by the best form of propaganda —
which is aid.
Mr. Buckley: We've been doing it
Mr. Combs: It should be more intelligently done, and it need not all be done
by the government. We could initiate
in this country of ours an "adoption"
of various communities and villages
throughout Asia and Latin America
which would establish a direct connection between our country and those
abroad. We should also, without any
question whatever, define our national
purpose and adhere to it.
Mr. Buckley: And what shall it be?
Mr. Combs: I think it should be a
stern, unequivocal expression of our unwillingness to live in a world dominated
Prof. Hodges: I guess we are all in
agreement on that one. I think we also
have to come down to the dollars and
cents. And I think it's preposterous
when Edward L. Bemays, eminent public relations man, tells me that he estimates three billion dollars a year being
spent by the Soviets—
Prof. Hodges: Now, what's the U.S.
1952 peak — $153 million, rounded;
1953 cut back to $123 million; 1954 a
oil further back of 37 per cent; and
we're spending for 1955, $89 million.
Now, what are you going to do with
ihe American people on that?
Mr. Buckley: I would also like to
point out that the Soviets won millions
of people when they had nothing to
spend. The whole cost of the Sorge spy
ring for eight years was $28 thousand
—twelve people working for eight years.