(Continued from Page 21)
Prof. Hodges: To me, it's always
easier to see the other fellow's successes than our own; and in part I
would say that we magnify the successes
of the Soviet. I wouldn't follow Buckley's judgment or naivete on the part
of Eden. That's diplomatic technique, a
tactic, and the British are committed to
act as spokesmen. Intermediary is what
they want to be, of course. I wouldn't
regard it as significant in terms of
propaganda. I think that we ought to
emphasize that sometimes Soviet propaganda goes wrong. For instance, I believe in Iran it's gone wrong. Very,
very definitely there was a loss there,
and it was easily traced.
I would say that we all have to form
a balance here; and I would take the
position that we're not doing too badly,
but we can do a great deal better.
Mr. Combs: I don't believe that it is
necessary for me to equivocate the case.
Communism is not only winning the
propaganda battle abroad, communism
is winning the world very rapidly. Unless we do something about it, the world
is going to be lost.
However, with reference to something Mr. Buckley said a moment ago
about the effectiveness of Communist
propaganda in England, I might point
out that one function of Soviet propaganda is to drive a wedge between the
Inited States and Great Britain. And in
the pursuit of that objective, the Kremlin has had some remarkably efficient
support from one or two American politicians — to whom it's not necessary to
make reference now.
1 am inclined to believe, however,
that England is le-- concerned about, let
us say, the subtleties of Kremlin propaganda than she is about the horrid
actuality of the atomic bomb and tin-
proximity of Russian bombers to the
British Isles. That perhaps accounts for
a certain degree of cowardice on the
part of Britain, but it is a cowardice
that might afflict and probably will afflict the Inited States, too, unless we
take long and vigorous measures to
build our military potential to an adequate defensive posture and an aggres-
-i\e- pie-tun- as well.
Are there shortcomings
in the American propaganda
\ln. I'd i kley: There are not only
shortcomings; there are contradictions,
in my opinion. For example, I'm told
that when a number of Frenchmen went
to our information offices in Paris about
a year ago to try to get the real dope on
the Rosenberg case — which the Communist apparatus in France had tried
to make as a case of gross anti-Semitism
here —there wasn't one office in the
United States Information Service in
Paris at that time who was in a position
to answer these questions out of a
first-hand knowledge of the case. An
instance like that, I'm afraid, can be
multiplied almost invariably.
But I think more interesting here are
the basic contradictions in American
propaganda techniques of the sort that
make it almost impossible for us to be
effective. One of these is, of course,
that on the one hand we want to encourage the people behind the Iron
Curtain and yet, on the other band,
we're constantly telling them in effect,
out of the other side of our mouths, that
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we are prepared to have a peaceful
coexistence with the Soviet Union. This
is a contradiction which not even the
most skillful Goebbels could possibly
The second contradiction lies in the
fact that we base our propaganda, as I
understand it, on the premise thai truth
will triumph. Unfortunately, I believe
that experience proves that this is a very
unsafe- premise as witness the fact that
truth did not triumph in Weimar.
Germany, nor is truth triumphing in
France itself primarily because you
cannot bank your propaganda system
on a presupposed preference by human
beings for freedom as against tyranny,
even if it's an idealized tyranny.
Dr. Schwartz: I think there are a
great many shortcomings in the American propaganda system, and I would
agree in large part with Mr. Buckley
that there is a fair amount of technical
incompetence among our propaganda
personnel, although on the other hand
there are very excellent people there,
too. But 1 think the problem goes a little
deeper than mere' technical competence
ileal there are at least two considerations that seem to me to be central.
One is that our propaganda people
have gotten in the position today where
they are not primarily writing or issuing propaganda for their target audience-. They are writing or issuing propaganda with the thought in the back
of their mind: How will this look if
somebody reads this over TV and I'm
Bitting there in the witness chair? I
don't care what one thinks about VI
ous controversial domestic figures,
we ought to realize that if we're f
to give every congressman or e'
senator a blank check to pillory
propaganda people, we're going to
a price. And that price is a Ice-- of
ibility and Ihe loss of centering o>
efforts on the aspirations of the tai
audience. Our propagandists are '
ing into account the values of our 0
gress — not the values of our taf|
And a second point of course is
one which Mr. Buckley was gettinl
and that is the contradiction bet*!
our protestations and our actions,
have let tile Communists monop"'
certain very key words — words >
peace and coexistence — things » hi'''1
the average human being sound "
good. We talk at one moment aM
peace, and the next moment we jj
about massive retaliation. Our p0''
must seem to many foreigners to be t
ing all directions simultaneously. I *1
see how we can expect a foreigner]
believe what we say, because he b*
choice of about a dozen different tl"'
we're saying at a given time on a g'1
Prof. Hodges: I think it's very
portant to pick up Dr. Schwartz's *i
there because this is one of the reaW
why it is wrong to attack the infofj
tion services and the propaganda ac*
ity of the State Department. Higb-1
policy at the very top is confusing, '
these people in the field do not j
proper direction. I think it's very I
portant, therefore, that we learn >'
the Soviets. Now they have a trctf1
dous advantage, because they op<F
on what I'd call a "monolithic l'r°'
ganda basis." And not only thai I
have local and national front orgs"*
tions in the various national Coi
Mr. Burt: What is a "monoli
Prof. Hodges: One- whole
without a break in it.
Dr. Schwartz: 1 think I'd .
with Professor Hodges that Soviet I
paganda is monolithic insofa
directed to a particular audieni
you look at the entire spectrum
Prof. Hodces: Oh, it's flexible.
Dr. Schwartz: Extreme!) (W
They say one thing to Great Britain
quite another thing to Japan and a'
thing to the United States, a fourth
to India. In other words, they h*'
series of planned contradictions bi>'
contradictions to a given audience. J
Mil. Comics: Back to the questij
shortcomings, I haven't the slifl
clciulct thai there are many technical
ferences. I don't believe that it's p"r"
for ii- to isolate each one of tint11
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