The settlement of th, Indochina war
was the next logical step in disengagement.10
When the Eisenhower administration
took office, the I nihil States was. in a
sense, at war vvilh Communist China on
three fronts. With disengagement accomplished in Korea and in Indochina, the
Formosa Strait remains the- only active
war Front with Communist China. The
administration now desires to eliminate
ihis lasl active war front wilh the Reds.
Only if llii- i- done will our disengagement I"- complete and lasling.1'
The President's special message on
Formosa represents an attempt to
achieve maximum disengagement without abandoning Chiang—ami maximum
support for Chiang without abandoning
lhe disengagement policy. Il will sustain
Chiang "ii Formosa—which was tcrri-
lorv lhe foiled States liberated I nun
Japan. But the United Slates will disengage itself from all territory which is
historically Chinese- -that is. the offshore' islands provided the- Chinese
Communists will agree not ie> attack
Formosa and lie- Pescadores.
There is no longer any doubt lhal the
administration is willing to offer all
the offshore islands to Red China in
return for a cease-fire anel a promise
to abandon ii> military campaign against
Formosa. A cease-fire could he had
tomorrow on those terms as far as the
I nited Slates is concerned.11
The offshore island- have heen Chinese for centuries. Formosa and the
Pescadores were original!}- Chinese, hut
Japan had held them for a half century
before World War If. Under tin- terms
of the Japanese Peace Treaty, rokyo
renounced all claim to Formosa anil tin-
Pescadores hut it did nol reassign
-Wide World Pl»" |
Busy scene at a Taipeh intersection as the bustling activity of the Formosa capital keep*
pace with the increased tempo of the Chinese civil war. Civilian evacuees from the Tache
Islands poured into the island fortress of Chiang Kai-shek.
them l" an) specific power, lev this linn-
Chiang had ahead) fled to Formosa,
The' I nited States has a legal responsibility le. secure Formosa ami the Pescadores until their future cm I"- decided
by international agreement. But the
I nited States has ■esponsibilit) to
keep the- offshore islands out of Communist hands. They are Chinese territor)
jii~t a> the mainland is. 'I he I nited
States was not responsible lee,- keeping
Chiang on the mainland, Neither is it
him on lhe o"'
responsible for k
We have- .1 righl to be present
Formosa and the Pescadores under t'1'
terms of the Japanese surrender. Bul
elo not have this righl in the case ''
lhe- offshore islands. They leave- a]vilf
been Chinese. If we- were In intci-V'1'
in lhe eiffshorc islands, we- would \
ailing on Chinese territory in a 0"
nese eivil war.13
If Communisl China had not 8'
nounced its intention of taking Form"?
when the attacks en, the offshore isle'1"
were started lasl fall. ||„- I nited
we,,,1,1 probably have' looked the. oil1'
way while the Communists look ''''
Chinese junks and small boats crowd the harbor of Tashato,
—Wide World Photo
llage in Upper Tachen
AMERICAN AID FOR CHIANG
The United States will help Chi«J
defend Formosa and lie Pescadore
return, the I nited States «ill esj
Chiang to refrain from any further
links on the iiommunists.
Ml of mis means, of course, th"'
arc officia I) writing off the vain- J
realistic dream lhal Chiang Kaiy1;
mighl -oineil.iv return ee the main''"
and overthrow the Communists. rf.
At last, we are facing up to re"
Oui presenl policy eel defending '\.
mosa but giving up the offshore is'3",
will almost certainly have lhe -"!'!\|.
of our active allies in the Far '•',
Il enables thi powers who reci ■■<"/l'
Communisl governmenl of Chin"
the defense of Fi rmosa **l
It will do m.ii h to win respeel I'" '
Be sure anil
Formosa position among the u"'1
FACTS FORUM NEWS, More*
J! ci'ia| »
N1 n 195J
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