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Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955
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Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955 - File 069. University of Houston Libraries. University of Houston Digital Library. Web. October 29, 2020. https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/69/show/68.

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Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955 - File 069. Facts Forum News, 1955-1956. University of Houston Libraries. Retrieved from https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/69/show/68

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum, Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955 - File 069, Facts Forum News, 1955-1956, University of Houston Libraries, accessed October 29, 2020, https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/69/show/68.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

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Title Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955
Alternate Title Facts Forum News, Vol. IV, No. 9, October 1955
Series Title Facts Forum News
Creator
  • Facts Forum
Publisher Facts Forum
Date unknown
Language eng
Subject
  • Anti-communist movements
  • Conservatism
  • Politics and government
  • Hunt, H. L.
Place
  • Dallas, Texas
Genre
  • journals (periodicals)
Type
  • Text
Identifier AP2.F146 v. 4 1955; OCLC: 1352973
Collection
  • University of Houston Libraries
  • Facts Forum News
Rights No Copyright - United States
Item Description
Title File 069
Transcript "Tr'e hai·e nner conceal<'d !he fact !hat our remlulinn is nnly !he bep:in· ni np:. that ii ,,·ill lead lo a rictorious Pndinp: only u·hen u·e ,/wll hare inflamed lhP u·lwle uorld zl'ith its rerolu!ionary fires." -'\1r01.\1 LE'\I'\ Collected ff'ork<i. \ ol. 1 i. Pap:t•.., 22-2.~ '·The l'nilf•d, /ales cannol be an Atlas. it canrwl b.r it.- financial sacrifices carry all other nalions of !he tl'Orld on its shouldrrs. and ll'e sho11ld slop p:i re-a1mr programs." -PRESIDE'\T D111Gl!T D. E1SF:'\J!(l\\ f.11 June ~.1, 1951 "True liberly is !he child nf kno1d­edge." -HoL \!ES F1FTI! RE \DER (1891) "The lrulh requires ron,lanl repeli· lion. because error is being pr('(zrl1<'d all !he time. all(/ not only l>y isolated indi- 1·id11als, b11t by the masses." -GOETHE Cnnrrrsationi; u'ith f>J.-rrnw11n. lft!8 "lien sho11/d not think ii slll1·err lo li1·e according In the rule of the consti· 1111ion; for ii is their salmlinn." -ARISTOTLE "There is an important sense in nhirh the gol'emmelll is distinct from the ad­ministralinn. Oru' is perp1•/11al. //lf' other temporary alld chall[!J'n/Jle. I man mar he /oval to his gnremment and yet op· pose the pec11liar pri11riplrs and melh· ods of the adminislralion." - ''11rn \ 11 \ \r L1 -.;coLx "Who merchandises u•ith a tyrant, he is straight his slare, how free soe'er he be." -SOPl!Ofl ES (Dudley Fitts' lran,Jation l Pe r~on~ ~ ub mi ll i n ,:: qu o t a li on-. \\hi..11 a re U"t'd in thi "" C"olumn "ill rf"<'C'h(" o ne· yea r '-ub ... t-ript ion "' to Fnru f 'orum l\ P1<',"· H a lread y a "'Uh .. e rih<' r , the t·ontributor m ay d e'iiJ,!'na te a n o ther per ... o n to '' h om the a "' a r d sub .. t.· riptio n "ill be .. e nt ~ or he may wi~h to ext end hi ~ pre~e nt ~ub­.. t· r i J>t ion . Be .. u re to li .. t the a uth o r ... und bou n·c ..... of ull quot a t ion.;. Education or De ge neration? .\Ir.... \nnt• "'mart of I .ark-.pur, ( .alifornia, 1li-.fO\l'rrd that amnnμ; tlw book-; in thr Sir Franct' .. Drak1• lliμ:h Sd1ool librar). San \n­' t'lmo. and tlw Tamalpai-; 1 liμ:h School Lili· rary. \lill \allt•), indud1•1I in li"h of rr1·om­men1lt• d n·adin~ furni-.lwd tlw -.111dt'nh ii) tht'ir lihrarit• ... , '\l'rt' tho .. t• b) 1'H•nty-four auth· or ... '\ho '\i'TI' '\t•ll dn1·unwntt·<I from .. tau· an1! fed1·ral μ;O\Prnnwnt ~OUTf'I'!'. a" tn tlwir ( .omm11· ni .. t and or ( :ommuni-.t·front afliliation ... and that many hook-; contuint'd ~ubH·r .. hf' and ob .. 1·t>rw mat1•ria\. \r1•1l-known col11mni .. t and rommrntator Fulton l,(''\i .... Jr .. ronlirnw1I hn findin~-- anti 1h·clart•cl that ''tlw hook-. that playt>d tlw mo .. t important part in \Jr ... \nnf' Smart\ 1·l1•anup t·fTorh '\l'Tf' d1·prn'l·d litna· turP in tlw \l'r) 1•,tn•m1', .. and that "0111• of them i ... fillt•d with tlw nin .. t n·pul"'h" and nau .. (·atin~ filth that 1 ha"· t'H·r 1·nt·o11ntnrd ... " Edward R. \lurrow dt•\ot1·d tht' major portion of one of hi ..... St•t• It \cm .. pro~ram.., to ri1li1·uli11j.! tlw thinJ!' that \Ir ... "-imart ha ... donP and attl•mptt•d to do. } (pnr~ \, \Joran 0£ \p,, 'I ork '"'it1• .. 11-.. ··Jn .. t1·a1I of prai .. in~ hn for it. E1h,ard H. \lurnrn pil'tt1n·1I lwr a .. a witdt '\ho l111rrwd i:-nod hook ... '"'ittt·n fnr tlw rnlij.!htrnmPnt and rdifiratinn of )Ollth ... E"idt•ntl) l .. inrt• thr \l11min11m <:orporation of \ml'rica tlroppt·d .. pon-.or .. hip of tlw "\,,,,t·t• It ~o,,·· pro~ram ,,ithin a r •. ,, wrd .... fnllcrninJ.!: \lurro'' ·..., trt•atnwnt of \Ir ... Smart I it \\3" \tr. \lurro'' '\ho "a" hurrwd up and not thf' hook" hr clt•f1•ndf'd." \ hill ha" ht·en introthwt•d in tl11• ( _alifornia Stall' St·natt• on th1· ha"'i" of \Jr ... Smart', t•f. fori... ,,hif'h a ... k ... in t·fT1·ct. tlw follo,,inii: that ("ach hook shall rnd1·nH1r to imprt'"'" upon !ht· mind.., of thr pupil .. tlw prirwipl1· ... of moralit~. truth. ju ... tic'f'. and patrioti ... m. to tt•ad1 tlwm to a'oi1I i1ll<'rw-. ... prnfanih. and fal .. 1·hnod. tn in .. trnrt tlwm in thf' prini·iplP .. of a frN· i:-m­nnmi• nt. an1I to train tlwm up to a tnw c·om· prf'lwn .. ion of tht> riJ!hl ... 1l11ti1·" and dij.!nit~ of \mni1·an c·iti1t•n .. hip. Tlw (JO and tlw \nwn· ran Frif'nd .. St•n it·r Cornmiltf•t'. rt·pn· .. rnlf•d hy a \Ir Tn•,·or Thoma ... '\ho .. aid that "pa· trioti .. m i.., dl'hatahlt'." oppo ... t• thi .. hill. '\hilt• thf' \ mPrican I .rj!ion and \ F\V arr on n·rord a..; fa,orinJ? it. On April 27 tlw A ..... ,.mbly Edu­cation fommitlt'f' \'ott•tl R to 7 for thf' ... chool hook hill. i\fo. lfiil. h11t it t:tk<'" f•lt•,f'n w1tf'"' to ra"" a hill out of thii:.; rommillf'f' and on to thf' floor. Second Chorus \!r'. Ever<·tt II. \\ lw1·lt·r of Oreana, lllinoi•. writf•.., that a J!rollp callinJ? tlwm .. 1•1\f' ... "Par· t•nh l nlimitt·d" haH' on!anin·d for tlw pur· po .. f' of f11·t11·r informin!! tlwm-.t·ht•.., and tlwir communitv rt'f!ardinJ? \\hat rhil1lrt·n arf' tauf!lit in tht·ir ...,,:hook \tr ... \\"lwt•ln t•111·lo ... Pd thr 0111 · lint• of a "'<'X f'dtwatinn prniuam '' hi<-h had hrt·n J!iH•n to .. t11d1•nt"' of Crndt• ... 7 throu~h I:! of th<' \rJ!f'nta '-\d1nol .... \q.?;t'nta Communit\ l"nit Oi-.trif"t 'o. 1 \Ir-.. \X'lw1·ll'T ''rit1· ... •·\rf' hinf• a pnmit from '''a .. hinf..!;ton. n.< ... to mail tJij, to adulh fir .. t <'la..-. mail.'' \lthouμ:h thi"' j.., matnial inti·ndt·d for tlw tf'achinμ: of d1il1lrt•n lwt\\f'f'll tlw appr<nima11· a~t· ... of 1::? to 17. tllf' li-.t of quf' .. tion .. a .. kNI tilt' <.;ft1tl1·ni... and tlw nutlirw or matnial tauμ-ht to mi"·d croup .. of .. t111l1·nt .. irwludt• m1H"h '\hid1 f·o11l1I d1·Jia .. 1· and di .. t·a-.P ynunii mind ... Tlw Supnint1·ndt•nt of \r:.!;f'nla Communit) Of, by, and for facts forum News readers l nit f)i-.tril"l \o. I. th1• nur .. r ~upl'n j .. or of tlw \ i .. itin~ \"ur .. f'"' \.., .. of'iation. and th<' Ronni of Ed1wation arprm·rd thi... rro~ram. J\lr..;. \Vht·1·ln. "ho fl'lt c·on .. trairwd to r1·moH' lwr child to a .,.cJ..:ool in n nt•iμ:hhorini:t rommu· nity. 'Hitt•-;: •·J hntl only to rrad thr 'o\l'lll­lwr. 19.11. j .. ..,,w or P.T. \. ma~azinf' to find that tlwy ath1lf'atf• ... ,., f'il11cation. rro~rt• .... h1· 1·1hwation. l \ESCO. f,tudy oil rmotional prohlt·m" and rPadju ... tmrnt of childrcn. an<l onf' wnrld tt•af'hin~"'· puttinμ a ~pt•rial 1·m· pha"i" on l"~. \J.,.o n•ad F1·hruary. 1955. j ..... uf' on Onr \Vorld." Shf' a ... k.., "H you ha'<' an) s11j!~l'"tion-; of '\hat "" I Pun·nt.., l "nlimitl'd I miμ:ht do to ('omhnt thi ... !-.ituation in a ~tronp;rr way. rlt•ac.;r !rt 11" know ahout thrm." Y'all Come! Tlw Fort \X'orth unit 0£ Pro· t\mrric·a ''ill prf'"'l'nt a "C'rit•-; of "ix lc·t·tur<'"' on .\mrriran Affair-; 01·tnht•r 22-2.l Sr1·akt•r.., arHI tlu•ir ... uh· jf'f"t..; '\ill hr: Dun Smoot. '"'Faith of Our Father,": Corinn<' C:riflith. "Thr Hool of \II E' ii": Dt•an ( :lan•n1•t• \Ian ion. "For t\nwri1·a. Sun irnl or S11i1·idt•'!": \.olonrl Hohnt Put· nam. '"fhr \~'u) Out": Captain Ed~nr ( Bunch. "Tlw romm11ni"'t"' \ rr .\ft<'r Your rhur1·hf'~." and \.t•rwrnl \V. II. \\'ilhur. "\mer· i1·a11 Forf'iμ:n Polin." Further information ma\ he nhtaint•d from \ fr ..... ff'wf'I \I. i\n· thony, \.f'rwrnl Chairman. i\mniran i\ffair .. l.1·c·t11rf'"'. Routt• 7. Bo-.; 156. Fort \Vorth, Trxa"'· FAR to Enlighten Tlw Fo11nda1 ion for \ nwriran Rr ... rarch. n pri\alf', non-prnfil in ... titution. ha.., lwf'n or· j!at1i1rd In 1',o n·tin·d hi~h offi"ial"' of tllf' Fnl and l\\O ltl\\\"t'r" "ho an• formt•r Fnl ag•·nt .... i.U'f'Ordinl! tn tht• -..:.rrrurdrr\" En'nirlf! />mt. \11μ:11 ... t 6. 19.J.1. Thi" foundation will i'"tahJi...,h ll largt• fr1·t· lihrnn that '\ill ~n1lw1 lol!t't!H'r undrr orw roof in " 'a .. hinj!ton a ,a .. t amn11nl of data on tntalituriani .. m rm·f'rin~ tht• ..,ubjt'f·t .. of C:ommuni .. m. Fa .. 1·i .. m. and ... ,wh oqwnization.., a-; an' now on thr 1\ttorn<'' r.t·nt·rar ... li .. 1. Tlw PoH 1•ditnrinl '·ommt•nt ... ··or co11r .. <'. tlw Communi .. t part\ and tlw mo ... 1 ,·ocift•rou.., anti· anti-Cnrnmuni"'t" an• d1·no11n('in~ the Fo11ncla· lion for \nwrintn H1· .. f'a11'11. But tlw..,1• at1n1·l-" nrr a "'if.!n that tllf' Fo1111dation\ lihrnn on tntalit.triani .. m \\ill lw a hir.:hly ll"'f•fol nwan" of pn• .. 1•ntinj.! tl1f' truth to till' 1wopl1·.'' Read About the Reds Thoma.., \\ ilC'o' of 71~ \V. Si'cond St., Lo .. \nμ;cl4•.., 12. <:uliforn1a. ha" "'f'nt 11.., a copy nf hi .. f11tiBohh1·1il1 llihlio1:raphY. Ji..,tin~ ,,jth 1·ornm1·11taq mon· than :mo author ... and ;;oo titJ4• .. , irwl111li11J! Fm" Forum \t•in. Thi .. hound H1l1111w i-. in mimt'Of.!raph form and j .. "''ulahl1· from \Ir. \\ il.-o' ~t . 1.00 pn t·op' 1 lw n·..,111t of )l'Ur ... nf ''ork 111 compilation. 11" author hf'lic\f· .. it to !lf' tlw mo .. t 1·ornpl1·1r thing of ih kind in f''i"'tl'nct'. \ Ir. \\'il'"o' '' ritf•-., "B1·1·n11 .. t' tlw g:n·ut pubJi...,Jiinμ; h<HJ"'I' .. turrlf'd 1lii .. hook 110\\11, ...,jμ:ht tlll"'t'f'n. (tht'' 1·011ld not 'i ... 11uli1.c a ..,ufli<'icnt .. a Jr 10 "arrant printinJ.!:) ii lu·1·a111r IH'ct• .. -.nr} for tlw ('Ofll pi Irr lo ~t·t it out liim .. clf 'ia mimt'Of.!raph. It ..,J1011ld lit· of .. f'ni1·1· to librariarh, organiwtion ...,t•1·n·tari1· .... n• .. t·i:11Tl11·r .... 1·1l111·a1or ... and pan•nl" a-. a. ~11id1· tlir~1111.d1 tlw lal" rinth of pro-( ·001· 11111111 .. t. nf'itr·( 11111111uni ... 1 and •·Fabian" titk"• lnf'id1·ntall), it i ... a 11..,1.ful g:ui1lt· for hool­tl1 ·alcr.._'' Yoh orr JaC'kil­in th• othf r. Any 1 m•y privil u.~.fl no Prt-Ait A. G• Mn. n. r.c AD Chall Da nlant s., .• ~ McQu (' w M<"Ni, [ Hoo T11 llno Do \V11 Hl!l C.o Wr POL Poi. 1.0 <: nat Un trs •n j ... or of the Board nm. Mf'. mO\ t' lwr ~ rommu· .. Nmc m­f' to find roj!rt• ...... h r r motio na l ln·n. and Pcia l f'm · 955. j ...... ur haH· an) nlimitrdl ' .. stron p:f'f r rica will i\nwriran thf'ir .. uh· 1 of Our iot of \II \mnica . hrrt Put· F.d ~a r ( "trr Your ir. "\mf'r· form a tion I \l. An· n t\rTair .. th, Tf',n'"· '"'r an-h . a hf'f'n nr· ti ' of th •· rmer FBI f."rrnin.c !I. lion "ill i" ill i:::n th1·1 ton a ,a-.t rm nin ~ , and .. urh Attnrn<'' ·our-.r. 1h1' ' ro11 .., nn1i · r FourHln .... ,. altncJ.. .. libran 011 f11J ITI('llll .., 11 St.. Lo­a r op) of .. t inp: \\ i1h , a rul ~O<I r·rn. Thi .. rm and , .. 1w r r op' il a tion . it-l'ompkt1 · r. \\ 'iko' 11 g: hou .. , ... ' t'll, ( thi '\ to \\ arr11nl tlw 1·0111 '0 /.!raph. ii ·J!a ni zation 111 p a n •nl "' pro-( ·orll un" 1itlr for hook FACTS FORUM NEWS Volume IV OCTOBER, 1955 Number 9 Official publication ot Fact~ Forum, Int'., 1710 Jackson Strt•(•l, Dnllns 1, Texas. Publishc>d monthly in th<• intnt·st:• of FnctM Forum rmrtidpnntB nnd othns con<'t'rn<-d with disp('llinf.!' puhlk opnthy. Any artic-IP originnting in FAC'TS FORUM Nlo:WS mAy b(" frN•ly reproduc-('(f. S('<'Ond·clnsll mnilinJ? Jlrivil~('ll authorizt·d at Dalin~. Tt·xn1o1. Printt·d in U.~.A. BOARD OF DIRECTORS: Hobert H . D(·dman, Prt'llidt·nt; John L. Dal<>, ViC'<··Pr<'!lident: Warren A. Gilb•·rt, Jr., S('('rE'tary: JO(> Nuh. Tn·1u1t1rt•r: Mr ~. E. P. Lamberth, Mrs. Sue McCrary, RobC'rt n. r,09,.ett. ADVISORY BOARD: MAfor B. A. H1'lrdey, Chairman Dr. Arthur A. Smith. Lloyd E. ~kinncr, David- P Strickler. Harry E. Rovi1·r. Willi&m N. Blanton, Mn. H. N. Ru&l"f'll. Jr .. MT". WallR<'f' SR\"&JZ(', W. G. Vollm('r, Doak Wnllu·r. E. E. McQuillt·n. Goq•rnor Allc·n Shinrl'I. C.t>nt>rnl Allx·rt C'. Wf'd<'meyt>r, GE'nf:'ral Hob<·rt E. Wood Hanford M't"Nidn. John Waynf:'. ' IN TH I S lloon:n Ens 0l'n Gm'F:R'\\fl''ff. l ntrn·irw of NPil ~facNril FACTS FORUM is a nalion-widt• public <•ducn· tionnl venhlr(' ch-dkntt"<I to nromdng public inten-11t in important curr1·nt t'Vt•nt~ nnd l'timulnting in· dividunl participation in the ahnpinJ,r of public policy. FnC'l8 Forum i!' nonprofit nnd nonpartisan. aup­portinJ? no politic-al cnndidnte or party. Fat"ts Forum·~ adivilies are d<'l'ign<'d to pn·ac·nt not jul't on<' view of a controvc·r!<iRl ia.-ut", but all views. believing that it is thc> right nnd th(' obligation of thf:' AmeriC'an propl<' tht>mf'<'h'<"8 to IC'nrn all the factM and come to thl'ir own conduaions. TO SUBSCRIBE, Se<' Pai;?'('S 41·42. CHANGE OF ADDRESS: Sf:'nd old addrefql (<"xaclly as imprint('(! on mailing IRbt>I or your copy of FACTg FORtfM NEWS\ and n<'w addrc'f;~ to FACTS FORUM NEWR. D1·pnrtmC'nt CA. Dal· Jn~ 1. T(•XR~. Pleft!H' 11.llow thr('(' wC'<'ka (or <'han~e­over. ISSUE Pr'\TIGO'\ \"(O JTooVEn. by llanson Baldwin fire Foi R Co'\FERE'ffE. 2 5 Prrsidrnl Du·i~ht !). Ei.<rnhou·rr Srnator Josrph R. McCarthy Spl'l'chrs of Edl'T1. Fa11rr and B111t!:anin Tntl'fl'iru· of. l'nator Bo11rk1• B. Tfickrn/ooprr on "Accomp/ishmrnts and Failurrs at Crnrm" (\,WE Th: StTRE OF GER\11'\Y? br Fn•da l t/ry P11n \[El'\S OR FOUL. by Srnator John 11arsha// Butler I . S. Fonrcrc" Po1.1rv- Rrc11T on Wno,c? Sl'naror llubrrt fl. ll11mphrey • 1•110tor William E. ]i'nnrr , r1wtor John ]. Sparkman Con~re.<rnwn A/tin E. O'Kon.1ki ro111 Pru. IRS OF FREF.00\1. br Tr'. G. Vollmer I" \VE W" T11rs W"? /11• Dr. Loui.1 II. Emns Tm 11 Of' THE F.tE\T\ C!l\1\1!'\ISTS, by lud~e llarold R. ~frdina ro S1 llSCHlllE hnr TH \TIO'\ OF Gm EH'\\rL"\T. /11 Cm1~rrsrnw11 Francis E. lf'altrr Is Si mERStO'\ STtLJ. /\ T11nE1T '? , cnators John J . Sparkman and William E. !rnncr 6 7 ] 1 16 18 2:-1 21 30 36 :n :-12 :-17 38 41. 12 43 41 Tm: R1srr L1w OF LnE. by Sl'lwtor H. Carroll Rrrce 46 llonr:: RE•·tE\\S 49 Dnrs 0'\E-Dor t 1n-1 -YE1n 1\11011 T.m 11 n TO Fm\IS 01 I'll Ot n TO Pt1n1.1r:? . 1•n11tor John J .• parkman 1111d Co/011rl l/ri11 1/. Ow.,/ry 5:~ Wu IT OF Orn Crur. DHE'\Si;s? "1t1•nicw of Grflt•ral C. R. Tlu rlmcr 55 Rrnro \"(D TV. c11ED1 u:s 58 Co\n:ST RLr ES 62 \Vl"\\l'\G LETTEllS TO f.DrTORS Poi 1. Qui;sTrO\S A'\O Pou. Qt ESTto-.. \Vl"\'\ER Pen 1. Hr:str.Ts rnn L 1sT \lo\Tll l.OG I 'Ii FOR Tll E J\lO'liTll Photo Crrdits, Con•r and l'a~c 2.'i: Wide World Photos 62 65 65 65 COVER: Pre .. ident I)'" i~ht D. Ei ... enhowrr be t·amf' the int e rnation al a;;; "'ell a ~ the nation al " man·of- tlu.•. month ~' '"h<"n h <' "a" iu·knowledged throu ghout the \\Orld as the F'AC'TS FORUM NEWS, Ortolicr, rn.sf. What they're saying • • • jF:,~~': ~)~~SJ about FACTS FORUM Want you to know that I enjoy readin~ f'H'rl i"'"ll<' I Ftffl.~ Forum \ t•u·.<; l because of the mental stimulation one gels from the in­terf'~ ting artidt>:-.. Roc.rR ~TA'TO'\ 16522 Ohio A'enue Detroit 21. \lfrhi~an ... r Fart."i Forum \"t•u·s] is C'Ontributing to a broader intt>rt>st and undrr:-;tanding on the part of tht• gt•n1•ral citizrnry on national ancl intt•rnational prohlt"ms as affect all humanity. Lo1 is W. DAwso" ·112 ( anal Street ew Orleans 16, Louisiana You are to hf' rommrrHf Pd on your out· ... tandin~ work in krrpinμ: •\rnrrira informe-d on important j..,..,urs and edurational truth ... lt has he-lped me to rralizt• that our liberty is the ... ame librrt) that our forrfathers gaH" their lhrs for. Our frrrclom deprnds on us and our a<'tions. Our adion"' dt>Jlfnd on our knmdedi;?:f', and our kno\df'dj!r is our power. I low powf'rful we arr drprntls on how in· forme-d we are. I lwlirve that )Ollr finf' and patriotic work j ... ht>lpins:t many Americ·ans to alrrt tht"m­"" lni·s. of the j:!;ra' e importanre in keeping \rn rrl<'a 3\\akr to the frrt•dom"' which God ha" :zhf"n ll". .1011' F. llnPKI's U ... Narnl Station, l\li rh,ay J,land< Na') 3080 Box 1, Fleet Po•t Office 'an Franris<·o, California 1 am an old tirnr \ortlwrn Republican and l am ra~n for tilt' truth likr thom•and ... or million" of othn .... I read f"\f'r) word of Farts Forum Yt•u.· .. I Jon• i\mrrica and de­... ire to lraH" to rn)' t'hildrrn and j!rand· c·hiJ,lren a hf'ttf"r hf'rita:;?;f' than Wf' ha'r at the present. T. I.. C."'""' P. 0. Bo, 817 Ale"<andria. \ 'iq!inia Plra"f' arrept my rompl im f'n l~ for puh­Ji ... hin:;?; a ~real •\rn<'r i<'nn rnai?nzinf'. \Jy onl) rf"~rPt is that T did not suhsrrihe to it a Jonμ: time af!;O. Wlwn first tol41 nhout your ma1!,"­nifirrnt puhlication. T dc•cided to subsrrihr to it. I am not clisappoirlt~·d, l a..;sure you . .T <>tr- I. floe•~ 210 We•t Elli• ~treet Ea ... t Syrnr11 ... f', "\'ew York I lwlif'\f' your poll is a fair samplin~ of puhlir opinion on n1rrt>nt f'\f'nt .... Krrp it up. llr'RY I'"' Ro, 16.1 .Tt>na. l .oui ... iana )f anu...,l• ript ~ ~ uhm i tt <' d to F<1 c ts F onun Ne r r.~ i-.hould he uc-­(' Ompaniecl by acl clrc .. i;,ed en,e­lo 1>es and return J>O,.laJ:e. Pub· Ji..,h e r ao: .. umf', no re .. ponsi bility for return of unsoli l·it ed 1nanu­- orript ... Page 1 - Wide World Photo Hoover Eyes Our Government Hoo\-er f.ommi .... ion r("(·om menda tio ns for {'("O ttO mi("'"I in the Ue1>a rlme nt or Defen se a lo ne will .;;a"t" a bo ut fo u r o r f ile billio n d o ll a r ... , C'°itimates Ne il ~1 u(' '\ e il , fo rme rly an e ditor o f the Nerv York T intes tu1d editorial dirCC'lOr o f the Commii;i ... io n , who h e re join "' the FiH'l "t Forum Pa nel in di..,t;u "isi ng the questi o n : "Should the lloo"er f.ommili>'l ion reromme nduti o n oot be a do pte d '!" und Pro f<-c;;..,or Ch a rl e"i Hodges of New York l n her ... ity. Ha rdy Burt i ~ th e ir ~~ra~ I r_ P a n e li '-lts ind ude \\ illi am F. Buckley, J r., e ditor o f the fo rtlu·om ing jour n a l J I o f public o pi nion , Natio unl U.e r,ie 1t•; Commf" nt uto r Geor ,:e llumiho n Co1nhs; -~~~~~ - ::J BURT: Mr. MacNeil, just to give us the background in brief, what are the principal recommenda· tions of the Hoover Com .. mission? /.I H:\E1L : We're going to produre, in all, about th ree million words. We've made ahout thn•e hun· dred n•c·ommPndations. P rohably the most im· portant recommenda­tion we've made was for a S<'nior civil serv· ice. We found that on<' of the great problems in government is the per-onnel (problem), the difficul­ty of getting good men and good \\onwn. too, to come into government, to dnelop comp('tenrP in their work. ancl then to remain in government. The) ·re not paid too highly, at least 11ot comparably to prirnt(' industry, and prirnte industry hire' them away. That applie:; even to generals, admirals and «o on. o we recommend a senior ri' ii srrvice of about three thousand career ci' ii •errnnts who would ha\!' pc•rsonal pn·-tige and he outstanding in the com· munity. would have security in their po-itions. \\'e want them to be on a Ind with a'.'-... j'.'-tant srrretaric in ~O\ t'rnmenl now. That would mean about l\H'nly-five thou-and dollar. a year. \ ow, that 'eem> out of character with the Hoover Commi"ion whic-h was recommending t'<·onomie,.; in goH•rnment. Actually thl're"s a trememlous turnowr in gov­ernment employePs. Th<' gon•rnment has ahout two million thrc·c• hundred thou­sand emplo)e<'s. and it has an annual turno\ er of ahout 25 p<'r cent. At least four hundred fifty thousand Jll'oplP mo,·e out of go,·ernment each year. J\ow. you Pa11:e 2 make gov<'rnmenl sen in· more attrac­tive when you cut that do" n to. say. two hundred thousand a year. and you save re-employing two hundred fiftr thousand a year. It costs about thn·e hundn'd dollars. and sOm<'linws as high as five hundred dolla" apiece to get them into governmrnt. and to break them into thf'ir \\Ork .. o tlwn· would be a very large economy llH'rt'. The second mo't important recom· mendation. in my opinion, "oulcl he the administrative court. Thf' administrative court. al the hrginninf!. was three de­partments: a ta' court. a labor court, and a trad<' court. Variou' independent a~encies in f!OH'rnm<•nt han• taken on judiciary functions: they make rule:; on their own. mah chargl'; again'! indiYid­uak and tlwn bring thP,!' individuals before them and lny fines upon them and other p!'naltiC's, and 'o on. W'e want those judicial functions takPn away from the deparlmf'nls and agc•ncies and given lo the administrative court. BURT: Let's pinpoint this a bit more. In what areas can the federal government best conserve the taxpayers' money, Mr. Buckley? BuCKLLY: Wdl. hy limiting the func­tion of governml'nt. Sur!'lv this is what the Hoowr Commi'- · sion is aftf'r. Richard Re,·ere sums it up in one simple word "Stop." The go\crn­ment ought to stop ex­panding. \h< \ Ell.: I wouldn't agr<'f' with Mr. Re\Cr<' on that. T think our major func­tion is lo get all we're getting for less, get more dTicif'nl gowrnmeni.. Bi C.KJ.EY: You nwan that tlw lloo,·er Commi"ion. for (''amplt>. supports such welfare measun'' as haw a ln'ad1· heen enacted-federal social st'curit)'. a·nd . .. \he \ El L: The !loo\ er Commission has not touched social security at all. It's made no study of it. It has madr no rf'commendation on tlw mallrr. \'Own it c•nclors!'s somNhing, it is very spt'· cific·. hut sorial serurity it has not gone into. Jl o"l'\l'r, to pinpoint this as \1r. Bu rl suggc•sted, I think tlw place to san· money is whC'r<' mo1wy is ]){'ing spen t. l\ow the DC'partmcnt of D£>ff' nse is wlwn• the big hu lk of you r monry is l)(' in μ­sp<' nl, and tha l, naturall y. is tlw an•a "hr re you can save money. We\e mad!' th irt<'<'n reports dra ling with \ari· ous phas!'s of the artivi ties of the De· partm<'nl of Ddc•nse because it is thr big sp<•ndPr. BURT: Well now, Mr. MacNeil, could the Department of Defense carry on all of its activities that it is carrying on at present, do you believe, but more efficiently, so that economies could be made? i\f \('.NE1 L: YC's, in fact, that's thl' rt'l'Ollll11<'1Hlation of the lloo\f'r Commi,­sion. DPspill' rt•marb madr by cC'rtain mi lilary l'Omnwntators. we ha \ e not toud1Ptl thl' combat forces of the l nitccl tal<'s, excrpl to support them. llor>GFS: l'm not happy O\!'r the de" fens<' setup. I rrgard it as the i111· pl<'ml'nting hand of sound fon•ign poliry. Ancl I feel that IH' are not going to gl'l 1diat the lfoo\cr Commi•· sion (''pec·ts, so far a~ I can judge from the defense proposals. I think that they arl' bui lding up an !'xl<•nsion of hurcaucran by th!' necessitv of incr!'asing the ci1 il ­ian stafTing. Basically we want thr Ci\ ilians to control thC' mi litary cstah· lishmpnt. But thl' complica tions of mod­ern war with tlw prohl<'ms of g<'t tinμ­tlw most !'fTt·c-ti\e us!' in mil itary tc·nll' FACTS FOHUM NEWS, October. J.?.i.I has that mt~r eco1 to i basi prc1 rou are ero1 rrit fore ;, ack Ill Hai Pap con l\ gan fecc the to I rep• mo1 fen! ll('l'j pjtrJ dri1 1 the1 the ser\ v Arv no wa Th tori 110~ Cor th('; in 1 of ~ ii or ,",,' al IS; J j tir _ :!j mis~ion · at all. nade no . Wh!'n •ry spc· tot gonr i1r. Burt to san· g sprnt. is wlwrt' s lwini;! lw an·a Wc\r ith yari· thr l)c. t is thr :ould the 111 of its present, r, so t hat at's thl' ... ommi'."'· ct'rtain l\'t' not • Fnitl'd the di·· the im· rnd of poliry. we are '!'l what :om mi~· ) far a• rom thl' hey an· ·au<·ran lw ci,ii· ant the y estah· of mod· getti111! ·y tprm· •('/", Jf}.j!J has to Le considered. J\ow I think that in rrgard lo the Drft•n'c DPpart· mrnt. it has lwen approarlwd on a dollar economy Lm•is. And I think 11P'rr going to gN in rpa) lrouhle on this partirnlar basis. At least, certainly that is the heavy preponderance of military opinion. Of eourse, you ran argue that th1• military are a!Tertrd hy this partil'ular '!'t of rronomies. Frankly. I 11 ould trnsl the rritici'm rather than the parti('ular tm-k force which worked on it. ~hcNEtL: Yes. that argument was adrnnred last wt'ek hy Hanson Baldwin in the Nru• York Timi's. [Reprint of Hanson Baldwin's column appears on Page 5]. IIooGES: Hanson ahrnys <'\presses the consensus of military Yie11s. l\hc ' EJL: Certain military propa· gandists in the Pentagon have heen fe!'ding that line out for quill' a 11hil<'· th!' people who think tlwn•'s no bottom to the barrel. The JlooYer Commi"ion rpporl has dealt largely with the com· mon use items in the DPpartnwnt of De· fens<'. I don't see, for instance, why it's rwrt•"ary for the thn·<' st'n il'es to buy <'i)!hl hundred di!Trrent kinds of ;;rrew dri\ers. The lloowr Commission is for fur· ther 'trengthening of the unification of the Dt•partmenl of Ddense, the three st•n ices within the one. We haYe found, for im•lance. that the Army, the Navy and tht' Air Force hme no prop<'r catalog. although a catalog was ordl'rt'd hy Congress as late as 1919. They still ha,·en't an adequatr imen· tory. They're trying Lo gN one up now in a grpal rush when the lloo\('r Commi,,ion made recommendations and tlwy knew they were going to he e'posecl in that rt"·pert. And it is in the field of common u:;c items alone that we're stressing economy in the Dt•partmenl of Defense. BURT: In you r opinion, how much co uld be saved in the Department of Defense if your recomme ndations went through, Mr. Mac Neil? 1\1 \CNEJL: I couldn't giYe you that ofThand, hut [ 11 c\c saved altogether l about four or fiye billion dollars [that could J halanr<' the budget. lkn .. LE): l\ot enough for our Social­iots, is it? HODGES: The military hudg<'t is run· ning around thirty-six billion, preoently, so that you could cul it do1>n hy a sixth, roughly. B Ch.LEY: I would like Lo ohsene that the Hoo' er Commi.,ion is engaged in dealing with two types of things. For one thing, it is streamlining go,crn­menl. And nobody t'\C't'pl the direct cao;ualties of sueh streamlining is going lo obj<'cl lo that. That is lo oay, we ought to have some considrrable solidarity here on the majority of the rerommen· elations that l\1r. l\larN1•il, n' prt>~enting hif! commission. i=- ur ging;. llowe\Pr. thl're is a 11hole other area 11hirh is highly c·ontro\l'rsiaL to 11hich I'd like Lo refer for on1• moment. That area is typified by l\Ir. lioo,er and his ideas of gon·rnnu•11t. ao disti11guislwd from l\1r. Truman or CH'n tlw incum· henl and his ideas on the roll' of go\· rrnment. 1\Ir. lloowr I look on as the most efTicient enginrer of gowrnnwnt. perhaps, in this rcntury. I helieYe that on top of that he has a highly con,iderl'd and thoughtful \it•w of ho11 this rountr) ran continue to progress, both in terms of freedom and in terms of industr1. ConsequPntly. the real hody of tl;e recommendations that he i, urging is one that would halt thl' \1•" D1•al trend toward natuknt human heings pater-nalized hy our gowrnment. These are preci,ely the recommendations that I would like to urge. BURT: Let 's get d irectly into one of the Hoover report recomme nd ations, and that is to take the government out of a good deal of the public enterprises, a nd revert them lo private enterprises, or to convert t hem into private ente rprises. What about t ha t, Mr. Mac Neil? \hr\'EJJ.: Well, the Hoon·r Commis­sion, which is non-parti,an, was set up by a law in Congress that 11ent through unanimously in both Hou,es. We were charged by that law lo point out the area' in 11 hieh the gowrnment is com· peting with priYate enterprise [which means 1 we would he remiss in our duty if we did not. One of the areas in which that is done wry greatly is in the De· partmenl of Defense. We found that there 11ere O\C'r t11enty-fiw hundred. and that count is not final, di!Tt>renl business enterprises in the Department of De· fense. Some of these are very necessary -we're not disputing that. We figured out that ahoul one thousand could he eliminated. They represent a co t price. incidentally, of owr fifteen billion dol· Jars, and some of them are not Yery economically administered . BURT: What are a few of those? Are military canteens one of them? ~I1cNE1L: Canteens are run like de· parlmenl store in selling laundromats and diamonds. HODGES: Well, we can't touch the PX\_ can we? l\flcNEJL: Oh. we rl'commenclcd t!:iat the law enforce the intent of Congres>­and we'ye bc!'n attacked by th<' military for asking that the intent of the la11 he obserYed ... You can buy Chant>! FiYe for your girl there and a lot of things of that kind. and a lot of people who arc not memhers of the militar) The re is a "va st r ese r voir of public support" f o r the r ecomme nd a ti o n s o f the bipartisan H o o ver Commission as r !'la ted hy Claren ce Fra n c is, Natio n a l Ch a irman o f the Citizens Commit­tee for the Hoover R e p ort. R esult s o f a s ludy by the Ci tizen s Commillee r esearch s ta ff indicates only 16 p e r cent o f the Commissio n's 31 l r ec·omme ndatio ns seem likely to d raw stro ng o ppositio n , and lha t r eaction within the government to this new Commission's r ec·ommenda tio n s is much m o r e• favo ra ble tha n th a t a ro u sed by the firs t lloover Commission in 1919. The study shows tha t 62 p e r rent , or 191 !1 r ecomme nda tio n s, a re m eeting with gen e ral suppo rt . On these recommenda tio n s, 'Ir. Fra n c is s tressed the d esira bility o f con s truc tive aetio n in o rde r tha t a r ecord o f " o rth"hile ac­complishme nts <·an he set up. S u ch a program of a ctio n is b e ing coordina ted h ) Budget Bureau Dir ecto r Ro" land R. Hug h es. The r emaining 22 p e r cent, o r 7 1 ~{? r ecomnwndations, wer e shown b y the Ci tizen s Commit­tee to lw evoking "ge1wra l sup1>o r t, hut s porarli c• o ppositio n," and sh o uld r ecei' e time f o r pub­lic d e b a te folio" ing s uch a record of ac·complishment o n n o n-cont r o ver s ial recommenda t ions . " All citizen s sh o uld he on ~ua rd ," Mr. Franc·is " a rns, "again st a ll empts b y a few g roups to discr edit the whole r e 1lort b ecau se of their 0 1lposition to a few o f its r ecommenda t ions." FACTS FORUM NEWS, October, 1955 P age S are taking achanla"t' of thL·,e situal101". They don "t charμ;e true costs. They don't charge rent. They don't charge taxes. They don't charge for military em­ployee,. They don't charge for insur­ance. They have to show no profit. and they're unfair competition. Don't mis­understand me on this: the Hoover Commission does not want a single sol­dier denied the PX for his use. BURT: Mr. Combs, what do you think of the Hoover Commissfo•'s recommendations? Co,rns: With much of what our gue't has •aicl I am. of course, in acrord. Therr are other areas in whirh. howner. I "ould register most 'iolent dissent. I un­d(' rstand that a task forcr of the Hoo' er Commission recom­nwn< led the sale of TVA to prirntt• utili­tie>, to private public utilities. But that was later modified to sugμ;est a changt• in the accountinμ; methods of TV A to require the government to figure in ta-..t» and other items in TVA costs- items "hi ch. of course. don't appt>ar in actual­itv in the administrative t>xpense of run­n fng TVA. But it is in this area that it seems to me, in all deft>renre to our guest of the e\ening. that tlw IToo_ver Commission has usurped some policy­making functions and is enterinμ; a highly controwrsial field in whir~ !t may Yitiate much of the good that 1t 1s doi~g in thl"'e othn admittedly respon­sihlr areas. :\Tl c'.'\EIL: The Hoover Commission, hv the law that set it up. is chaq?;ed w0ilh the dutv of draling with policy. And. by the' way, it's even got the authority from Congress to recommend constitutional amendments. CO\IBS: I douht that that's ronstitu­tional. \ hr\EIL: Well. any r1tizen can rec­ommend con>titutional amendments. (O\IB. : lloweYer. this is an agcnry of !!O\ ernment. :\l\r'.'IEIL: That's a side issue. If You're a student of pO\lt'r you'll find that the first multiple dam in the l"nited tales was set up in 1928 hy \lr. Hoov­er. I miμ;ht remark that the thing you dealt with-the task fore is an office document. It\ not a report of the Com­mission. It's a task paper. It leaked out. and it leaked out ,·cry inacruratel). and the Commission is not doing what you are saying it's going lo do. BLlCKLEY: Are you saying. \Ir. \Iac-- 1\'eil. that it will not he thr rernmmenda­tion of the Hoowr Commi"ion to st•ll the TVA to private power'? :\l\r\EIL: That's quite riμ;ht. BLCKLEY: I regret that wry much. Howner. I do think that to the extent that they aim in that direction hy ex­ploding such myths as that goYern- Page 4 nwnl po" 1·r is cheaper than pri,·att· power, to that extent- CO\IBS: Oh. w!'ll. goYrrnmcnt power is cheap!'r than pri\ale power. And there's no argument about it- 1\IACNEIL: Power from public power is no cheaper than any other power when all the costs inrnlved are put in. It's cheap<•r het·a use some p<'ople don't pay the true costs. Co\IBS: ~O\\ ll'l m<' tell you som<'­thing, :\Ir . .\Iac'\eil: the reason that you"re wrong is a \t•ry simpl<' ont" ... I also am experirnrrd in this realm of public utilities and powt•r. The reason that goYernment power, e\ en if you in­rlucle certain accounting costs which should not enter into the picture. is cheaper than power manufactured by our private utilities is very simple. The prirnlt> uti litirs always retain in their rate base that is. the nalualion of their propt>rl) for ralt'-making pur­poses - obsoletp equipment. innated t>quipmPnt. and they also operate on something known as reproduction rosts of thosp facilities inslPad of the histori­cal costs to them. and as a result of that. and complacent puhlic srrvice commis· sions in the stales. they manage lo rook the publil' royally and eom•islently all of the time. Bt:rKLEY: Purp demagoguery. In tht> fi rst place. depletion is fixed by law, It's an accounting factor that is not left to the caprice of individual ... CO,IBS: I'm talk inμ; about rate bases. It should h<' an rlPmenl of co•t. Bt:RT: I'm go inμ; to interrupt this h<'­cau e we're getting into an argument about public \S. prirnte power. and it's not what we're talking about. \l\r\Ell : '\fay l say a word ahout the Hoover Commission's report on water resources? ... It's the first time in the history of the United tales that a proper study has been made of all these things. and it's going to he wry illuminating. It's going to give the pub­lic the farts for the first time. BURT: We have a report here which ulti­mately is going to be three million words long. It has a million facts in it. Do you think there will be con9ressional resistance to enactment of these reports? :\llc\EIL: I think some of the r<'ports. some of the recommendations. are hiμ;h­ly controwr,;ial. W'e're not picking our spots for economit's or anything of that kind. We're not tryinμ; to salve up cer­tain people. and we're not trying to 11;et \'Otes, incidrntalh. We're trying to give the facts to thP AmPriran public as they rome. The only instruction that WP haw had from Mr. lToon•r is to gPt lhr farts and !(ive thrrn lo the public. Tn doing so. certain peoplr didn't likr somp of the facts we hrou~ht up. We didn't make the facts. We simplv rrport them. BURT: Mr. MacNeil, how much of the public is going to read three million words? '\!1C\'E11.: \'onr. You don't r!'ad a daily paper through. You read what in­terests you and "hat concerns you. And our report is made to the Congress and this report !(Ot's into the archiws and gors to all thr. libraries and the students will rPad it. Thi• prople dealing with the various functions of govprnment will read it. The rornmitlr<'s of Congress will read it. lh<' 01ws that concern them, and so on. BURT: Won't you have a situation arising, Mr. MacNeil, of special interest groups gath­ering concentrated strength to oppose your recommendations? J\.hcNEIL: Yes. That's happened al­n• adv. It t•wn happt'n!'d hefore th<' re­ports wt're made. and the most Yiolent of all those were in the public powt'r area. Co\m : Wf'll, naturally, that's where the public interest is the most deeply touched. M 1cNE11.: Four national oq~aniza­tions wrre form<•d of propagandists to fight the Hoowr report on power llt'­fore the task fort'e was even formed. BurKLEY: I ran rertainly understand that. for example. th<' rf'sidents of Idaho would he mu<'h more intf'rested in haY­inμ; the citizens of I\ew York pay for their power than paying for it them­sehes. The qut•stion is, who is getting rooked? Co\IBS: That isn't the qu<'slion at all. The entin• mallf'f of power such as is reprrsented by the Tennr'5ee VallPy Au­~ hority is a national rather than a rc•g- 10nal matter. It enrit'hes the econom\ of the whole rounlry. We deal "ith dust bowls rrosion is a national prob­lem. Why not the enrichment of our economy? BURT: Mr. MacNeil, outside of public power where else will you encounter re­sistance- major resistance-to your recom­mendation? ;\,-1 \C: EIL: We havr made an effort to bring out all the hiddt>n suhsidies. I no­tice the REA is crying aloud. I notice the veterans are crying aloud. We ln lo stop a lot of rhisding in government. incidPnlally. CO'\IBS: The veterans are chiseling? MAC EIL: I didn't sny that. But the chisPlers arc yelling. They don't likr it. BURT: Are you goin9 to be very good at stopping what you call chiseling? \flr'\rn.: I\o, hut I think the l\nwri­t'an public will be. We're just gi' in!! tlwm the facts. BURT: The question Is, can the American public be interested enough In the whole to apply enough pressure on their side to counteract the pressure of special Interest groups? M~c EIL: o, I doubt that. The prl'­vious I lOO\W Commission made 27:~ recommendations. They finished up in '19, and so far 196 hm·e been carried into effl'rl. I think it' heller than 72 per rent. FACTS FORUM NEWS, October, 1955 Rcpri. A force 100 en~ arrnr the t Va of th the 1 ment the l vices zatio1 head1 lloov findi1 lure. Ch tant Pent1 the l expe< tion.' ifyin1 is ex the p to th uary. Th impo of th lions S<•rvi mora \ [ n•gul ~ari~ infiu1 poinl rnissi E T~ lo civil' of D au th <·om1 \ 1 \\av. atl\-3 lian lion.._ fi,c·a mil it t»lal agt·~ supp Tl ]JlO' an~) the n~rr~s them, arising, s gath­se your ied al­the re­Yiolenl pow!'f where deeply aniza­ists to rr lw-rd. rstand Idaho n haY­ay for thrm­getting at all. as is ey Au­a n·~­onom\ 1 "it ii I proh­of our public ter re· recom· fort to . I no­notice e lr) rnment. rling? But the likP it good al Anwn· gi,·in,!! merican •hole to side to Inte rest lw pn•­le 27 ;~ up in carried nan 72 ·r, 1955 Rrpri111<·d from .\Ell' l ORI\ TI.Ill::'., T"'""foy, August 9, 1955 PENTAGON AND HOOVER By llanson W. Baldwin A special defense department task force has heen established lo study the 100 major recommendations and doz­ens of minor changes regarding the armed forces that were suggested hy the IIoowr Commission. Various study groups or task forces of the Commission on Organization of the £,erutiw Branch of th<> Gonrn· ment made these recommendations ahout the Defense Department and the ser· vices. They cowred the fields of oq~ani­zation and policy. The Commission, headed by former President l!erhert Hoover, e~dorsed most of the task force findings- -some of a very sweeping na­ture. Charles A. Coolidge, a former Assis­tant Secretary of Defense, head" the Pentagon group that is studying all of the Hom er suggestions. The group is expected lo formulate a Pentagon "posi­tion," approving, disapproving or mod­ifying the Iloovrr recommendations. It is rxp('t'ted that bills co,crinf!; some of the points will be ready for presentation to the next session of Congress in Jan­uary. The Cooliclgt> study is of fundamental importance lo the armed forces. Many of the Hoover Commission recommenda­tions were so sweeping in nature that 'Pnice people fear their effects upon morale and comhat effectiwness. :\Tedical care for depemlents. I rawl n•gulations. the operation of commis­saries and post e,changes would all he influenced • from the srnice man's point of Yirw, adYersely-by the Com­mission reports. EFFECTS OF RECOMMENDATIONS The recommendations also would ll'nd lo c1•ntraliz1• evrn more authority in rivilian manggement at the Sccrl'lary of D1·frn,1• lnel, and ''°uld reduce the authoritv of military personnel, even in f'omman°il fields. \mong the C'-lensive and. in some "ay,_ n•volutionary recommendations advanced "ere more prNlominanl ci,·i­lian managt•mcnt of military tran,porta­tion. ci,·ilian responsibility for military fisc·al matters, civilian supl'n ision for military legal matters and the suggested "'lahlishm<"nl of a "ri' ilian-managed" agl'ncy . . . to adminisll'r common supply and sen ice arti' ities." Thr Hoover recommendations regard­ing the Penlaf!;On. "ith 'ome notable an1l oublanding ewrptions. approadird tlw prohl<•m of military policy and organization primarily from the point FACTS FORUM NEWS, Ortolil'r, 19.5.5 of 'it'w of dollar economy. The tenor of loo manv reports had tlw C'ffect of un­der- emphasizing the reason for the exist­encC' of the armed scniccs- combat ef­fectiveness. There were at least two notable ex­ceptions to these strictures. Thr reports on rrsl'arch and development and on intelligence activities were among others that did not owrrmphasize the "dol­lar crnnomy" approach, and their rec­ommendations thus were more valuable and more convincing. A MAJOR JOB IN PROSPECT The new Pentagon evaluation task force has, therefore. a major joh of sift­ing and analyzing recomnl('ndations, some of which are ronslructiw, some of which rnuld hr destructi\'I'. T n making this analysis, it should re­jl'rl two commonly accepted "princi­ples." When applied to the Pl'ntagon and the armed forces thl'y haw cau,ed much of the confusion and red tape and difficulty with which the formula­tion of even the simplest military plans is now associated. Onr of these shihholeths is that the armed st>rvices can hr run likr any husi- 1ir><s. The other is that any husiness­man can move into the Pentagon and quickly master, better than the profes­sional, the intricacies of weapons svs­trms. tactics. military per,onnel a;1d morale and so on. "I have heard it said, time and again," writes ~. Henry Josephs. a '\ew York attorney ,d10 has rxprriPnre with the armed forces, "that tlw husinrs' of ational Defrnsr is tlir samr as any otlwr husinrss. l\frn of hig husinrss ai­gue. tlwrefore. that there is no reason why general ru les of good business man­agement should not apply rqualh to the armed 'en ices. This false premise is responsihle for the unn•alistic approach to the problem hy (some) of the HooYer task forces. "Certain areas of \\astc in thr armed srn·ices could and should hr reduced, hut in a manner which would not inter­fere "ith essential militan pallrrns, or in any manner that would slow up, or intcrfl're with, mohility of militar) com­mand." ANOTHER LETTER CITED Another letter points out that "the inrnsion of ci' ii administrators into what arc clearly military functions is one cause of thr rnnfusion that plagues the top level military direction and com· mand of our armed forcl's." The ll'tter abo 'ays in part: "~o experient'l'd l ' nitl'd ::;tales mili­tary officer que,tio11' thl' concept of ciYil superiority in policy-making and supen·ision . . . But the trend O\'Cr the past decade has gonr so far that we find unthinking al'cq1tance of the id<"a that any successful husiness administra­tor or financial l"\('('UtivC' is hv r<'a,on of his appointment comprlt'nt io drcidl' such things as weapon types, military oqranization, disciplinary matters. or soh-e the vastly complicated problems of military logistics. "Too many of our military decisions in these an(f other arras are based on a nc\\ ly appointed ciYilian'g quick field tri?, an oversimplified graphic pm•en­tallon and a frw hastily jotted m<"mos prepared hy a gpl'cial assistant. "In the not so distant past a ci\ ilian Secretary acquired some kno\dl'dge and considerable experience in the policy direction of an armed scnice simply h)· staying in office for a while ... -Th~ rapid turno,·er today in the floatina pop· ulation of transient errelaries ;nd a c~rps of special assistants plays harnc with sound and authoritaliYe militan command." · "One far-reaching and aclwr•e l'f­fecl of this typ<' of control," the letter continu<'s. "is the drafting of legislation affecting. our armed forces by ci,ilian ll'gal assistants "hose closest approach to seafaring is attrndina a rnival of '.Pinafore,' or whose milirary experience 1s documented hy a reference in 'From Here to Eternity.'" Objectives Of Hoover Con1mission u . .. Jn our recommenda t ion~ "e hn' e "Ou,:ht "'ix objecthe ... : Fir"t-To pre'ien e the fu ll 'i{'(·urity o f the nution in a di ... tu rbed \\Orld. Se('ond-To 1nai nt ui 11 th e f u ne t ion in ~ of aJI nece!ii· 1.ary a,::en('ies wh i<·h make for the l'O rnn 1on "' elfare. Third-To "tt irnula te the fun· clamt'"n ta l re ... earch upon "' h idt nutionul "et•uri ty and J>rO~nms are ba ... ed. Fo11rll1-To i1npro'e efriC'ien· ry and ('liminute \\H .. te in the e:xecu t i ' e a,:en<.'ieli<. Fifth-To e liminate or redure IZ"~'er n n~en t c·ompeti tion \\-I th prl\ate enterpri ... e. ixth-and perhap"' the mo ... t im11or tant of a ll-to totr('n~th en the economic .. o<"ial and f:O\C'rnmen tai strul·turc which has brought U"~ now for o ne h undred sixly·fiiix years, C'On .. tunt b lessings and progresfii. -The lloorer Couunission.~· Pai:e 5 Contrasting Views on President Eisenhower upon his re turn from the mee tin ~ at the Summit reviewed in this report to the nation the accomplibhme nts o f the eonfe rence. Also presented are excerpts of a later speech by the President before the Ame rican Bar Association in Philadelphia in which he elaborates further on results of the Big Four meetin~. Secretary Dulle,; and I. "ith our as­, odate-. ":ent to the Big Four Confer­t ·11cc at Cenr\ a n·-ohrd to rrprt''!'nt as .iccuratt'ly as we could thr aspirations of thr \ nwrican pt·oplt" for peace. and the pri11ciples upon which this country be­lie' e' that peace should lw based. l n this task we had thp hipartisan. i11dt·Pd almost the unanimous, support of the country. This fart greatly strengthened our hand throughout the rwrrotiations. Our grateful thanks go out to all your senators and your con­grc, smen in the l'nited talcs Congre". .\ side from this wt• had during thl' pa,t wt'ek thousands of tdegrams of f•111·ouragemf•nl and support from you as indi,iduals. Along with thcs!' came simi­Jar tt"leμ:ram~ from great oqrnni1ation~ church ornanizations. husint•ss and great labor organizations. \JI of thc,c n•mhined ,;i•n<"d to makt• th ft·t•l that possibly we were faithfully representing the Yiews that you would have us repre· sent. ;:\ow peace and the pur,;uit of peace involve many perpJc,ing question>'. For example. justif't' to our rwighbor'. gn•at and small. Frt•cdom and security for all these nations. Th!' prosperity of their sewral economit•s and a rising standard of liYing in the world. Finally. opportu­nity for all of us to live in peace and in security. Now, naturally. in a study of such questions as thcst'. we don't proceed recklessly, we must go prudently and cautiously. both in reaching conclusions and in subsequent actions. We cannot afford to he negligent or complacent. hut wc must lw ho1wful. We must hme faith in oursrl\'C:i and in the justice of our rausr. If we don't do this we will allow our -Wide World Photo History·makin9 Foursome. Left to right, Soviet Premier Bulganin, President Eisenhower, Premier Faure and Sir Anthony Eden. Page 6 own pessimism and our own lack of faith to d<•fcat the nohll'st purposes that we can pursue. ow hecause of the Yitai signifi('an('t' of all of these circumslatH'f's lh!'y "ill ht' e'haustively surveyed hy our gowrnment o,·er a period of many weeks. Tonight th<' most that I can giw to you are a f<'w pt'rsonal impressions and opinions that may haYe some intt•rr•t for you and certainly have som!' rnlut' bearing on th!' outcome, and on the proct'ss of those negotiations. {)f ('OUTS(', an int<'rt'Sling subject that could he takt'n up had I the time, would he prrsonalitics· thr personalities o[ thr several delegations, their relationship" or apparent relationsh ips one to the other, the principal considerations that seemed to motivate them. These all would have a bearing on this prohl<·m. but r forego tht'm and take up instead just two general opinions in which I am sun• ('V!'ry Am!'rirnn shares. Thr first of these is that we must never he deluded into hf'li<'ving that onr wet'k of friendly. t•ven fruitful negotia· lions c-an wholly f•liminate a prohl<'m arising out of thr wide gulf that scpa· rates so far East and Wf•st, a gulf as widt' and deep as the difTf'rt'nce between individual liht•rly and regimentation. a' wide and ckcp as the gulf that lies he· twN•n tlw conf'cpl of man madt> in thr image of his Cod and lhl' concept of man as a mf'rc instrument of the state. !\ow, if we think of those things we arc apt to hi' possihlv discouraged. But I was also profoundly impressed "ith tlw need for nil of us to amid discour· ngcmrnt m!'rcly because our own pro· posak our own approaches and our own lwlit'fs arc not always immediately aeccptrd hy the other side. On till' night I left for Gencrn I ap· pean·d h!'forc the tele,·ision Lo rxplain to you what we were seeking. I told you rrontinurd on Pa~e UJ FACTS FORUM NEWS, Orto/in. J955 For< R. '1 of ti Or dis<"U for t tht' I a ~u ii m frat. ord. h1•re, form prop \\oul •·nnf• tddr di1tr not lire a< hut I ib t \ J I hat 1·rnm l1·d"1 aft;.r \\or! lo\\f' 11orl1 ktlar 1·011r tnort lake and l1ut I 110~ ... i rd or flour f nn· rrnm Tr ritori as w~ lh1•ir lhan Post. T!lP \V1·st lh(' ion the re the eetin~. lack of ses that the Yitai starH·t·~ yed hy f many give to on• and interest t' yalue on tht' "eel that r, would s of the ion,hi1" lo the ons that ('se all rohkm. inslpad whirh I e must that onr negotia· prohlrm lat sepa· gulf as hrtween ntion. a:;. lies hr· le in thr nccpt of ie state. 'lings wr ged. But ed with discour· )wn pro· and our nediately ·rn I ap· 1 explain told you 1 Page U) ber, 1955 Foremost among the critics of the Geneva Conference is Senator Joseph R. '\lcCarthy (Republican, Wisconsin) who spoke adversely on the results of the Conference before the United States Senate. On June 16, and again on July 11. I di-ru--ed al •ome length the prospt'rls for the Big Four Conference. I took the position that the dt'cision lo attend a summit m1•1•ling was ill-ad\ ised that it m1•an l. int'\ itahly. a fret' world de· fPal. For rt'asons that arc on the rrc· ore!, and thus nerd not lw recounted hne. I aq!ued that no matter what form it look lt'rrilorial conre,sions or propaganda gains tht' f.ommunisls \\ould havp lhr Yirtory. f mus[ now r·onft•ss that tht' 'iews e\pr<'"t'd in thost' addrt''ses were overly optimist ir. l prt'· dir-tPd a f rt'(' world set hack. hut T did not foresee a rout. T foresaw serious l1n•arhes in tht' anli-Communi>l front. !tut T did not and T could not anliripalc it- total disintegration. \[y critical mistake was to a"umt' that aftt'r l.ent'rn had failPd our gov· "rJlmt•nt would recognize and ackno\\- 1.. d!!t' that it had failed. T assumed that aftrr Soviet kadcrs had dasht'd the 11orld's hopes that communism had nwl­lrm "d and had ahandonrd its goal of ''or Id c·o1111uest, we would rerowr our l1alanc1•. and Pmbark oner again on a r·ourst• of dediraled oppo,ilion lo our rnortal ent'my. T thought that it \\ould lakp some time lo pick up lht' pi<'rt's. and lo repair the Frt'r World\ po,ilion: hut T din not rl'ckon sl'riou,h "ith tlw rio--ilrility that the myth of f.ommuni'l rl'formation would not onlv he ali'r and flouri,hing: aflt•r l.rnern." hut that its fon·mosl "'ponenl "oulcl hr thr go,·­rrnnwnt of the llnitrcl tales. Tnlt'. tht' \'\'rsl made no •pecifir ter­ritorial rorH't•ssions al l.rnr\ a so far as \It' kno\\. Rut lht' Communists had 't'l thPir si:rhb on far mon• amhitious μoals than thr surrt'ndrr of this Western oul- 110,t. or tlw rwutralizalion of that one. 'flw Communists st'l out lo crack the Wt'st's will lo rrsist, arHI in this for th,, monwnl al lrasl they haY<' ht't'n IJllf'rlv surcr.,ful. Far ht'llt'r that "e hail ]o,.l only lrr· PAC'TS FORUM NEWS, 01"111/>rr, J.?.5.5 rilory. The outlook would be brighter had the Big Four met'ling been a replica of last year's Geneva conferenre. where Wt' mad<' roncessiom• sped fically half of lndorhina; but where aftrrnards \le felt the sling of drfeal and thus "err lwstirred lo make new rt'sohcs lo turn hark th<' forces of nil. Bt•ller that the WPst lose some land. as it did then. than to lose its soul, as the Wegt is p<'rilously dost' lo doing today. To grasp the magnitudr of the Genna disaslt'r, we need only lo stale the argu· menl of those who rlaim l.rnrva was a sucress- namrlv. that "wr ha\e madr fril'nds "ith the SO\ irt govrrnmrnl." For this is another way of saying that wr have made friends with the apostles of hell. Wr ha\e. indeed. made fripnds \\ilh thr . O\ i<'l lraders· -\\ho denounre Cod: who dt'spise frrpdom; \\ho dern in· di' idual rights; "ho exa!t treadl('rv: who counsel decrit: "ho prarticr terror. intimidation and torture as a part of each day's work; who ha\r. \\here pos· sihlt>, rxterminatrcl l'\<'ry human hring and every human in•lilution that has oppo,ed th rm; and "ho Ira'<' acknow· lcdgt•d. as thrir supreme mission. the dP,lruclion of this rounln and tlw la-i \csliges of our way of Ji.fr. Such mt'n are now our wry good friends. So far as T know and owr the pa't wrek T ha\<' madt' a point of canYassini:r tht' suhjecl not a sing-It• spt't't h. tll'\1>­eolumn, editorial, or magazine article that has hailrd l.crlt'\ a as a s11!'ct•ss has failrd to makt> tlw judgnwnl, t''Jlrt'"'Y or implicitly. that friendship "ith Com­munists is a goo<l thing. (ht>r tlw past yt'ars, in dealing \\ ith lht' suhjt'l'l of eommtlllism. l haYt' found that a grt'al number of things had lo ht' said. or t•,plained, that sremrd lo he pl<•nwnlary; hut I newr once felt that it had lo ht' s!'riously argtwd that friend,hip \\ ith Communists is \Hong. '\o\\, in the wake of Grrwrn, this not only has to he i;aid, The ~incPrity anti iruiru:·erity of the Russian rulers in their stated goal of tcorl<l peace is tlte dwllenge today Jacirr~ Anterican and Europ­ean lea<lership. Accomplishnrerrts arul failures of the GenPra Co11/ere11ce are git-en IU!re by Prt>.'iirlrnt Eisenhml'er. Sir Anthony E<len. Prernier Faure. ~far­shal Bulf!m1in. Senator Joseph R. lllcCar1hy. anti errator Bourke B. Hickenlooper. but it can ht· said only al the prire of being 1·orhitlt•rt'd a reactionary, spoil. fun eccentric. Yet, 1\Ir. President, is it not still self­evident that hostility to the Soviet l'n· ion O\erl. arlirulate, unyielding hos­tility is ho th necessary and desirable? We mu~l he hostile to the , oviet iro, .. ernment for the same rea,on that truth is hostile to falsil1. that fn•t'dom is ho,-­tile to tyranm. low to hate. and kind­ne• s to .brutality· for the same rea,.on that good is hostile lo e' ii. 1.ood cannot clasp tht' hand of evil without becominf( evil. and without inviting destruction hy <'Yil. We rannol offer frirndship to lvrants and murdrrers, as has the Prr,-i· dent of the l"nitecl States. without ad­vancing th<' rause of tyranny and mur· dcr. It is the measure of the West's moral degeneracy that the friendship crmented al Cenern has !wen heralded - not as a harbinger of e\ il days ahead, hut a,­proof that things are gelling heller. Only by thinking long and hard about this 'erdict. is it possihle to apprrciale tht' depths lo which we haw fallen. (Continued on next page) -Wide World Photo Se nator Joseph McCarthy Page 7 President Ei,enhower's announce­ment tliat our gon•rnment ha" maclt• frirncl" with the Kremlin leaden' would have a precedent if the mayor of Chi­cago had publicly proclaimed in the earlv thirties that his administration had.made friends with the Capone mob. The moral implications of Grnern are •hocking enough; but its practical r-onsequences are just as p:ravr. The l.t'nern frirnd,hip part has already caused complacency and a fa],e •en,;e of •ecurity here at home. It is only natural that we rel a" our vigilanc-t· "lwn we are told that our rnemie• are not such had folk after all. Today thr di•­intPgrntion of the anti-Communist front is of the •pirit. Before long it "ill af­frct armament and mobilization. Whv foot huge ta" bill•, the American prop!~ mav J.r.!!in to a•k. when the Communists Ji,n:r abandoned their plans for world conquest? \\'hNher the majority of thr Ameri­can people have acceptrd tlw wnlirt on Gent•rn eertified hy the administration and the pres•. I cannot •ay. But if it has and if it continues to arrt•pt that wrdi«L then the Geneva Big Four meet­ing will have written a permanrnt hlaek pa!!e in the hi•tory hook of thr human rare. The Geneva Confrrencr will he­g- in the la•t ehapter on western riYili­zation -a<; the event that u•hered in its era of delw•ion and deeline. It is not enough to say that adminis­tration leaders and the pre,.. v.hen thf'v intt'rprrt Grneva as a sueress, are ill-ad­Yi>' ecl. In my judg-ment, they are guilty of -omething far more serious than havin!! made a mistake. Ther have per­rwtrated a fraud on the American peo­ple. Thrir judgment i,_ no doubt. had; but it i,.: not that bad. As I see it the primarv concern of the admini•tration and the majority of the pre•s has been to Yindicate their original judgment that Genern was a good idea, and their <;ec­ondarv concern has been to di,clo"e 11 hat ihev think is the truth ahout Gr­neva. The fraud is the more serious hecau•e. in a verv real <;f'n<;P. thr Ameri­can people are at thr merry of the ad­mini• tration and the pn••s. The ordinarv eitizen i" in a wry poor po,ition to form independent judgments on thi,: .. uhjeet. For one thing. he is dependent for information- almo•t ex· rlu>iYel~ upon hi" national leaders who partiripated in the conferenee. and upon the pres.. which rrported it. If thrr mis­lead him. whrre c-an he turn? For an­other. the ordinary citizen usually dors not concern him•elf with the details of such matter>'. Beeause of the demand,; of his prirntr affairs and problem<;, his knowledge of international affairs is often confined to general impr<'ssions. ~11!'n the decision was made to attend the Big Four meeting, the puhlic's gen­!' rnl impre-sion was that the purpose of the meeting was to discover whether Pal!'e there was sufficient evidence that com­munism hud changed its mind about conquering the world. to jw;tify a ne11 American foreign policy- including the relaxation of our pr<'"ures on the Com­muni,- is. ahandonm!'nt of a hostile atti­tude. disarmamPnL m·gotiation'- conces­• ions. and the like. After tht' conf Prence, the irem•ral impression conveyed to the public was that a favorable answer had been gi1·en to that que,tion- that there wa> enough e,·idrn«!' that eommunism had ehanged to justify a new poli cy of reeonciliation and friendship. The only way thf' public could avoid getting that imprt•<;sion was for thr ad­mini, tration and the press to tell th!' truth ahout Geneva. The truth about Geneva is that it did not produce one scrap of evidence that the Communists had budged from their objective of world conquest. EYery pro­po• al made by thr Wrst. thr Communists either rejected or ignorl'<L EYery pro­posal made by the Communists had been made. in substance. a hundred times before-and a hundred times had been unaeceptahle to the West. Let us go down the li•t. On Germany: We in"i"ted on German unification, and on Germany's right to remain in the western defense alliance if she so chose; the Communi"t" refu,ed to agree to unification. and demanded that Germany withdraw from ' ATO. On European •<'<' urity: We •aid we would not join the Russians in an over­all European security pact until Ger­many had been unified; the Communists drmanded such a pact immediately and refu•ed to prore!'d with German unifica­tion. On disarmament: The We•t on!'e again asked for a reliable system of in­spection: thr Commun is ts r!'f u•ed to agree to <;uch guaranties. and insi<;t!'d that hoth sides di<;arm. each <;ide tru<;t­ing the other to play fair. On East-We:;t contacts: The West re­quested, in effect, that the Soviets haul down the Iron Curtain; the Iron Cur­tain is still there and <;hows every sign of being permanent. On freedom for the •atrllite eountril's: The Pre,ident said he would like to dis­cu"' the question; the Communists re­fu• ed. 1lenying even the existence of a prohlem. On int!'rnationnl communi"m: The President hroug-ht up the suhject; the Communi"t" . coffed at the idea. ealled it an internal matter and. therefore. an inappropriate suhjert for di<;cu<;<;ion. On the Far East: While the American people were led to believe the suhject did not eome up at Geneva, we now know it was di•cu<; ed in secret meetings. where-let us hope the United State" argued that Communi"t a!!rrssion should cease; the Communist , wr may hP •ure. renewed their demand, for Re'd China's admission to the United ;:\ations and for the surrender of Quemoy, the ;\lat­sus and Formosa to the Communist><. And on this subject. it is beginning to look as though the Communi,ts not only stood firm. hut that we p:aYe ground. So where is the evidence that Com­munist intentions have changed? The Communists said, as they have said, for Western con<;umption, ever since thP Ru"'ian revolution, that they wantPd peaee. On the basis of word•, and of word" alone. the Presid!'nt led tlw American people to helieve that there is sufficient eYidence of Communist sin­cerity to go ahead with a new policy of reconciliation and friend,hip. In handing down that n-rdict on thP conference. the President hetrayrd the trust that <;O many Americans place in him. I repeat: In handing down that verdict on the conference, the President betrayed th<' trust that so many Americans plaee in him. The vast majority of the nation·­newspapers also p:ave that verdict. Thu•. the pres<;, too, betrayed any eonfidence the American people may still repose in it. We still have a free pre•s in this country, hut its reporting of Geneva confirms the fact that, for the most part, we have an irresponsible press. Thank God this does not include all the press. A small segment of the press has accurately reported the Geneva con­ference. Let us now turn from the question of whether Geneva was accurately re­ported and examine more closely the question of who won at Geneva. The best way to answer that que:;tion is to recall the aims, first of the Communists, and then of the United States. Russia's aim was as <;imple as it wa" ambitious; and from the day the Com­muni" t" hep:an agitating for a summit meeting, it was understandable hy all who wanted to understand it. The Com­munists' ohjective was nothing less than to destroy the West's will to resist. They would, of eour•e. appreciate any con­cessions we offered them. But for the momrnt, in Communist eyes, this was not important. If the West's spirit eould be broken, the territories would fall in good time. The Communists appreciated that while pur~;uing an aggre,.ive policr dur­ing the preceding fifteen years they had won tn•mendous victories. But Western defenses were now firming up. and thus future progrrss promised to be slower and perhaps costly. This prospect could he chanp:ed if only the We<;! could he persuaded to hatr communism a little le•s. fear communi<;m a little less, and be less su,picious of Communi•t ob­jectives. So the KrPmlin leaders decided to turn FACTS FORUM NEWS, Ortohrr, 1955 Co Sec.re Grom mier right. I.a ck the a durir thirti ritori West quest po we for t fore, Th e tah and whic once raus rel a" nists «es<;f Th s rwd e \Tal­unist: o;. ing lo ot onh nd. - t Com­? The id, for re th!' wantrd and of ed th1• there is ist ~in~ policy on thr cd the lace in on tlw yed tlw lace in nation°' t. Thus. fidenre pose in in this Geneva st part, lude all e prei;s !::,:~:~ tely re­ely the he best o recall and it ,,·as e Com· summit by all e Com­ess than lst. Thry 1ny con· for thr lhis was rit could d fall in ed that lier dur­lhrv had We:;tern ~nd thus e slower rel could ·ould be a little ess, and nist oh-d to turn - Wide World Photo Council table in Geneva, July 18th. On the left (center l are President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. In foreground (backs to the comeral are Russion Delegates Gromyko, Molotov, Bulganin, Khrushchev and Zhukov. The French delegation, headed by Pre­mier Faure, i5 ot the far end. The British delegation, Prime Minister Eden in charge, is at right. lia1k the dock twenty years, and try tht• approach they had used suc1·1·,sfully during the popular-front era of th!' lhirti!'s. That policy had not yit•ldt·d ter­ritorie:;; but it had softened up lhe West, and paved the way for the 1·on­quests of the forties. The We:;tt·rn powers, the Communists reasoned, fell for the ruse once before; they, there· fore, might fa ll for it again. The Communist aim, then, was lo Pstablish an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence-an atmosplwre in which the popular front would flourish once ap:ain. an atmosphere that woultl rause the West lo <lrop its guard and to r<'lax its vigilance. In this. the Commu­nists were utterly and completely sue­re"' ful. The way is now open for the rr-rmrrg­enr!' of roalition governmrnls in Frant'I' and Italy, for neutralizing Japan and f.ermany, for the developm!'nl of "volu­minous" East-West tradr· to use Presi­ch• nt Eisrnhower's word which will holster Russia's eronomy and slrenp:then hn militarv machine. And. finally, the dimate is right for persuading the l'nited Stales to abandon its fighting allies, the Chinese Nationalists. thr outh Korrans. and th!' . outh Yirt­name~ e. o murh for Communist aims and ad1i1·vrmrnts. ow what did thr l'nitrd 5.tatt-s hope to arromplish at thr Big Four mrrting? The doubletalk that •·manatee] dailv from thr Stair Depart­m1 ·nt ancl tlw Whitr House in the wreks l.dorr tlw confrrrnrr madr this qurs­lion difficult to answer; hut it rould hr l'.oil1·d down to this: wr had two ohjrc­ll\ 1·' onr whirh we might rail thr oh­Jt ·c·tiYP of "rlarifying lkr's mind"; thP FACTS FORUM NEWS, Ortnbrr, 1.95.5 other, the objecliYC of forcing O\ iet conce"ions from "po,itions of strength." These two objectiws implit•d wry difT1·r- 1•nt approaches to the confen•nre for the reason, I think. that the Pn•sident and Secretary Dulles had, at that timr. wry difTerenl ideas lo the real character of the Soviet peace oliensivc. Lel us, first, examine the Big Four's achievements in the light of the Presi­drnt's objertive. Mr. Eisenhower set forth his views al a press conference on l\foy l l. When ask1·d why he had changed his mind about the drsirahilitv of a summit ronferenre. he said: · " l would hope that my own mind would he clarified a little bit." The President. in other words. was not quilr sun• what thr Communists werr after. and propo,ed to haYr a ron­f eretH'e with the Krrmlin leaders in order to clear up his douhls. I com· menled at the lime that the Presidrnt had no business allrnding a ronfrrrnce with Communists if he did not under­stand Communist ohjerti' rs. and that. in any r\·ent. it was just a littll' nai\r to rxpPrl that the Communist,;. in their talks with him. would come clean as to tlwir real aims. \\hat was learnrd al Genern ahout So' it'! intentions? The world learnrd or. hrttrr. that part of th!' world that paid attrntion lo thr roncretr positions taken by the SoYiet drlegation that Communist intentions wrre the samr as rver: destruction of Western ci' ilizat ion and Communist domination of the world. But what did thr l'rrsidrnl lrarn? The Pm;idenl discmrrrd that the . o,·i ~ t lraders sinrrrelv wanted prare. And how did thr Prrsidrnl arriw at that ronrlusion? Why. Bulganin told him so, h.hru,hdw\ lold him ,o. and ju4 in 1-.i-e am· doubts lingered· hi, old thum Zhuko\· told him so. It mattered not to the President that the SJl!'cific SoYiet propo,ak in C'\t'fl" instance. refuted these a"urances. For he had it on the solemn word of thr!'e Communist gang,-­lt• rs-\\ hose present po,itions of power are altrihutable. amonp; other thinp:s. to newr ha,·ing dr' iated from the Com­munist leaching that one must always tell lies whrn thr interests of rommunis;n are sen·ed by trllinp: lies· that commu­nism sincerrly wantrd peace with th<' West. To my mind. \fr. f.i,;rnhower's pro­fession of faith in thr Communist>' sin­rerily wa,; thr most astonishin" statt·­mrnt ewr ullrn·d in puhlic ln· ; Pn·,i­drnt of thr l'nitrd Stairs. Onr would haYP experted thr Amrriran prrss. had it still a srnsr of rr,;ponsihilitv. to haYr heaped ridirnlr upon thr Prr,;ident'> ht>ad. lnstrad. thr reporlPrs and tlw columnist,; rrlawd thr statrmrnt to the American proplr with thr strongest im­plications that it was a rarefullv wt>i"hed. Je,·el-headt>d judgment. thorm;ghlY \rnr­ranted by the fart,;. Thr only thinp: to he regretted about thr statement. the press ohserwd. was that it might p:et the President into lrouhlr with unim­aginatiw politicians hark home. lt is surely a sad rommrntarv on the times. l\lr. P~rsidrnt. that it must he left to unimaginatiYe politirians to point out lhr Oagrant absurdi ty of taking on their fare Communi,;t assurances ahout their good intentions. Why did the press. it­self. not make the point? One would have thought that the mrn and women. who onre ronrriYrd it thrir solemn duty to remind thr A.mrriran peoplr nerv dav of the week that thr 1\'azis could not he trustrd. would haw seen fit to adYise the American prople that Com­munists can hr trusted no more than Nazis-that Bulp:anin's p:uaranty at Ge­ne\' a was ewry hit as reliahle as Hitler's at l\fonirh. . And whrre were the memhrrs of this hodv. l\fr. Presidrnl. and of thr House. when that outlandish sta tement was made? Wlw wrrr thr\' silrnt? The Dem­ocrats mav· hr r'rused. for the hahit of apolop:izin.g for Yisionaries and appeas­ers of their own party has prohably de­srnsitized them to such things. But whv did not Repuhlicans- rwrv onr of them - ~peak out? When Franklin Roose,·elt and Harry Truman ofTerrd similar ap­praisals of So,·irt intention•. in the hev­dav of our alliance with Russia. the Re.publican partv drnounced surh fool­ishness in roundrr trrms than I am using today. Siner Dt>morral$ haw a Pre~ident w_ho thinks the way they do. and Republwans a President who. they feel, i~ indispensahle for keeping thei"r party m power. the numher of protests ran be counted on the finp:ers of one hand. frnntinurd on nPYl pner) Page 9 '-o a, to thi, lir,l .\mnic·an ohjt·diH'. that of enli:,?hlenin~ lhl' l'n"i<lt·nl ahoul Communi,t objl'<·li\l'"· il mu'l he said that the conferrnc<' not onlr fail<'d lo enlighten him. but •·<·mPnlrcl his dehh· ions and spread tht'm lo othrrs. :\or did our 'r('Ond ohjrctiw· that of ho,ding owr the Russians from po· •itions of strength- farr any lll'llt'r. We heard a areal deal of talk bt'fort' the ('onferenc~ began lo tht' !'fTt'C'l that Rus­sia was weak. that her rrnnomy had eollap,ed. that her empirr was falling apart. that she was thus preparrd to make conce;sion' to the \'\' r;t in ordn to keep uoina. Srrrrtarv DullPs sug­gr,- tt·d we "would hr ahlP- to clriw a hard haruain al Gene\'a. and could wrrnrh ,;om"'e conce"'ions from thr Communisb. The fir4 day of the Big Four m<'Pling demonstrated how pathrtically wrong :\Ir. Dulles had brrn. The Prrsidenl made a stab al starting up a disrnssion of i•sues regarding which the Commu· ni>ls mi!!hl make conce;sions lhosP of the sateilite countries and inlrrnalional communism. In pra('tiral r!Trcl. lhr Communists simply laughed in his facr: our dele!!alion thrn dropprd th<' suhjt•cl like a hot potato. \rither werr thr Com­munists impressed with our strong po­' itions whrn the subject of GNmany came up. And so on clown tht> linr. :\Ir. Dulles' highly touted policy of neaotiating from strength newr f!Ol off th; ground at Gt>nrrn. Today, it is uller­ly bankrupt. Not even State Department propagandists haY<' dared suμ:f!est that in the coming nef!otiations with the Chi­ne> e Communists we are dt>aling from a po,ition of strength. :\ow. of course. the,e facts make it difficult for the administration and its apologists to claim that we won a vic­tor\' at Geneva. Nonetht>l<'"· thr claim j, -made. and it is maclt> morr ronfi­dt'nlly and more vigorously than had wt> forced the o\it>ls to disgorge half thri r Pmpire. America won a f!Tt>at Yirtory. wr are told. beraust> Prt>sidenl Eist>n­hower emerged from the Gt>nt>va ronfer­!' nre the most popular man in Europe. The attempt to equate America\ poli­tical fortunes with Dwight Eisenhowrr's ranking on a world-wide popularity ro,;­ter be..,an the dav the confen'tH'!' 01wn­ed: today it is revealed truth that Amrri­c ·a11 diplomacy triumphrd ]l(•f'aus<' :\Ir. n-<'llhower •on the popularity rontr'l. .\ more Aagrant non sequilur can hardly he imagined. The aq~umrnl assume' what I insi't is demonstrably fal•r namrlv. that the \'i!'ws that madt> i\Tr. Eisrnhower popular served the interrsts of th<' l'nited States and the cause of a.nti-rommunism. Of rour•e. :\lr. Eisenhowrr was popu­lar with the Europran nrulrnli,;b. Of rour•r. thev lowd him. II<' said prrci•rl) "hat the)· wanted to hear. and did prt>- Page 10 ci,t·h 11hat tlu y 11a11t.-d him to do. He annou111·t·d thai Cornrn11ni,;b 'incerely wantt·d p<·arP. H.- s<·aled a friendship part with th<• So\ il'l lt'adl'Ts. Hr changed Amerira's poliry from one of militant oppo,ition to communism to on<' that comes wry <·lost' lo 11 anting peace at any prier. His linl" at Genern would not ha\'!' read much di!Tnt>nlly had tlw Europran neutrali,ts dictalPd nery word he spoke. '\Ir. PrP,idenl. Id me rite a typical account of European rl'artion. This one is from the Wa.,fiington Po.,/ and Times ffprald. u11dt>r tlH' hannrr IH'adline "Ike's :.en;,' a Triumph I las Britain Cheer­ing. Here is the story: "London.- Britain is in a mood of double rhrl'Ting ahoul the l'nited State,;. For in Briti,h Pyt's, America has come around to a 'rnsihlt' approach toward Ru"ia and has begun to giYe ground from it• ohstinalt' >land against the Chi­nese Communists. i\fo,l Britons probahl) would agrrr that hoth drnngr' amount to Amt'ri!'an a!'r!'pta1wp of the Briti,h approa!'h toward the Communist 11orld." Then the article go<" on to say: ''l ' nqut•,tionahly. the summit confer­ence was Pr!'sident [ist'nho11 er's tri­umph. To Britons and W<·,tt•rn Europ­eans in gent'ral. the Prrsident's approach to the Russians represt>nted a reYirnl or the kind of American l<•ad<•rship in th<' grand manner to whirh they had hren so at'rustomrd in the day of Franklin Roosevelt." A re' i' al. :\lr. Pn•,idenl. in Franklin Roosrvell's grand manner. I continue the quotation: '-In a way the Pn,,.ident\ perform­ance 11 rot<' final finis to th!' drearr period or :\kCarthyi•m which causr;I ;uch, revul~ion amo!~:? Am~rica's friend~ 111 ~ e,;t!'rn Europr. \lr. Eist•nho11er's performance was. indrrd. a r<'lurn lo tlw grand mannrr of Franklin Roo,en•lt the μ:rand mann!'r or T!'heran and Yalta. And it was. in· deed. a re1n1diation of :\kCarthyism. which. in thr P)r' of our so-callrd Eu­ropean friend,;. is lhP symhol for hard anti-rommuni,m. But hefore wt• rPjoi!'<' any furtlwr 0\('f the fart that \lr. F.isPnhower madr a hit in Europe. lrt lh think long and hard about how Jawaharlal \t'hru would haw been rrct>in•d. had hr comr to EuropP as Amerira\ prrsidPnt. preachinf! his sell-out program. Or how !hr n!'utrali,ts would hm<' grrrtt'd Adlai Stnen,on. with his wry ronrrete plan for appease­ment. The applau'!'. if possihlP. would haYr he!'n rYrn morP dt'af Pninf!. Two yrars ago \lr. Eist'nhowl'r was not so popular wilh !hr Europrans. for hi,; administration hail adopted a poli<"Y of unlra,hin~ th<' forrPs of freP China. By 1955 all that had diang<·<I. '.Ir. Eisen-ho1H'r had hl'come a hrro. C\t'n hdon• he arri,!'d in Europe. For had ht• not said on .\larrh 2 that the l'nited Stal<·s would n1•wr support an attempt hy China to rPcapturc the mainland. br­caust' that would he aggressin war? And had nol thr Eisrnhowrr administra­tion already adopted. in practical efTl'<·t. the polici<"s that St'<'Tt>lary Dulles formal­ly announcPd to the American people last wt>ek [July, 1955 J-and I call this to the allPnlion of PH'TY American who i' in­terrsled in !hr enslawd peoples of tht> world - namPly. that the United States would oppose any attempt by South Ko­rea to n•lease l\orth Korea from chains. hrcausr that would he an aggressiw war; !hat the United States would op· posr anv allempl hy South Virtnam to releas!' \orlh Vietnam from chains, he­rnusr that woulil lw an aggressive war; and that tlw llnitrd States would t'on­tinul' to oppose the return of Chiang Kai-shpk for the samP reason. Our for· mrr lih<•ration policy. which tht> F.u­ropeans drspisr. was almost dead \\ hrn :\lr. EisPnhow<'r ldt the United States. He <·am<' to Europe to hury it "h<"r<' lhr rH'ulralists could clwer at the funrral. Tl is lilllP wondrr that Mr. EisPnhow<"r "on !ht• popularity rrown-- not only from lh<' EuropPan• hut from thr Com­munists thrm•rhrs. At onr point during thr ronfrren<'r. thr President turnrd to thr Communist leadrrs and said: "I can assur<' the people in this ron­f<" rrncr room that the United Stalrs "ill not he a party lo an agf!ressiw war and that undPr no l'ircumstanres would "'' approw of an agμ:re•~ive war." Europe l'ht•t•n•d. and thr Communist• clwrred. in<'r tlw Prrsidt>nl had adop1t•d the Communists' definition - not our dPfinition. of aggrl'ssive war namrly. a war hy disposse"t>d peoplPs <h•'if!tH'd to rrmpture t!'rritorirs stolPn ll\' lh<' Communi,ls. his statemrnt was. lo Com· munist rars. the swrPlt>st musil' t'\t'r ht>ard. l'io wondn. thr day thr !'onf1·r· Pn1·1• was O\'t'r. Pr<"mirr Bulganin joint'd tlw F.isrnhowrr-for-Prrsidrnl hoom. I ask th<> enatp: Would Senator Taft or Gt'tH'ral \Tacl\rthur. if onr of th<'lll wrrr our pr<"sidrnl at this timr. ha\'P rr<·riwd the ac!'oladt's of Europr? :\lo•l crrtainly not. and for tlw wry good rea~on that nPithrr Taft nor l\fal'Arthur would hm <' lwPn srdul'rd hy the hlan­dishml'nls of Communist propagancfo. Thry would haYr drnounl'rd lht> ~o' id pea<·r ofTPnsiw for the fraud it is. Then• art' some p<'ople. howewr. for whom Dwight Eispnhower is not a f!rrat lwro. Tlwst' pcoplr are in such rirl'ttlll· sta1H'<'S that thrir \'Oi!'l's cannot hr !ward. Thl'y an• p<'oplP who arr now ensla\<'d by thP Communists. and could harnly ht' exp<'<'trn lo dwt'r a plrasant sorial gath· cring IH'twet'n lh<"ir opprpssors and tho•<' upon whom thrir hoprs for frrt•dorn rest. The cn,]a,rd proplt's saw tho,t' FACTS FORUM NEWS, Ort11bn, 1955 pidt pan· tlw may has ('\'er Curl slalt• han am' capt "'Ure mrPl \'\ it is n·lat \far· wrre with husi is ti and. rom rrm a n the "to l'ni !hat lit' i ni" po•. and ship Th<' ha, non. !hr lrad \To i• Ii of t of. mt> writ du shi1 Jos <·on mu Wr •up mr our ('\'(' mr upo rr\' F. hdon· ht' not Statt-s pl hy 1d, b('- war? inistra- 1 !'fTpc·t. form a I­p le last ·s to the o i~ in­of thr re:--~iYr uld op· nam to ins, he· ·l" war~ ld ron· Chiang ur for· he F.u· d whl'n Stair,. w lwn· funrral. nhowrr t onlr r Com· durin~ med to i~ ron­trs will ·ar and uld wt' it· ('\er confcr· join1•tl ltor Taft of tlwm 1r. ha\<' (''? ;\1o-t ry l!ood 1rArthur he hlan· 'la~an<hL <' So,ict ~. ?Wr. for t a !!rent cirrun1· 1e heard. <'nsla\cd 1ardlr ht' ·ial iath· ind tho•P fr<'t'tlofll lW tho•t' pidun·' of tlw 'miling l'n·•itlt-nt. ap· pan·ntly cx!"hanging pleasanlrit•s with tht' smiling Communist hut!"ht·r-. \\ t' may be sure that the So\iet gon·rnnwnt has had thos(' pirtur<'s distrihutt'd in {'\"Pry city and hamlet heh ind the r ron Curtain-along with l\lr. Eisenhower's stal<'mt•nt that hr brlir\'rs thr So\'it·ts ha\(' μ-ood intC'ntions. r rannol imal!int' a more lrthal hlow to thr moralP of thr raptive p<'oplt's than the reports th<'y art' sure to g<'t of 1\1r. Eisrnhowrr's fri!'ndh­mt'eting with thrir opprr"ors. 'J'hile I am on this suhjrn. I think it is finally timr to sav a word ahout tht' n•lationship lwtwt'cn ·thr President and \for,hal Zhukov. If Dwil!hl F.ist"nhowt'r w!'re a private ritizrn. his friPndship with a Communist mil!ht lw nohotlv's husinr-. hut his own. But ht• is not. Hr is thP Prt•sidrnl of Lht' Pnitt'd • tatt·s; and, as surh. oul!ht to ha\'r a dcrrnl rrl!ard for the fet'linl!s of his rountn._ mf'n. 1\farshal Zhukov mav ha\!' hrf'n \1r. Fisrnhown's wartimr. "huddv." a rnmrade in arms, and all that; hut it r<'mains that he is a lt'adinl! mt'mhf'r of a ruthll'ss rahal that holds one-third of tl11• world's p<'oples in rhains. and that, "to hoot." is det!'rmint'd to dt'stroy thl' llnit<'<l • tatt's. It got's without savinl! that \farshal Zhukov would not ht' wht'rl' hf' is today. <lid hf' not support commu­nism whol!'hf'artedly and did hr not pos>rss the m!'asure of <lrrrit. trt'arhrry. and hrutality that qualifil's for mt'mhrr­ship in the Communist hil!h rommand. Thr arμ-ument that, throul!h Zhukov. wr haw a piprlinr lo the Krt'mlin is shl'er nonst'nSI'; Zhukov is not !!Oinl! to It'll thr Prrsidrnt anything thl' Communist lradrrship does not want him to know. \foreowr. the sort of thing- that Zhuko' is likrly to tell the President is thr sort of thing the President should hrar less of. not more. Bt'fore I am hrrated for making- an i•,ur of thr Eisenhower-Zhukov rrlat ion­ship. lrt me ask those who would heratr mP what they would haw said and written had Franklin Roosrvrlt ron· r·h1drd a part of mutual trust and friend­ship with, say, Hermann Goering or Josrph Goehbels. • o far. I have spokrn of the Crnl'\'a ronfrrenre largrly in trrms of thr Com­munists' surcess in drmoralizinp: the W1·st. But it would hr wry \HOnp: lo -uppose that the atmosphrrr of apprasr­menl f!t'neratrd al Crnrrn damap:rd only our spirit, our will to rr"i"l. Thrre i. 1·vrry rrason to helirw that ronrrrlr mf'asurrs of appeasement wrrr al!rrrd upon al Geneva whirh haw nol hern rrvralrd to the Amrriran propk. Last l\fonday [July 251 thr Prrsiclrnt assured us that therr wrrr no >rrrt'l agrrf'menh f'ilhf'r writtf'n or olht•n,i>r at Cen!'va. Wr wrrr al>o led to lwline that thr Far F.aslrrn situation wn" not dis­cussed. But on Wr<lnt"-dav, Primf' l\lin-isler Edt'n tolcl tlw Hou<;<' of Common:; that thr Far Ea>tern nisi:; had been dis· ru<;>ed in thr >rn!'l fli~ Four mt•rtin~s. What was dt'C'idt'd in thosr srnel mrel· in gs. wr do not know. But in thr lil!ht of thr Stale DrparlmPnl announrrment -coming-. as it <lid. rig-ht aflrr Geneva -of talks with tllf' Chinr>r Communists on the que•tion of a rrasefire in the Formosa Strait". it is hil!hly prohahlP that thr Prrsid1•nt a!!rt'f'd with thr Com­muni_, ts to nf'gotialf' ahoul Qurmoy and thr l\fotsus. l\forroYrr. in \'ir" of to<lav's nrws that thP Chi1wse Communists ha,·r n•Jpasf'd rlrYrn of thr remaining- 177 Amrriran prisonrrs of war. it is possihlr that this wrt'k\ amhas•adorial talks "ill simply ratify a dral ma<l<' at thr Rig Four mrrl· inp; to surrrndt•r thf' ofTshorr islands lo thr Communi>Ls. for it has long hern apparent that wr would harl!ain for thr return of our pri>onrrs of war hy mak­inl! territorial f'Onf't'S>ions lo Rf'd China. Whatner al!rrrmrnl about thr Far F.ast wa> rrarhr1l in Ct•1w\'a. it is rlt•ar that the rampail!n lo srll out free China i,- under a full ht'ad of stram. The ad­ministration has alrt•ady !!Ont' hark on its solemn promi>r lo Chiang Kai-shrk not lo nel!oliatr on qurstions dralinp: with the ri1?hts and trrritories of the Rrpuhlir of China w ithoul the partiri· pation of the frrr Chinesr. The admin­istration <loes not want Chianμ-'s rrprr· srntatiws al those talks, for thr under· standahle rrason that they would op· pm•e thr administration's plans. Oner Quemoy and thr l\fatsus are lost. the Re­publir of China will hr rlTrrti,·ely neu· tralizrd and Lhrre will no lonp:rr he any realistic hopr of h8\inl! Chiang- return to the mainland a fart thr administra­tion knows only too well. Our poliry toward Free China is more than a hrtrayal of a drrntrd and fil!hl· inl?" ally: it is a blatant repu<liation of the Rrpuhliran party's solrmn pledl!rs to thr Ameriran people. Onre al!ain. lrt me rrrall to thr Srnalr what wr Repuh· limns told the Amrriran prople in 1952. when we asked them lo rlrct us to officr: "We shall aμ:ain make liberty into a hracon liμ-ht of hopr that will prnetralt' the dark places. That proμ-ram will l!i'r thr \'oirr of Amrrira a real funrtion. It will mark the rn<l of the negali\r. futile. and immoral policy of 'ronlainmrnt' whirh abandons rountlrss human hl'ing' to a despotism and μ-odlf'ss lt'rrorism. whirh in Lum enables the rulrrs to forp:t• thr rapti,·es into a weapon for our dt'strurtion." Mr. President, the way wr ha\'f' lht'd up Lo that promise does not makr ml' proud of my party. Thrre are three an•as in thr world whrrr wr mig-hl han• implemrntrd a policy of lihrration. hut havr rrfusrd Lo do so. Wr might haw implrmentr<l it in F.a>trrn F.urope, along the linrs I sup:p:estrd st'Yt'ral wreks ago. by withdrawing cliplomatir rPrng111L10n from the >alt·llite rridmes. and hy r•tah­] i,hing g°' rrnments-in-e-..ile. Rut thr ad· ministration is satisfie<l with expre>sing a humanitarian conrern for the satellite peoples. We might hme implemented it in Korra. by !?iYinμ: the armies of South Korea the equipment and support they nerd to liheratr thri r northern hrrthren. But thr administration has trrmed such a lihrration attempt "an al!l!ressiYe war." and wr arr now withholdinμ: the supplir,- \\ hirh the . outh Korrans need in or<ler lo go it alonr. Finally. we might haw kept Chiang Kai-,Jlt'k's for!"t'' unlrashl'<l. But the Truman-Acheson poliry ha" heen re­Yiwd. and we are proct'rding with the neutralization of Formosa. The coming sellout in Asia is differ­ent from most sellouts in the past. in that thi,; time wr ran rlrarly see it coming. There is thus thr opportunity to prrYent it if only thrrr were the will. On the lnel of the national μ-owrn­ment. that will does not r-..ist. for the onre powrrful opposition to appease­ment. encompassinp; nrarly rwry Repub­liran legislator. has all hut faded away. There is only the remnant. The Eisen­hower a<lmin.istration has adopted eYerY important plank of the Drmorratic party's foreil!n policy. And sinre the President dors prerisrly what the Demo­crats want him to <lo. there is no rhanre of opposition there. l\fost Republicans. T think. are. in thrir hearts, oppose<l lo the President's polirirs. But they haw arcrptrd the theory that they cannot return to offirr in 1956 without having l\fr. Eisenhower al the hrad of the party ticket; and they are. T am afraid. pre­pare< l to subordinate ronsideration of sound poliry to those of political sur· vim!. As a result. the Rrpuhliran party platform is just a scrap of paper. Tt is not a pretty picture-the Genern demoralization and the China sellout. and it most rertainly is not a hopeful one. Fiw yrars ago I saw a picture that was only sliμ:htly less hleak and slightly }ps• hopeful than this one. It <lepicte<l a situation that afTrrted the surYival of this nation rwry hit as >rriously as does the situation today. As I saw it then. there was only o~e recourse-to take the i>Sue to the American people. That is the only solution I see today. I shall l!O to the people. If I. and the others who will join me in thi,; fight. are surrr>Sf11l it will be hrcause the American peoplr ha\'e the innate good 'l'nse lo makr sound and rouragrou• derisions w ht'n thrv are l!iwn thr farts. I propose Lo gin: them thr fact>. IL ma\ he Loo late. hut insofar a' my ahilities and enduranre permit. I •hall sre to it that this country doe• not die without the people of the country being ginn a chance lo saw it. Page 11 BIG FOGR CO'\FERE'\CE Report of President Eisenhower (Continued from Pai:e 6) that we were going primarily to at­ll'mpl to change the spirit in whif'h th<»e ''Teat ne«otiations and conferences were held. " . .\ tran,-cripl was ma1le of that talk and I should like now to read you one paragraph from it. Thi• is "hat I •aid with n·•1iect to our purpo•e: '·"\';·!' realiu that onr ingredient has been mi"ing from all past conft'rt'nces. That is an honrsl intent lo rnnriliate, to undt'rsland. to he tolerant. lo try lo see the olhl'r fellow's ,·iewpoint as "ell as we see our own. I say lo vou if we can change the spirit in which thr•e confer­ences arr conducted we "ill haw taken the !!realest step tow a rd 1wace for future prosperity and tranquility that ha> nrr hecn taken in all thr hi•tory of mankind." During last week in formal confrr· rncrs and in per,onal visits. these pur­po, es have been pursued. -O now there «'"isb a better undrrstanding. a dosrr unit\· amon" the nation• of • ATO. There seems to hf' a growing realization 1..v all that nuclear warfarr. pursued to the ultimate. could be practically race suicidr. There is a realization that nrgo­tiations can be conducted without propa· rranda and threat and irnrl"li\I'. ,.. Finalh·. there is a sharpened realiza­tion hv ihe world that the l ' nil I'd Stales will go to any length consistent with our conrrpt>' of decrncy and juslif'I' and ri)!hl to obtain peace. For this purpose we will work cooperativrly with the SoYiet• and any otlwr people as long as there is -;incerity of purpose and a genu­inr de•ire to go ahrad. :\ow. in thr coursr of carrying on the,e discussions thrrr were a number of sprrific proposals. somP of which are items on the official agrnda. That arrenda contains G('rman unifi­cation and Europran srcuritv. disarma­mrnl and inrrrasrd contach of all kinds hetwrrn the East and the West. \ow most of the rnnfrrence mertinw< werr gi,·rn widr publicity and f'\ rn 'omf' of the specific su11gr-;tions made in tho,r confrrrnrrs lik'"'isr \\Pr<' puh­lif'izrd. In any Hrnt. I can a•"urr you of one thini. There wt•n• no se~rct a!!n·1•menb ma<le. rithrr undrr>tood a~n·t·mPnts or \\.TittPn ag:rPf'mPnlc:.. E\'· ervthing is put hf'fon• you on tlw record. ":\"ow outsidP of thrs;• ronfl'fl'nce mP<'l· inf?~ there were numprou... unoffiria1 n1£>t•tin~~. ronn•rsation ... with important mrmht'r< of thP otlwr ckl<"galions. an1I of cour•e wrv sp<'cifirally "ilh tlw So,·­ict deleμ-ation. In the•e c·om1·r ... ation ... a number of ~ubject were di•<·u•-t>d and Pal:"e 12 among them the St'rretary of State and I specifically brought up more than once American cominions and Amrriran be­liefs. Am<•riran rnnc·Nn ahout such questions as the satl'lliles of Eastern Eu­rope and thr acti' ilil's of international communism. \Ve made cn:;tal cl1•ar what <\merira lwlie,·es ahoul ;ud1 matters as these. '\ow. to take up for the momPnt the items on the official agenda. Probably no question causes as much trouble as that of German rrunifiration and Europran security. At first wr thou11ht that thesr could he dealt with st>paralrly. but the Amrrican dt•legation conrludrd that they had to hr dralt with as one subject. · \'\'p hrld that Germany should he reunited under a l!Owrnmrnl freely chosen hv tht'm•rln•s and under rondi­tions that would proYide security hoth for nations of the Ea l and for nations of the \Vest. In fact. in a framework that pro' ided European srrurity In the matter of disarmament the Amrrican p;ovrrnmrnt hrlic"·ps that an effective disarmam<'nt syslrm can he reached onlv if at its ha.sr thrre is an eflecti,·e reciprocal inspr<'tion and owr­all upen·ision splem. onr in which we can haw confidence and each side can know that thr othrr is carrying out his commitments. "low because of this hrlirf we joined with tht' French and thr British in mak­in11 sewral proposals; somP wrrP glohal. some were loral, some wrrr •ort of lmd- 11etary in character. hut all \\rre in fur­therance of this onr sinμ-1.• ohjrrtiw: that is. lo makP inspPl"t ion the basis of disarmament proposals. ·ow. one proposal sug-gPstrd arrial photography as lwtwc•c•n the So, i!'ls and oursrln•s hv unarmc•d peaceful planes. and to makr thi' inspc•rtion jusl as thorou11h as this kind of rPrnnnaissance can po,..ihly he. The principal purpose. of course. was to com in1·p t'vrryonr of Westrrn sinrnity in si•1-kinμ- pracr. Rut anothrr idea was this: if wt' rould 110 ahrad and r,;tablish this kind of in•pec­tion as an initiation of an inspPrtion sy•lrm. "f' could pos.ihly dl'Yrlop it into a hroadrr one and <•n•ntuallv build on it an cflrcliYe and durablt' di.sarmamrnl S)Aem. \ow. in thr matlt'r of irir·n~a-.;111g <'On· tarts. man\· itl'ms w1•rp disnrssrcl. WP talkrd abO;ll a f fl'l'r now of II( WS across the curtains of all kinds. "\';'r talked ahout thr rirculation of hooks. and par­tirularlr wr talkPd about prart>ful tran­ing. Rut tlw subjPl't that look mo•t of our attrntion in lhi, regard was the pos- ~ibility of inc·n·a•t'd 'is its by tlw titizt't1s of one country into tlw territory of an­other. doing this in su<·h way as lo gi'e each the fulle ... t po"ihlt' opportunity to learn about the people of the other nation. 'ow, in this partirular subject there was the grralc•st possible degree of agreement. As a mattn of fact, it was an agrermrnt oftrn repeated and en­thusiaslit'ally supported hy the words of the members of each side. As a matter of fact. each side assured the other earnestly and often that it in­tended to pursue a new spirit of con­ciliation and cooperation in its contacts with the other. '\ow. of course, we are profoundly hopeful that these assurances will lw faithfully carried out. One evidence as to thr,r' assurancrs will, of course, he arnilahl!' soon in lhP language and the l!'rminology in whirh we will find sp!'rrhes and diplomatic e\.changes courhrd. Rut lhr acid trsl should liegin ne"t 0f'tohrr. hrcausr lh<'n is when the next m!'rting ocrurs. It will be a meeting of thr forc•ign ministers and its principal purpose will hr lo take the conrlusions of this confer!'n<'r as to the subjects to he discussrcl and thr general procedures lo hr ohs!'rwd in translating thosr l!Pn· eralities that we talked ahout into actual sprcific agrermenls. Then is when renl conciliation and some giving on each side will he drfinitely necessary. For myself, I do not hrlittlc the oh· stacl!'s lying ahead on the road to a <1•1·urc• and just peace. Ry no m<'ans do I underestimate the long and e\.hausting work that will he necessary before real rrsults are achi!'n•d. I cio not blink the fact that all of us must continue to sarrifice for what wr hrlie,·e to hr best for the safety of oursrh·rs and for thr prrserrnlion of thr things in which we hrlir\r. Rut l do know that the people of thP world want prace. \lorron•r. ('\!'ry olh!'r indiYidual who was al Ccnrrn likewise felt this longin!( of mankind. So there is great pressure to adrnnr<' conslrurtin•ly- nol mrrelr to rr-rnacl tlw dreary pcrformann· ... - the nrgatiw performances of the past. Wr, all of us. indiYidually and as a p<'oplr. now have possibly thr most dif­firult assignment of our nation's histor ·. LikPwis<' we haw thr most shining op· portunitv C'\!'r poss<»sc•d hy Amrriran,.. ;\Ia,· llws!' truths inspir!'. newr dismay us. r h<·linc that only with prayc•rful pa· tirrH"r. intelligc•r11·r. courage and toler· anrr n1'\1·r forp'<•tting \igilance and prudrnc·p- ran we k!'rp aJi,e the spark ignitrd at G1•nf'rn. But if we arc suc· crssful in this thl'n wr will make con· stantly hrightrr the lamp that "ill on<' day guid1• us lo our goal - -a just and lasting pracr. Thank you. Good night to eaf'h of you. FAC'TS FORU~1 NEWS, October, 195.'J I 1 Yid· !-'Ui l not rec hur org ('f I thr \Ill( in is is < !is ra of he In ha th Wt1 SU ho ~i ('ll rh '0 id pl. an rn SlJ ca to w 1le rn w Ol \\ w t],. <If' l" liZPJl~ fan­as to unity other there e of t was d en­ds of sured it in­con­ntacts ,undly ill hr ce as e, he d the find anges necxt e next inf! of ncipal u~ions cts to clur<'S (' f!£'rl· actual n rr:il each IC oh· to a ns do ustinf! e real blink nue to e best or the irh WC' people al \\hO onginμ: 'rc-ssurr mrrelr lll(' (~~­past. d as a ost dif· iistorr. ing oj,. ~ riran~. dismay )'ful pa· I toler­• e an<l ~ spark re sur· kr ('Oil" <ill on<' tsl and 1 night Excerpts from President Eisenhower's Later Speech at Philadelphia The spirit of Geneva, if it is to pro­Yiclr a healthy atmosplH're for the pur­suit of peace, if it is to he grnuilH' and not spurious, must in,pirr all to a ('Or­rrrtion of injustices, an observance of human ri1d1ts ancl an encl to siiln ('rsion organized on a worlcl-wi<k "·all'. \\ lwth­n or not su('h a spirit as this will thri\C through the combinrcl intellif!Pnc·(• aiul unclrn•landing of mrn. or will shri\l'I in the gn·Pd ancl ruthlP•,;iirss of .-onw. is for th<• future lo It'll. Rut OIH' thing is C'('rlain. This spirit an<I the goals we "'<'k <'oulcl nr' n hm·p hrcn arhieYrcl hv 'iolPnrc or when mrn and nations co~­f rontecl each other "ith hearts filled with fear and hatrrcl. At Gt>n<•va we strow to help rstab­li.- h this spirit. Gr1H'\ a sprlls for America, not stag­nation, then. hut opportunity· - opportu­nity for our own people and for pro­plr evrrywhere to realize their just as­pirations. Eagern<'" lo aYoicl war if we think no d1•ppcr than this single desire- ·<·an produce outright or impli<·it agrrrmrnt that injustices ancl wrongs of the prcs­<' nt shall be perpetuated in the future. We must not participate in any surh false agreement. Thrrehy, wr would out­rage our own ronsrienre. T n thr eyes of those who suffrr injustice. we would herome partners with their oppressors. Jn the judgment of history, we would have sold out the frrrclom of men for the pottage of a false prare. Moreover, we would assure future con flirt! The division of Germany rannol he supported by any argume;1l hased on boundaries or language or racial ori­:; rin. The domination of captive countries ran not longer hr justified hv anv claim that this is needed for purposes of se­< ·u ritv. An international politiral ma­rhim>, operating within the hordrrs of sowrrign nations for their politiral and iclrological suhversion, cannot hr <"''" plain<'d away as a <'ultural mo,<•mrnt. Very prohahly, the rra,on for these ancl other violations of the rights of men and of nations is a compound of suspirions and fear. That <''plains. Tt cannot ewuse. In justice to otlwrs and to oursehrs. we can ne\rr accept those wrongs as a part of the peaee that we dbire and •eek. WC' must be firm but friendly. We rnwsl he tolerant hut not complacent. Wr must he quick to under,tand an­otll(' r's Yicwpoint, honrstly as'1mH'cl. Rut "" must nrwr agree to injustic·e for the wrak. for thr unfortunatr. for the un­dt• rpri,ilrgcd. well kno\\inir that if wr .1c·1·(·pt <lestruction of the principle of FACTS FORUM NEWS, Ortober, 1955 justirr for all, we rannot lonμ:rr claim justice for ourselves as a matter of right. The peace we want- the produrt of understandin p; and agre<'mrnt and la" amon~ nations- is an rnduring intC'r· national (' ll\ ironmenl. hm•rd on ju,tice an<l srrurity. It will reflect enlightened H·lf-inlrn•,t. It \\ill fosl('r tlw conrenlra· lion of human <'nrrgy- indi,·idual and organized- for tlw a1hancem1•nt of hu· man standards in all the areas of man­kind\ material, intdlrctual and spiritual lifP. I.an wr achie,·r that sort of prarr ? J think wr ran. At times it mav seem hoprless. far heyoncl human capacity to rt'ach. Rut has any great accomplish­mt• nt in history hrgun with assurance of its succ<'sS? Our own republic is a cast' in point. Through a long genera· lion there was almost a unanimous \\Oriel rom iction that the Unitrcl Stales of .\mrrira was an artificial contrirnnce that rould not long endure. And the rrpuhlic suni,·ed its most perilous years the rxprrimrntal years hrrausr of dPclirated rlTorts hv in­cJi, iduak not hrrausr it had a ht;ilt-in guarantre of succeos or a path frer from ohstarles. Our casr for peace, based on justice, is as sound as was John J\1an•hall's for thr Constitution and thr l'nion. And it will be as successful-if we present it hrfore the bar of world opinion with the same courage and dedicated con­Yirtion that he hrought to his mission. Jn our communities we can. each ac­cordinp; to his capacity. promote com· prrhension of what this republic must hr· ·in strength, in 11nderolancling, in clrdiration to principle- if it is lo ful­fill its role of 1£>aclrrship for peace. In thr search for justir<', \\C' can mak<' our system an e\'er more glorious ex ­ample of an orderly go\!'rnment dr­votrd to the pr<'srrrntion of human frredom and man's indi\ idual opportu­nitirs and r<'sponsibilitiC's. '\o matter how Yigorously wr pro­po.- r and uphold our indi' idual Yiews in clomeolie prohlrms, we can pr<'srnl ahroad a united front in all that con­<'!' rns th!' frr<•dom and H'<·urity of the repuhlic. its dedication to a just and prospt'rouo peace. Aho\<' all. conscious of the towrring arhie,rmrnts manif<'sl in tht• r<'[Hthlir's history und!'r the Constitution. assur<'d that no human prohlrm is hP\·ond solu­tion gi'rn tlw \\ill. thr persf'\('ran<'<' and the strrnl!lh !'ach of ns can help arouse in Amerira a rt' IH'\\Pd and flaming dedi­cation lo justice and liberty, prosperity and prare among men. SPECIAL FREE OFFER Do You Have Friends Who Need FACTS? Faels Forum in response to su~~estions from our man) friends will forward without char~e, for a limited time, com­plimentary copies of Facts Forum News. r----------------- 1 ! Fi\CTS FORUM l DALLAS, TEXAS ! I would like a free copy of l Facts Forum News sent to the fol­! lowing persons with my compli-ments: J\'ame. ( Plt·n-.;e Print) I City. I I 1 ~fame _-~ i Addre""'--- Cih Namf" : Cit' Nanlf• Name ____ _ A.<l<ln·" ---- I Cit) .Stale. State State - <;late l ---------------~ I I : ~t·ndn I I : ~\ddn·"'" I 1 Cit) Zorw ~talt' If )OU 1>r<"f('r not to c·ut ~our nrnJ.!azin('~ n1erely \\rite ) our re<111C''-l to F .\CT FORLM, Oa/ltis, Texa.• Page 13 THE BIG FOUR C01'FERENCE, Continued Following are remarks of Sir Anthony Eden, Premier Ed~ar Faure, and '.\larsbal Bulganin at the conclusion of the Gene,·a meeting: Sir Anthony Eden's Speech \\-e hm·p now condudt'cl tlw confer­!' llf'l' of th•• ht·ad' of f!O\l'rnmenb which ha' ln•t•n >'O muf'h di,cu''"cl and so rarne•tlv ad\ Of'atecl. notahlv In· Sir\\ in­>' ton Ch~rchill morr than t~,o - year' airo ... Thi' ronfrrence 'l'l it,1·lf a limited ta-k. Thi' it ha,- more than acrnmp­ji_, ht><l. Ten yrar,; airo the war in Europt> wa" hrou!!ht to an end. :\ow at Ja,t 11r hU\t> ma<lt• a 'tart with the work which we mi!!ht ha\r hoped to hl'f!in in 1915. \\"hat we haw now airn·!'d make' it po-,.ihl!' to iret lo irrip,; with th!' twin problem- of thl' unit\· of Germany and th!' ,pe·urity of F:urop<» :\o 01w e'l"'cb that it "ill lw ea'y to -ettl!' f'\PT\ dl'lail of th'·'e compli­rat!'< l i-,.ue,.. But th,•re i' no11 a better f'hance than Wf' h3\ f' kno11 n at anv time •in,·p the 11ar to f!d to work on j>racti­cal propo,.al• to ,ohf' the difTf'rrnce,; which ha\P di' i,Jt.d F.urop<' all the•e ypar .... · .\t thi- ronft'rPnrr 11r did not set out to makP a dPtailr,J plan in lhf'se few cl:i'·" · For all that. it will l><' found that in -our dirertiw to thP foreiirn secre­lariP• wP han• inrlu<kd thr '''st•ntia!, of a rompr!'h!'n'i' I' S!'tllt'ml'nl. The world will haw oh,pn·!'d the tone an<l temper in 11 hirh our work has h!'en ,-onductrd. Tho"r of u' 11 ho han• hren r11!!a2ed in th<' actual n!'f!Otiation- haw h<'en aware that a nrw ,piril of con­r ·iliation ha' hrf'n prf''rnt al our mPrt­it1!!"'. Tiut in addition to thi' formal 11ork. WP ha\e had manv opportunitie,; for pt>r•onal rontacb. whid1 I kno11 wr haw all found inrnluahll'. I am rpritr rrrtain that thr t>xd1anf!P" "hif'h ha'r takf'n phre out•idr thr conf Prt'TH'<' room han• f!i\rn all of u' a far hrllcr undt>r,tand­in!! of each otht·r's point,; of 'iew and of the prohkm" rarh ha• to face. If we can continue our work toirether in the spirit of thi' mrrting'. what is honeful promisf' todaY ,houlcl llf'rnmr -oli1l pNformance as ewnt.; unfold . Premier F'lurt"s "ipeerli fTran,.Iation from tlw French) Our mPetin!! i" draw inf! to a do••'- But for all that, wt' muo;l not "'paralr. I rnean hY this that if thl' four of u• art' 110 lonrrt:.r prf''f'nl in onf' room. wr mu~I remain morallv unitrd 11 ith onr and the •ame will. · T ron-idrr that O\t'T and ahm·r thP a2reement• which wr havr reachPd lw· tween "' on certain •uhjt•cb. texb and directiw•. thl' \l'T\' fart of our mt·t·tinf!. the •pirit whirh ha.; f!On·rnrd our de- Pa~e U bate,; and the mutual under,tandinf! which resulted from it. "ill lea,·e a pro· found mark on intPrnational relations and will haw a happy innueru·t• on their e\·olution. '\\'e hml' shown herr a common n·· sol\e. It i' now our n·,.ponsibilil\· to find the mran-. ThP fir,t ,;trp ha,; hef'n takPn alonf! this path. but thrrr an• still obstacle, to O\rrrnmP. \\'e hme not souf(ht lo hid!' tlwm. for it i' throuf!h truth that all proμ;rt'" is achit'H'd. If it is true that life today is charac­terized by ten,;ion and force, may this tension and slrrnirth Ill' that of undrr­standinf! and friendship. and no lon"l'T of hostility and distrust. To thr peor~t•s who look lo u,. and not onh- lo tho,.<' for whom wt• han• rr,.ponsi.hilit\'. \IP mu'1 be ahlr to propo,t• thr prog'~e"i'r substitution of conslruc-ti,·r and hPne· firial la,b of peacP for thr securil\' measurr' \\ hid1 arr still nere,sary. · Ua r.~ h al Bul{{an in's S peech (Translation from the Russian) Thf'rl' i' no douht that the presf'nl mertinf! in Grnern of thr hl'ads of !(O\'· Prnmrnts of Franrr. Great Britain. thr United . tatrs and the So, irt l'nion ha, a posili\r meaning' for thl' rasina of l!'Tl· sion in thr relations bt'tween !Jl{' !(O\. ernmt'nts and for tlw innitable inrrrasl' in conficlPnrP hrtwrrn thrm. Abo,·r all. this was facilitated bv the per,onal rontac·t in G1•nt'\ a brt\\ ern th1· leader,; of the four powt'rs. '\\'e f!OI lo know Parh otlwr lwttf'r hrrr and r'­rhang'ed opinions on a srrirs of import­ant international problt•ms. Despite lhl' fan that on some que,.. lions our points of \if•w did not roin­ridr. on thP w holr the mrrtin.- proceed rd in an honl''t atmosphl'r/ and was marked hy pfTorts of its parliripants to arhil'\r mutual undrrslandinf!. Thr Grn1·rn ronfrrrnt·r attrartf'd thl' attention of thr nations of thr "holl' world and further streng'thened their de•ire for thl' 11•N•ning' of intrrnational tension and for the shortl'nin" of tlw cold war. " Wr hopr that all of thi' 11 ill pla,· its positi\'r role nnd will facilitatl' - tht• achif'\·eml'nt of a worthy f!Oal thr sr­rurinf! of a solid aiul la,tinf! pt'acl'. Thi• Sm irt drlei?al ion came to thr Ge­lH'\ a mr..ting \\ ith tlw f!OOd intf'nlions of fat·ilitalinf! thr or!!anization of prar­tiral 1rnrk for thr solution ahO\f' all of thr,r hasir international problrm•- surh as. for rxamplr. thf' org'anization of F.uropPan rnlll't·tin• srrurity and dis­armament. In present conditions these questions haw a dl'r·i,;i,·e nwaninf! for this la,.k of 'lrl'ngtlwninμ; world prart'. The most important issue of the Ge­m'\ ·a conft•rt•nrc• was the problt>m of Europl'an "'curity. The So, iel d!'l1•ption considers that, in thl' inlt•rt•st,; of slrenμ;theninμ; peace. a systt•m of collectiH' sPcurity should he created in Europe. has!'d on the partici­pation of all European 1(0' rrnments and the Pnited Stales of America. Our nrw proposal, on this qu1·,lion. put lo the G1•n1'\a conference. arf' ha•rd <lll tlw consid1•ration that in present cir· cumslarn·r,; - "' lwn opposinf! i:roupinf!s of nations han• lwl'n rreated in Europe - it is rH'CP"ari abon• all lo put tlw relations lwtwt•1•n tlw nations includ1·d in th!',.l' f!r<>Upinirs on thr path of normal peacrful t·oop<'ralion and of thr p!'an·· ful solution of dispul<'' betw!'en them. Jn this fir,;! stage of the creation of an all-Europt'an s!'curity sy,;tem. thr So, il'I propo,als rlo not em i,age thf' liquida­tion of the '\orth Atlantic blo". tlw \'i\•,tprn Europran Pnion or the \\'ar­sa" Trt·at\· Orf!anizalion. With thr pa,,af!e of time. in the >f't·­ond slaf!<'. "lwn 'u<·<'l'"l'' in th!' lP»f'n­ing of Lt•n,ion in Europe will haw lwrn adiit•n•cl and confidence between !(O\­rrnmcnb will ban• hren established. tlw aho\!'·namecl irroupini:s may he dis· sol\l•d and rrplai·rcl hy a collcrli\e 'r· curity svslem in Europe. Togrtlwr with thi,, thr SoYiPl clel!'«a­tion proposed that, before thr crealionr of a Europ!'an rollt'cli\l' security sy,tl'm tlwr<' shou ld be af!r<'<'mPnl on· thr con­dusion of a pact helwrl'n the gO\!'Tll­m<' nts partiripalinμ; in lhC'~e ~roupinf!~ in Europe lo rl'jl'ct fore!' and lo u'r onh 1wa,·1•ful mt'an,; to s..ttl!' thrir dispul<». Tlw t'"f'hanf!t' of opinion' on thi' prohlt•m of European s!'curilY shO\\l'd that all of tlw partiripanb of th!' confl'r­l'nc ·1• wi,hrd lo find an ai:reed solution for this important prohlem. Wr hopt• that in thr c-our'" of futur<' consideration of this problem l'\t'n i:rratrr su,·ct'" will br achit'\Td. On the qut•stion of disarmamrnl th!' So,iet gon•rnmt·nt tahlrd r\rn hdore the Genna confrrPnce on l\fav 10 !'onrrl'lt• propo,-als for th!' r!'durtion of armamt•nts. the outlawing of atomic weapons and tlw remornl of tlw thri·at of war. At tlw Gt•nf'Ya confPTl'nrl' "<' pro· po,Pd to dl'fine tlw alread\· arhit'\t·cl agrrrmt·nt on m•pPrb <'oncPrOin~ which our po,ition,; arr Pitlwr fulh- al ont• or haw _romp sif!nifi,·antly clos~r tof!l'lhrr. This roncrrns fir,;l of all thr fixinl! of thr lt•\d of armanwnts of thr g'O\!'rn· mrnts. prohibition of atomic weapons and tlw nrcrssary establishment of a systPm of rfTt•rti~·e international ron· trols. Tlw cJi,_ru,.sion of thr question of dis­a~ mam1·~1l shmn•1l that all of the parti­!' rpants 111 thp confl'rrnrr wished to find an af(rrNl solution of thi' wrr important FACTS FORUM 'EWS, Of'loh1 r, t !!55 proh for t In po ill' cussi pant• whic cour: prob nrrt Tl the f mPnt efTor ans\\ Tl hl'tw Vari wrrr. n dt'll'~ Gt'rn assu is to tlw unit lrlo th{' T whi rrf'a rlra ti on that a arc t;ik r oin ti on Pow A R.f'p f'On tak Wa I ran rhar f the Ge­hlem of ers that, I( Jl!'UCe, hould he c parlici­cnts and que,tion, re ha,!'d esent cir­roupinp;~ n Europ<' pul llw includ1·cl ~~ nl~;;;:~~ them. on of an ir Sovid liquida· ilor. llw the \\' ar· th!' '('('· e Jp,-,!'n· me he!'n C'en ~O\"· ·,h!'cl. llw hi' di,. t d1•1Pp;a· !'alion of y srt1•m tlir con- μ-on·rn­upin: r'.'- in us<' onh­lispulp,." on this • shO\\l'd r conft·r· solution of fultm' <'n•n llll'lll tlH' ~n hdor!' ~1a1 10 lurtion of ~f atomic th!' thn·at we pro· ad1ieH·d inμ- whid1 at on~ or toμ-rthrr. lhe fi,inμ­lr ~oH~rn­weapons 1rnt of a onal con· on of dis· th<' parti· rd to finrl important 111.,,,., rn55 problt·m which has d!'cisiw siμ;nificann• for the s!'curity of the nations. In this connrction it is 1ircc·"arv to point out that in the cours<' of tlw ·dis­cussions on disarmamrnt till' parlici· pants of the conference made proposals which indubitably will be studied in tlw cours!' of furthe.r n<'gotiations on this problem and will serve to achieve the n1•ce"arv agrermrnt brtwrrn thrm. Tlw Sovirt govrrnmrnt slates that in the furtlwr considrration of thi' disarma­mrnt prohlrm it will makr thr ulmo't efforts to find a solution to tlw prohkm. answering the yearning of the nations. There was an exchange of opinions hrtwren us on the Gnman prohlem. \'arious approaches to this prohlrm wnr cxpr!'ss!'d. Thr l'nil!'d lairs, British and Fr!'nch delr:rntions. s1)('aking of lh<' r!'tmion of Germany, has!'d thrir arμ;umrnts on th!' assumption that WPst Grrmany, which is to hi' rPmilitarized in accordance with lhr Paris agrN•ments -and later a re­unilrrl G!'rmany- must !'Iller into thr hloc·, of tbr J\iorth Atlantic pact and the Western European llnion. The Soviet governm!'nt, lhl'r!'forr. which is consequentially sePking the <'reation of German national unitv. has rlrawn attrntion even lwfor!' thl' ratifica­tion of the Paris agrerments to th<' fart that th<' coming into force of thpse agreements would create difficulties for talks on th!' German prohlem and mah pointl!'ss any discussion on the reunifica­tion of G<'rmany. The Soviet government believes that it is n!'cessary to take the facts into con­sideration. War in Europe ended ten years ago. ince that time two Germani!'s haw ap­pear!' d - the German Democratic RPpuh­lir and the German Federal Repuhli<'· rach with its own economic and sorial structure. Besides this, in accordance with the Paris agr<'!'ments, the German FPd!'ral Rrpuhlic entered upon the path of re­militarization and was included in the military grouping of the Western flOW!'rS. As far as the German DemoPratic Repuhli<' is <'On<'!'rned, in view of the "Onrlnsion of the Paris paC'ts. it has lakrn th!' d!'Pision to parlicipate in the Warsaw Tr!'aty Organization. It is cl!'ar that in surh <'Onrlilions we rannot arμ;ue th!' question of thr me­" haniPal union of the l\\O parts of Grr­many the German DPmocrali<' RPpuh­lir ancl the Federal Repuhlic - because this would be an unrealistic approach lo the problem. Thr Soviet Union was and rrmains a warm supporter of the reunion of G!'r· many as a peace-loving, democratic •lat<'. WP arc de!'p]y convinced that thl' l:rrman prohl!'m must not lw disrus•!'cl Without th<' participation of th!' rppre· · rntatiws of lhe German DPmo<'ratic FACTS FORUM NEWS, October, 1955 •and the German Federal Republics. In the situation whiC"h dt'\l'loped in Europe, the only real approal'h lo the n'union of Germany appears to he by way of a coordinated effort of the four powprs, and also of the German people, which is directed toward a r!'laxation of tension in Europe and the eslahlishm!'nl of confirlence hetween the slates. Just this goal would!)(' Sl'n!'cl hl"·t by the <'r!'ation of a European C'ollectin• st•­<' urity srtem, with the participation of both parts of G!'rmany on a hasis of <'quality until r<'t111ion is ad1ipn•tl. Sin<'<' this would lead to the str!'np;lh· ening of p<'ace in Europ<' ancl crrat<' an obstacle to the growth of G!'rman mili­tarism. tlw obstacles al pr<'s!'nt in thr path of a German reunion could hr rlonr away with. On the other hanrl, for tlw reunion of G!'rmany from llw point of view of lwr int!'rnal conditions, the rapproch!'· m!'nt hetw!'en her two parts is of th<' utmost importanC'e. The SoYiet rlelegation r!'p;r!'ts that further attention was not μ;in•n to the prohlrms of Asia and the Far East at our !'onfprenC'e. Among olhers, such qupstions as llw restoration of the l!'gal riμ-hts of the ChinPse People's Repuhlic in tlw l1nit!'rl \Tations organization, the regulation of the situation in the Formosa r<'gion on the hasis of the recognition of the indis· pulable rights of the Chinese peopl<'. the execution of the Geneva agre!'mrnts on Indochina and other problems will not tolerate postponement. We can never escape these problems. They must be solved in the interests of p<'ace and security in Asia and th!' Far East, in the interests of world peaC'e. The Geneva conf!'rence opened the road for the further treatment and solu-tion of the matured international prob­lems. We also made an important decision about the necessity for wideninμ; con­taC'ts betw!'en East and West and ahout the de1·elopmt·nt anrl strenμ;thPninp; of <'!'Onomic and cultural tics between our states. With these decisions we haYe laid the basis for a wirier cooperation between our countries. Th!' So' irt gowrnm!'nt, on its part. is ready In· all mean" to facilitate such cooperation. It t''P<'<·ts that other par­lic- ipants in thi, !'Onf!'r!'n<'<' will trawl along this road, whiC'h spn·ps the in­t!' re't" of our peopl!'s and the interest> of world peac<'. We all rerogniz!' the importance of the decisions marle her!'. They are the heginninμ; of a n!'w stage in the relation,­hl'tw!' en our counlri!'s. They will facili­tal<' the str<'ngthening of confidence be­tw!' en us, lwtwepn our peoples. These d!'cisions will haw a positin meaning also for other C'Ountries and for the strenp;lhPning of world peace. The warmest warninμ; of all nations is the yearning ·for peaC'e. · The oYiet gowrnment will make thr requisite pfTorts lo translate into action our decisions which are direC'led toward the relaxation of international tension and the strengtheninp; of world peace. This requires the patient and loyal examination of those prohlems which we must still discuss and rernlve. But if this same spirit of cooperation is shown by all of us, as it has heen shown at the Geneva C'onfer!'nce, this will he a reliahle pledμ;e that the nohl!' goal of the maintenance of peace will he aC'hieved and the peoples will be able to look calmly toward the morrow. (Continued on next page) Peace Conference, World War I. The "Big Four," left to right, Orlando, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Woodrow Wilson. Page 15 lnterrieu- of Senator II iclwnlooper Co11ct•r11i11g Accomplishments and Failures at Geneva Senator Bourke B. Hirkenlooper (Re· publican, Iowa). a memh{'r of tht' '.'->1·n· ate- Forei~n Relation!-i Committt·t-. nnd ranking minority mt'mhf"r of thf" Joint ( ommittP.e on -\tomic Enng~- f''\pre··_. .. , .... h1 ... ,-if'w..:. on thi..:. ronlrO\f"r .. ial ... ubjnt l\·h· e being intr.rrnJ?atrd hy Jark Doh· erty of the 'ew l'ork Daily Sews and John \lao!i~an of th~ Wa-hin~ton Bu· rt•au of \1·u·orn·re~· on faf'l..;, Forum's Ht·portf" .... : Roundup program. ( '.\1ADIG ~:'i ): Sena tor, do you belie'e th at the U. S. rnade any rn i '- t a ke~ at the Big Four meeting? think that the Big Four meeting ju•t concluded at Genna was a highly succt>ssful meeting from our standpoint. To answer po•itively that no mi•takes were made. I think, is impo;siblt>. I don't know of any major mistakes that are apparent at thi,; moment. CUADIG ~ '\): Hei:urdi n i: Pre•ident Ei•enh o" e r'• pro­po" al for a free and o pen e xchange of blue1>rint ... and inr;;;;pef' tion be tween Rn'-'>iu's military "- tre n ~th nnd the i nliiita ll a t io n ~ here in the tl. S., do you bc lie ' e that liii Ut°ll a pro posal would C\ er be acceptable to the Atne ri t.·un people? It would he and I think it was a very dramatic demonstra­tion of the fact to the peoples of the world that the l . S. is bent on peace and it now is up to the Ru•sians to an"'er thi; and see whether they really are sincere in their desire for peace. ( '\1 \DIGA :'i): Wo uld •u.-11 a p ropo•al take lei:i• lation in the Senate and the 11ou ... e? hrlie'e it woulcl not nec<'"arilr takl' le~islation. There might be a few phases of it that would require authoriza· lion- C:'I \DIG \'\ ): 1.. . i..; not a fa<" t that many of o ur atomi<· in ... tall ati on .. now are re .. tri t· ted area .. to peopl e- from o ur nation '? There are reslridt'd arras to people of our nation al the moment ancl that i,; on a basis of '!'Curit\'. Ilowen•r. th!' .\tomic Energy Commission has broad latil;td<' to decla"ify information and installations and I think that that authority probably 1rnuld ht> sufficient. although I would ha\e to C"heck it a little more 1·lost>h. CU \DIG \:'i): Do you br lie'e th at Ru •ia " ould accept th i ... propo..,al o f the PrC"~ide nl0 1iii'! • 'o. I don't. ( DOHERT Y): \\'ell, <.,e nator, in the ''""' th a t Ru.-ia did arf"ept th i'lil drumutit: propo .. al of Pre ... ide nt Ei"en­h o\'\e r~ .... wo uldn"t th at mean th at we wo ul d o pen up e ' e ry "in,::le "'E'<"ret th inl! we Jta , f", lay it on the table nnd Q;ay. ull e re it i"'i, <·ome tuke a look at it '!,, Uy th at 'lilnme toJ... c-n wouldn't wc then ha' e to throw uwuy o ur entire "it"'f"Urity o rgunirution whieh i1.t n1eunt to protec l our "'<"<"rets from JH"ople e'en in th i"' rountry'! ;'\o. I clon't ht'lie1·p that the proposal contemplates such a broad and minute in,pt·C"tion of evcrythin~ we haw- (DOHERTY): Pre•ident Ei•enho" er u'ed 1he word blue· print ... - Page 16 I understand, but blueprints indicate the location of our military installations and our plants, and the oiler as [ H't' it did not go to the disclosure of every last secrt'l dewlop· mt'nl which we have, engineeringwisl' and from a s<·ientifit· standpoint. It ollered to let the Hu'Sians make aerial photo· graphs pro,·iding they gaw us the same information Tl" garding locations of tlwir plants, types of plants, and tlw pt'rmission £or us to makt> simultaneous aerial photograph» 1 don't believe it included all of our scientific knowledge. \'re do not maintain secrecy in these plants in order to keep the information away from th<• American people. We main· lain secrecy in order to k<•ep information away from tho•e nations who are opposed to us, and from our enemies who would increase the thn•at of war if they learned about it. That is the purpose of srcrecy. ( DOHERTY): W<"ll, s 1><"11k in l( merely h ypothetirull y. Senator, if we wert' to exchunf:'e this information with Ru ..... ia, i1m't it po-.,ihl <" tha t '!Om e n a tio n rni ght tak e ad­va nlnJ!f' or th is a nd k nowi n ~ our weu knesse~ build u p and try to do ~o m e th i n g ngai n ~t thern '! Well. I presume hypolhrtic·ally that might be possible, ancl wt I think the hPnefits which would accrue to the caus!' of jieace and to ours!'h <'' would overshadow the danp;rr,. I think it is a cakulatNl ri>k. one of those calculated risks it is worthwhile to tak!'. ( II IJRLEIGll): St>na tor, u momt'nt Hl(O you SUl(j:<'•ted th at the Pre'iide nt's ugreeme nt, if u<·repted, to g h e bluf'­print" and ueriul ph ot o~ ru 1>h y ri ght..; to th e- ~ O\ iN .. would not nN·e"t~u ril y n t'ed legi"l lution. Would th at m("an that it would <·ome under un cxe<"utivc n1treeme nt h<-­tween the Pre<oiide nt and the heud of ~t u t e of the So"i et Uni o n '! The authority for classification of information in the atomic field is \'ested almost pntirt'lv with the Commission-tlw AEC. They can classify or de<;la'Sify as their judgment and the st>nsiti,enr'• of the information indical('s. In 1·01u1t·1·tion with our military t>stah]i,hm!'nts. thrre is "hat tht>v rail "war information," or '"military inrormation" 0£ a ~e~:-;itin• nalurr which i' gcnt>rally in the province of the errNan­of Oeft>ns!' or tlw PrPsidenl to hold S!'t'Ure or to releast'. and while there may he certain things that a re prolectt>d hf la1\. and I can't recall if th1•re art• su!'h areas. it is mv Yit>w at this moment that the t>nlirt' discretion would he locl'!t>d eitlwr in thr Prt>sidt>nl, thl' St'rrl'lary of Orfrnse or the A fl. in rnnneclion with the cleelassifiration of most of th<·se plants . ( Hl'RLEIGll): But, th ere would hn'" to be an al(rt'r· m t" nt ~ th e re would lul\ e to he authori ty, th e re would lul\ e to be .,ome o,Qrt o f u " i ~n ed papt"r- Tlwre would ha1·e to h<' a simultaneous authorization or per· mi"ion given hy tlw KrPmlin to our people at the same time the\' wpre permiltt>d to !'Omc hl're and take a look and to make aerial photographs. ( TI URLEIGH): I um only t ryi ni: to e'tubl i<h wh et her or not the President would be do in l! thi ... in his <"U llm·i t,- U" the Pre'- ide nt thro u ~ h un t"Xf't·uthe u,:reeme nt riu her th an as a treaty whit·h would have to be ratified by the Senate. Well. you haw raised a qurstion whi!'h 1 ju0 t haYen't look!'d up in the time since it was propost>cl, hut it is my Yiew at this mom!'nt- suhj!'cl. of !'Ours<>. to change if tht' law is dif· ferPnt than I think il is- il is within tlw power of the Pn·-i· d<•nt no" to make information publicly arnilahlt'. or in thr t>crelary of D<·fer1'-e or in llw Commis,ion itsp]f. FACTS FORUM NEWS, Ortober, 1,q55 ;'\o. ha' m1·1 thi1 and ~Oil ~ar: te11' lit' lo pt·a r 11 ha tlw llw mr Th mi PP tht fol \ t l'O th 11 .. ft. 110 Is no m1 I th c·r " JI k1 ti 11 If rn it f, F a on of our r as I ~t·t· et drn·lop· s<'ientifir rial photo· ation rt'· s, and tlw otographs. nowlt>di:<'· er to kt'ep We main· from those emies who about it. othetirully, r.ation wilh fht tnke nd­' build up sgible. and e rau•t' of dan~t'r•. I ted ri•h it ~ sug,::f' .. tt"d o gh·e blu<"­thf' So~iN.., [e!~:~~n1:1 i~~~ r the So,iN the atomil' ssion-tlw ~ment and ('OOJlt•f'tinll t they rail a ~en~itin~ e St>rrt'lan elt>asr. and ted by la". my vif'w nt hr lod2<'d or tht> Af:I I l of thr"t' ~ nn u,::ref"· there "'ould Ilion or per· e •ame timl' look and to ) whether or ~ ('ll)lUf'il,- U" ~nent ruth"r ti ficd hy the \en't looked my Yiew at r law is dif· of thr Pn•,i· Ir. or in the lf. lrtober, 1955 f'l\OIG,\'.'): Can'"<" no~ tru .. t Hu ...... iu, in your opinion? :\o. no. I don't think "r nm. I think till' Hu"ian ohjeetives ha\t' not diani::t•d one iota; thl'ir ohjt•t·li\l's ar!' still funda· mt·ntally \\Orld communism· ·lo communizl' th!' world. I think tl;t•y an• in a period in "hich tlwy use hlancli,hmC'nls and put on th<'ir brst and most fri<'ndly fat·t•. l\ly
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