corrective recommendations, applied to
diplomacy, which are worth study.
Mr. Huddleston feels that there has
been too much scurrying around on the
part of chiefs-of-state and foreign ministers, too much discussion of delicate
negotiations while slill in process, too
many highly publicized "conferences.'
too much appeal and response to popular, ill-informed emotion. He feels thai
the use of the UN as a platform for invective is a constant threat to peace.
While urging a return to diplomacy,
quietly and expertly conducted, the
author realizes the difficulties attending
such a change, for he accompanies this
recommendation with the observation
that this would require a large-scale
change of personnel. Indeed, few would
be in favor of a policy of secret diplomacy in the hands of the foreign policy
hierarchy whose crumbling architecture
is today such a blot on the global landscape. And they would insist, also, that
the people be given some semblance of
a choice of national policy in elections.
Delightful is the manner in which Mr.
Huddleston answers the apologists for
the foreign policies which have brought
us where we are—those apologists who
say criticism must be "constructive,
that if we say these policies are wrong
we must have something to put in their
"Since it is expected that criticism be
'constructive.' I will offer some suggestions along this line of thought. First,
however, let me deny the assumption
that one cannot render needed and constructive service by merely exposing
fatal errors and abuses. That, quite conceivably, may be lhe most important
service of all, even though, hy a curious
quirk, it has now become the fashion
to protest whenever the evils of any
system are pointed out. But. what have
you to put in its place? is always asked.
It may not be necessary to put anything
in the place of bad practices. It may he
sufficient to abandon them. If a dipsomaniac is urged to stop drinking to save
his life or preserve his sanity, it is
rather fatuous to tell him to try taking
narcotics, chewing gum. or eating can-
dies. He can. if he pleases, take drugs.
chew gum or eat candies; it is possible
that this substitution of one habit for
another will help; but it is no part of
the business of the person who warns
him of the consequences of his dangerous addiction to teach him how to
contract other habits. He must stop
drinking—that is the first step.
". . . So with the system of popular
diplomacy, whose ravages I have described briefly in these pages. If we are.
as nations, to recover from the serious
public illness into which we have fallen
Ihe first and last recipe is to stop fur
ther indulgence in at least the grosser
and more fatal phases of popular diplo
macv. Cut out the much advertised con
ferences, the top-level meetings, the bitter public discussions, the perpetual
agitation, the interminable speeches
about foreign affairs, the inflammatory
newspaper comments, the incessant
comings-and-goings of politicians, the
working up of crises. More discretion.
decent silence, these are 'negative' remedies; but the result will be a 'positive'
gain in diplomatic health."'
Of particular interest is Mr. Huddleston's discussion of the position of commanding influence that Maxim Litvinov
achieved in the League of Nations. Litvinov sold Western diplomats two pernicious doctrines which today represent
foundation stones of the United Nations
and of our own foreign policy,
"All the pacifists of the League were
bound lo applaud when Litvinov called
for 'collective security,' which meant
that all countries (with a mental restriction in favor of Russia) should
jump with both Feel into anv local wetland destroy each other. He coined another clever and seductive phrase, 'indivisible peace,' which signified much
the same thing. For my part, I held
that 'collective security' was really 'collective suicide,' and that 'indivisible
peace' amounted to 'indivisible war'—
war on a bigger and bigger scale, world
war whenever two or more tiny states
started a dogfight. But the most responsible ministers from the great powers
piously repeated the words after Litvinov, and the most earnest peace-workers
in Geneva thrilled at the prospect of an
" 'Russian communism emerged from
the First World War; world communism will emerge from a Second World
War.' said a cynical Russian observer.
The unexpressed condition was that Russia should keep out of the Second World
War after having provoked it."
True enough, the Soviet Union entered a non-aggression pact with Nazi
Germany, participated in the enslavement of the Polish people, and then sat
complacently on the sidelines while the
Western powers went to war with Germany. Stalin overlooked one point: the
madness of Hitler.
For those who look to the United \ei-
lions for the establishment of peace. Mr.
Huddleston has this to say: "• • ■ most of
the evils of the League of Nalions persist in this international organization
which grew- oul nf the Second Wen Iel
War—in some respects they bene been
aggravated. . . . Though the UN was established to preserve peace, ii was soon
admitted by both sides thai peace was
most likely to be maintained by wars
against aggressors and by gigantic mililarv preparations. The Orwellian slogan
that 'Wen is Peace' weis. consciously or
unconsciously, from the beginning
adopted by both conflicting groups within the UN."
UN adherents have claimed that the
Korean War proved the usefulness of
that organization in deterring aggression. Sisley Huddleston offers an explanation for the Soviet delegate's strange
absence from the Security Council the
absence which permitted the conversion
of President Truman's "police action"
into a UN war:
"Only the unexplained absence of lhe
Russian delegate from the Security
Council in June. 1950. made possible
the' UN intervention in the Korean War.
Probably the absence was due to the
shrewd perception that such action
would greatly drain and weaken the
United States, would train the new
Chinese military machine, and would
solidify Chinese public opinion behind
the Communist regime, while imposing
no serious burdens on Soviet Russia."
It is inconceivable that the Kremlin
rulers were ignorant of the impending
Communist allack in Korea. They either
miscalculated very badly or else knew.
also, lhal lhe United Stales would not
be permitted to achieve victory.
Popular Diplomacy and War is a most
helpful book which provides perceptive
commentary on many facets of the present world situation. But there is one
major point to which the author could
have given more attention. It is a point
now brought lo lhe fore bv the' successful carrying-oul of the Kremlin's "peaceful coexistence" line. Yet, in his opposition to theatrical conferences and meetings of chiefs-of-state, Mr. Huddleston
is very much on the right track.
Il is simply this. The Communist
tyrants in Moscow and Peiping rule a
vast slave empire. The people of dozens
of originally independent countries are
suffering under the most extensive and
most brutal slave system the world has
ever known. Not only the people of
Czechoslovakia, Poland. East Germany,
Hungary, Bulgaria, lhe Baltic countries,
and others desire release from foreign
conquest and tyranny. Ih'' people oF
Russia, lhe Ukraine. Byelorussia. Georgia — and China — must have some
yearning for freedom, for some release
from the terror of the total Communisl
police state. These people must look for
hope to the free peoples of the world.
But if the elected representatives of the
free peoples constantly honor and dignify murderous tyrants at e
ami international cocktail parlies, they
offer scant hope to lhe wretchedly enslaved.
There will be few supporters for the
thesis of a war of liberation, and such
a thesis has nol been seriously advanced.
Evil is not destroyed by attempting to
annihilate ils victims — by saturation
bombings of non-combatant civilian
populations and other acts which fulfill
only evil's intent. If we learned nothing
else frnm World War 11. we should have
learned that. Bui rejection of initiation
(Continual mi Page 54)
FACTS FORUM NEWS, October, 1955