by constitutional means, and make it
slick. We took for granted that resistance
to Communist attack would remain our
If the President had staled what was
official policy, what could hinder us
from following the new course? We did
not believe the one essential fact—the
colleetivist, global. pro-Soviet elite never
quits. It only goes underground, until
the conflict is forgotten. Then it surfaces again, ready for action, while we
sleep. It puts on a new cover of pro-
Americanism, but it is unchanged.
From 1947 to today the colleetivist
elite has let the pro-Americans win the
public victories, but it has promptly
pulverized the true American policies in
It may help to call the globalist-collec-
tivist-pro-Russian group the Acheson
group. We are, however, dealing with
something much stronger than personalities. Forrestal is dead, but his policy has
been revived again and again. Acheson
is gone, but the evil that he did lives
The important point is that we did
not have a united American government
which could, after debate, set a final
American policy. We had two centers
of policymaking competing for mastery.
The globalists made no attempt to
attack or debate the Forrestal policy of
rearming. They set out secretly to undermine it, so tbat it would sink slowly,
silently into the ground, and collapse in
a heap of dust.
As soon as they thought it safe their
tame columnists began to beat the
drums. Their friends in the State Department and other government agencies
came forward piously with their loaded
proposals—always under a carefully innocent surface, proposals to sabotage
hard mililarv resistance and go back to
the Teheran-Yalta policies.
You know what happened to Forrestal. You may not remember what happened to his successor. Louis Johnson.
He tried desperately with reduced appropriations, to gel American military
forces in readiness in 1950. A few weeks
after the Korean war began, the columnists who worked wilh the elite began
a bitter attack on him. He was let oul
summarily. He learned from the newspapermen of his replacement by General Marshall.
On the foreign-policy front thc colleetivist one-worlders diverted the Truman doctrine for hard military aid
"gainst communism into Ihe Marshall
plan for economic aid for people in the
line of march of thc Communisl legions.
' have said again and again thai the
Marshall plan was Greek-Turkish aid
with ils claws pulled. It could roar
fiercely at Soviet Russia but never burl
". In fail, il was selling the table for
Stalin, enriching the countries the Soviel
Union intended to take without conquest.
Was President Truman to blame for
abandonment of the hard Truman doctrine and ils replacement by the soft
policy of economic aid? I do not say so.
So long as two competing centers of
power battle for control of the American
government, any President is nearly
helpless. The elite was stronger than
President Roosevelt. It was stronger
than President Truman. Early in 1952,
in describing the Colossus on the Potomac, I said I did not want President
Truman to head up such powers. I did
not want any Democratic President to
bead up sucb powers, and I did not
want any Republican President to head
up such powers.
Neither am I criticizing the Demo-
eieeiii- party. This supraconstitutional
elite is stronger than any American political party.
Slowly our security deteriorated on
In June, 1948, Senator Vandenberg
bad introduced the resolution authorizing a regional pact with European nations. He did not suspect this was one
of the interchangeable purls in lhe plan
for NATO. Our security was tied to nations in which nearly one-third of the
electors voted Communist, and where
the trade unions, seaports, rail lines, and
other services were under tight Communist control.
Secretary Acheson drew a line in the
Pacific leaving Korea to the Communist
Empire. Our troops were withdrawn and
Formosa was solemnly excluded from
the territory necessary to make the Pacific a peaceful lake, and to keep the
west coasl of the United States secure.
When the Communists struck in Korea, the collectivisl one-worlders talked
victory but they set oul secretly to undermine it, to belittle it, to tie it up in
a legal maze. You remember the steps.
The one-worlders put our troops under the United Nations, but the UN included Soviet Russia and her satellites.
They pretended we were fighting the war
in Korea for Korea, though the war
actually was for all Asia, and it should
have been fought on lhe territory of thc
real enemy—Red China. The elile di-
verted badly needed American troops to
Europe in spile of bitter opposition in
Congress. Then when victory was in
sight, thev agreed to a cease-fire on
terms the Soviet LInion had proclaimed
six months before.
Our pro-American mililarv and naval
officers pulled us oul of the cease-fire
negotiations with honor. They refused lo
return the anti-Communist Chinese prisoners of war to the Communists io be
murdered like the hostages surrendered
That success, however, was not to last.
In December, 1952, at the UN, Krishna*
Menon, in league with the American one-
worlders, rewrote the cease-fire agreement and provided for a new brainwashing of the pitiful prisoners, so the Communists could be saved from the disgrace of losing most of the Chinese
soldiers, who found a chance to get
In the election of 1952 the American
people voted overwhelmingly for pro-
American foreign and military policies,
but that meant nothing to the globalist
elite. They went underground again.
President Eisenhower replaced obsequious Joint Chiefs of Staff with a x igor-
ous pro-American body. Secretary Wilson and the new Joint Chiefs set out
to repair the damage from our "accordion" defense policy, which by running
appropriations up and down has kept
our military program in turmoil.
President Eisenhower also rescinded
the shameful order by which the 7th
Fleet had been sent to defend the Red
China coast against the Nationalist
Peace was imminent in Korea. The
American military were aware of our
obligation to make sure the battle-lrard-
encd Chinese armies in North Korea
were not moved to another place on the
chessboard, like Indochina, to capture
more millions of human slaves.
Americans breathed easy for the first
time in many years. That was our mistake. It was the moment the elite were
The one-world collectivists knew thev
could soon surface again, and reduce to
dust the courageous policies of the
Presidenl and lhe Joint Chiefs.
In Berlin in February, 195 I. the Red
Chinese were given de facto recognition
as the legal government of China, on
equal footing with the United States.
The siege of Dien Bien Phu, which
had some of the earmarks of a planned
disaster, focused the world's attention
on thc difficulties of jungle fighting. In
a theatrical atmosphere of defeat the
Western nalions surrendered at Geneva
half of the richest section of Asia, the
military key to the South Pacific.
Our military were caught napping.
Suddenly ihey talked of entering the
Indochinese war by sending Americans
to fight on the soil of Indochina. The
onh Bound strategy would have been to
equip both the South Koreans and the
Nationalists to the highest point of efficiency and then say to Red China—
"'The instant ibere is a Communist uprising in Indochina, the Koreans and
Nationalists will move in on your railroads and airfields."
We can have confidence in the patriotism and intelligence of our military men.
lt was from them 1 learned of the pitiful
transportation lines from North to South
(Continued on Page 34)
Facts forum news, Oetabtr, 1955