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Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955
File 029
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Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955 - File 029. University of Houston Libraries. University of Houston Digital Library. Web. October 29, 2020. https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/69/show/28.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955 - File 029. Facts Forum News, 1955-1956. University of Houston Libraries. Retrieved from https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/69/show/28

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum, Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955 - File 029, Facts Forum News, 1955-1956, University of Houston Libraries, accessed October 29, 2020, https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/69/show/28.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

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Title Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955
Alternate Title Facts Forum News, Vol. IV, No. 9, October 1955
Series Title Facts Forum News
Creator
  • Facts Forum
Publisher Facts Forum
Date unknown
Language eng
Subject
  • Anti-communist movements
  • Conservatism
  • Politics and government
  • Hunt, H. L.
Place
  • Dallas, Texas
Genre
  • journals (periodicals)
Type
  • Text
Identifier AP2.F146 v. 4 1955; OCLC: 1352973
Collection
  • University of Houston Libraries
  • Facts Forum News
Rights No Copyright - United States
Item Description
Title File 029
Transcript —.-..., a*»5«*«ei,e and in the villages. How paradoxial this is. Here we see the ironical siluation of the dictators speaking like democrats, with a small "d," appealing to the people; of the tyrant extolling the virtues of freedom; of the oppressor dramatizing himself as the liberator and the emancipator. Yes, the irony of an im perialist extolling the virtues of self-determination. In our anxiety to win thc debate point by point, to discredit our opponent on each and every occasion. we sacrifice the affirmative case that we need to make. To be sure, this is not always the case. The President's proposal of use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is an example of what I mean by accentuating lhe positive and stating the affirmative case. Whenever we have done this we have been on the march to victory. The Marshall plan is another example where we literally ignored the arguments of the Kremlin and proceeded with our own program. NATO again provides a concrete example of action. The Point Four program is another example where a positive and constructive proposal left the Communists bewildered, confused and weakened. We have examples of seizing the initiative, but all loo often once we have seized it and are parading down the boulevard of a belter world, we lose our trail and end up in a side street or back alley of bitter argument with the Communist protagonist. There has been far too much "playing to the domestic political galleries" for purposes of partisan political expediency. Too much doubletalk — a policy for home consumption and another for foreign use. What is worse. this doubletalk has come from the State Department. . . . We may very well have to shift the emphasis in our foreign policy in the days to come. I am personally convinced lhat the Soviet Union has given up any hope of any further success in Europe. She may well seek lo stabilize Europe 'Mn lo the point of cooperating in the reunification of Germany and granting her satellite states a degree of independence and autonomy. Wc have no accurate way of knowing how much trouble, economically or politically, exists within the Iron Curtain area. We do know thai all is not well. We do know that if lhe burden of rearmament is heavy upon rich America, it rests nun b heavier upon the much weaker Soviet economy. Remember it costs money to build guns, tanks, and planes in the Soviet just as it does here. I am always shocked and disappointed when I hear spokesmen of American finance and industry expound upon the fear of bankruptcy for our country if we maintain a strong defense program. They show little faith in free political and economic institutions, or possibly FACTS FORUM NEWS, October, 1955 they reveal gross ignorance of whal lhe burden of such a rearmament race is upon a relatively poor and collectivized economy. Then I imagine it is fair to assume that all has nol been well in the satellite countries. They were impoverished and destroyed by tbe war, as were huge areas of lhe Soviet Union itself. Add to this the costs of thc Korean war to the Soviet, her aid to China, the admitted deficiencies of Soviet agriculture, the difficult task of rebuilding the areas destroyed by World War II, and it seems reasonable to say that there is and has been trouble behind the Iron Curtain. But it would be equally wrong to assume that economic difficulties alone would prevent the Soviet from being an aggressor or engaging in war. Possibly the most compelling factor, if there is only one, that has temporarily changed the Soviet attitude is the terrible reality of nuclear warfare. We now know that the Soviet military has a closer identity with the present regime than before. Possibly General Zhukov and some of his associates have been able to explain lo the Soviet leaders what would happen if the United States and the Soviel Union were to engage in war. The awful potentialities of the hydrogen bomb, and the guided missile wilh hydrogen warheads cannot help but have an effect upon men who now hold power and position and wish to continue in thai favored role. There is more reason to believe tbat the men in the Kremlin want time to consolidate llieir empire. time to strengthen their economy, time to consolidate their position—a position which has been very unstable since the death of Stalin. Whatever may be the reason for the Soviet peace talk, there is ample evidence to lead one to believe that concessions will be made, thai tensions, at leasl temporarily, will be eased, lhat there will be a period of time when lhe possibilities for peace look more inviting and encouraging. The one word thai seems important to me is time. But Ihis concept of lime is meaningless unless it is used, and the question is who will use the time and for what purpose. If there is to be a time period for easing of tensions, will this mean less effort on our part? Are we to assume that the long-range objective of communism—namely, to dominate lhe world—will be given up or set aside? I see no convincing evidence lo lead to that conclusion. Therefore time is an ally to whomever pre-empts it— uses it. We can be sure the Bolsheviks will not waste it—whether we like it or not, coexistence will be competitive. . .. We Americans arc prone to underestimate the technical competence of the modern Soviet system. The record should be clear: The Soviet has made remarkable strides in technical and scientific advance. She emphasizes her educational structure, science and technology. Every policy and every directive is concentrated on producing military strength. Civilian goods, the needs of the consumer, are subordinated to the production of capital goods and modern armaments. The police slate is not responsive to public opinion as is a democratic state. We must never forget that dictatorship removes dissident elements through the cruel and heartless process of liquidation, murder, and banishment. Public demonstrations of protest are crushed, at the same time lhat the dictator arouses in the minds of the people a fear of foreign intervention, encirclement, or attack. I say these things because even some of our own policymakers have, on occasion, indicated that there may be a split between the Russian people and the Communist party. The people have nothing to say about the government of the Soviet. The Communist party and the government are one and the same. They are political Siamese twins, but with only one head—the Communist party apparatus. It is wishful thinking to base a foreign policy upon any major upheaval in the Soviet Union, or even in the satellite states. What is more, when one such upheavel did take place, namely, the riots in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in June of 195H. we were unprepared, we bad no policy. All the loose talk of liberation that was so much a part of the 1952 presidential campaign, was either forgotten or forsaken. We were without an Ambassador in the Soviet Union on the death of Stalin. Our Central Intelligence was unable to obtain any information that indicated the demotion of Malenkov and thc elevation of Bulganin. We were short of facts and information, and therefore unprepared to make any policy shift thai might have worked to our advantage. Every conceivable effort should be made to expand our intelligence service to give us more information. We were caught short even at the time of the North Korean invasion, despite the facl that our own military had been in North Korea for at least two years prior to the agreement on the 38th parallel as a line of demarcation between North and South Korea. Therefore, wishful thinking about the condition of the Soviet will get us nowhere. What is more important is to build strength and cooperation between ourselves and our allies—to use every means at our command to expand the area of freedom, to strengthen the independent and neutral nations so they can resisl subversion from within and aggression from withoul. Yes. to be prepared for every eventuality, recognizing Page 27
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