pictures of the smiling President, apparently exchanging pleasantries with
the smiling Communist butchers. We
may be sure that the Soviet government
has had those pictures .distributed in
every city and hamlet behind the Iron
Curtain—along with Mr. Eisenhower's
statement that he believes Ihe Soviets
have good intentions. I cannot imagine
a more lethal blow to the morale of the
captive peoples than the reports thev arc
sure lo get of Mr. Eisenhower's friendly
meeting with llieir oppressors.
While I am on this subjeel. I lliink
it is finally time to sav a word aboul the
n-lettionship between the President and
Marshal Zhukov. If Dwighl Eisenhower
were a private citizen, his friendship
with a Communist might be nobody's
business but his own. But he is not. He
is the President of lhe United Stales:
and. as such, ought to have a decent
regard for the feelings of his countrymen. Marshal Zhukov may have been
Mr. Eisenhower's wartime "buddy." a
comrade in arms, and all that: but it
remains that he is a leading member of
a ruthless cabal that holds one-third of
the world's peoples in chains, and that,
"lo boot." is determined lo destroy the
I nited State's. It goes without saving
thai Marshal Zhukov would not be where
he is today, did he not support communism wholeheartedly and did he not
jeee-M'ss the measure of deceit, treachery,
and brutality that qualifies for membership in the Communisl high command.
The argument that, through Zhukov. we
have .1 pipeline to the Kremlin is sheer
nonsense: Zhukov is not going to tell
lhe President anything the Communist
leadership does not want him to know.
Moreover, the sort of thing that Zhukov
is likely to tell the Presidenl is the sort
of thing the President should hear less
of. not more.
Before I am berated for making an
i~sue' eef tic Kisenhower-Zhukov relationship, let me ask those who would berate'
me what they would have said and
written had Franklin Roosevelt con-
eluded a pact of mutual trust and friendship with, say, Hermann Gocring or
So far, I have spoken of the Geneva
conference largely in terms of the Communisls' success in demoralizing the
West. But it would be very wrong to
suppose that the atmosphere of appeasement generated at Geneva damaged only
our spirit, our will to resist. There is
every reason to believe thai concrete
measures of appeasement were agreed
upon at Geneva which have not been
revealed lo the American people.
Last Monday [July 251 the Presidenl
assured us that there were no secret
agreements either written or otherwise
eet Geneva. Wc were also led to believe
lhat the' Far Eastern situation was not discussed. But on Wednesday, Prime Min
ister Eden lold the House of Commons
that the Far Eastern crisis had been discussed in lhe secrel Big Four meetings.
What was decided in those secret meetings, we do not know. But in the light
of the Slale Department announcement
—coming, as it did. right after Geneva
—of talks with the Chinese Communists
on the question of a ceasefire in the
Formosa Straits, il is highly probable
iheil the President agreed with the Communists to negotiate about Quemoy and
Moreover, in view of today's news that
lhe Chinese Communists have released
eleven of lhe remaining 477 American
prisoners of weir, it is possible thai this
week's ambassadorial talks will simply
ratify a deal made at the Big Four meeting to surrender the offshore islands lo
the Communists, for it has long been
apparent that we would bargain for the
return of our prisoners of war by making territorial concessions to Red China.
Whatever agreement about the Far
Easl nets reached in Geneva, it is clear
iheil lhe campaign to sell out free China
is under a full head of steam. The administration has already gone back on
its solemn promise to Chiang Kai-shek
not to negotiate on questions dealing
with the rights and territories of the
Republic of China without the participation of thc free Chinese. The administration does not want Chiang's representatives ai those talks, for lhe understandable reason lhat ihev would oppose' the administration's plans. Once
Quemoy and the Matsus are lost, the Republic of China will be effectively neutralized and there will no longer be any
realistic hope of having Chiang return
to the mainland—-a fact the administration knows onlv too well.
Our policy toward Free China is more
than a betrayal of a devoted and fighting ally: it is a blatant repudiation of
the Republican party's solemn pledges
to the American people. Once again, let
tne recall to the Senate' what we Republicans lold thc American people in 1952.
when wc asked them to elect us to office:
"We shall again make liberty into a
beacon light of hope that will penetrate
lhe dark places. That program will give
the Voice of America a real function. It
will mark lhe end of the negative, futile.
and immoral policy of 'containment
which abandons countless human beings
to a despotism and godless terrorism,
which in turn enables the rulers l" forge
the captives into a weapon for our
Mr. Presidenl. lhe' way wc have lived
up to that promise does not make nn
proud of my party. There are three
areas in lhe world where we might have'
implemented a policy of liberation, bul
have refused to do so. We mighl have
implemented ii in Eastern Europe, along
the lines 1 suggested several weeks ago.
by withdrawing diplomatic recognition
from the satellite regimes, and by establishing governments-in-exile. But the administration is satisfied wilh expressing
a humanitarian concern for the satellite
peoples. We might have implemented it
in Korea, by giving the armies of South
Korea the equipment and support they
need to liberate their northern brethren.
Bul the administration has termed such
a liberation attempt "an aggressive
war.*' and we eire- now withholding the
supplies which the South Koreans need
in order to go it alone.
Finally, we might have kept Chiang
Kai-shek's forces unleashed. But the
Truman-Acheson policy has been revived, and we are proceeding with the'
neutralization of Formosa.
The coming sellout in Asia is different from most sellouts in the past, in
that this time we can clearly see it
coming. There is thus the opportunity
to prevent it—if only there were the
will. On the level of the national government, lhat will does not exist, for the
once powerful opposition to appeasement, encompassing nearly every Republican legislator, has all but faded away.
There is only the remnant. The Eisenhower administration has adopted every
important plank of the Democratic
party's foreign policy. And since the
President does precisely what the Demo-
crats want him to do. there is no chance
of opposition there. Most Republicans.
I think, are. in their hearts, opposed
lo lhe President's policies. But they have
accepted thc theory that they cannot
return to office in 1956 without having
Mr. Eisenhower at the head of the party
lie kit: and they are. I am afraid, prepared to subordinate consideration of
sound policy to those of political survival. As a result, the Republican party
platform is just a scrap of paper.
It is not a pretty picture—the Geneva
demoralization and the China sellout,
and it mosl certainly is not a hopeful
Five years ago I saw a picture that
was only slightly less bleak and slightlv
less hopeful than this one. It depicted
a situation that affected the survival of
this nation every bit as seriously as does
the situation today. As I saw it then,
there was only one recourse—to take
the issue to the American people. That
is lhe onlv solution I see today. I shall
go to the people.
If I. and the others who will join me
in this fight, are successful it will be
because the American people have the
innate good sense to make sound and
courageous decisions when thev eire
given the- facts. I propose to give them
the facts, ll may be too late, but insofar
as my eileililies and enduranre permit. I
shall see to it that this countrv does not
die without the people of the country
being given a chance to save it.
FACTS FORUM NEWS, Octobtr, 1955