So as to this fir-i American objective,
thai of enlightening the President about
Communist objectives, it must be said
that the conference not only failed lo
enlighten him. but cemented his delusions and spread them to others.
Nor did our second objective—that
of bowling over the Russians from positions of strength—fare any better. Vi e
heard a great deal of talk before the
conference began to the effect that Russia was weak, that her economy had
collapsed, that her empire was falling
apart, that she was thus prepared to
make concessions to the West in order
to keep going. Secretary Dulles suggested we would be able to drive a hard
bargain at Geneva, and could wrench
some concessions from the Communists.
The first day of the Big Four meeting
demonstrated how pathetically wrong
Mr. Dulles had been. The President
made a stab at starting up a discussion
of issues regarding which the Communists might make concessions—those of
the satellite countries and international
communism. In practical effect, the
Communists simply laughed in his face;
our delegation then dropped the subject
like a hot potato. Neither were the Communists impressed with our strong positions when the subject of Germany
came up. And so on down the line.
Mr. Dulles' highly touted policy of
negotiating from strength never got off
the "round at Geneva. Today, it is utterly bankrupt. Not even State Department
propagandists have dared suggest that
in the coming negotiations with the Chinese Communists we are dealing from
a position of strength.
Now, of course, these facts make it
difficult for the administration and its
apologists to claim that we won a victory at Geneva. Nonetheless, the claim
is made, and it is made more ronfi-
dentlv and more vigorously than had we
forced the Soviets to disgorge half their
empire. America won a great victory,
we are told, because President Eisenhower emerged from the Geneva conference the most popular man in Europe.
The attempt to equate America's political fortunes with Dwight Eisenhower's
ranking on a world-wide popularity roster began the day the conference opened ; today it is revealed truth that American diplomacy triumphed because Mr.
Eisenhower-won the popularity contest.
A more flagrant non sequitur can hardly
be imagined. The argument assumes
what I insist is demonstrably false—
namely, that the views that made Mr.
Eisenhower popular served the interests
of the United States and the cause of
Of course, Mr. Eisenhower was popular with the European neutralists. Of
course', thev loved him. He said precisely
what thev wanted to hear, and did pre
cisely what thev wanted him to do. He
announced that Communists sincerely
wauled peace. He sealed a friendship
pact with the Soviel leaders. He changed
America's policy from one of militant
opposition to communism to one that
comes \erv close to wanting peace at
any price. His lines al Geneva would
not have read much differently had the
European neutralists dictated every word
Mr. Presidenl. let me cite a typical
account of European reaction. This one
is from the Washington Post and Times
Herald, under the banner headline "Ike's
Geneva Triumph Has Britain Cheering."
Here is the story:
"London.—Britain is in a mood of
double cheering about the United States.
For in British eyes. America has come
around to a sensible approach toward
liiis-ia and has begun to give ground
from its obstinate stand against the Chinese Communists. Most Britons probably
would agree that both changes amount
to American acceptance of the British
approach toward the Communist world."
Then the article goes on to say:
"I nquestionably, the summit conference was President Eisenhower's triumph. To Britons and Western Europeans in general, the President's approach
to the Russians represented a revival of
the kind of American leadership in the
grand manner to which they had been
so accustomed in the day of Franklin
A revival. Mr. President, in Franklin
Roosevelt's grand manner.
I continue the quotation:
"In a way the President's performance wrote final finis to the dreary
period of McCarthyism which caused
such revulsion among America's friend-
in Western Europe"
Mr. Eisenhower's performance was.
indeed, a return to the grand manner of
Franklin Roosevelt the grand manner
of Teheran and Yalta. And it was. indeed, a repudiation of McCarthyism,
which, in the eves of our so-called European friends, is the symbol for hard
But before we rejoice any further over
the fail that Mr. Eisenhower made a hit
in Europe. Iel us think long and hard
about how Jawaharlal Nehru would bene'
been received, had he come to Europe
as America's president, preaching his
sell-out program. Or how the neutralists
would have greeted Adlai Stevenson,
with his very concrete plan for appeasement. The applause', if possible, would
bene been even more deafening.
Two years ago Mr. Eisenhower weis
not so popular with the Europeans, for
bis administration had adopted a policy
of unleashing the forces eef free China.
By 1955 all that bad changed. Mr. Eisen
hower had become a hero, even before
he arrived in Europe. For had he not
said on March 2 that the United Stales
would never support an attempt by
China to recapture the mainland, because that would be aggressive war?
And had not the Eisenhower administration already adopted, in practical effect.
the policies lhat Secretary Dulles formally announced to the American people last
week | July, 1955]—and I call this to the
attention of every American who is interested in the enslaved peoples of the
world—namely, that the United Sleili-s
would oppose any attempt by South Korea to release North Korea from chains.
because lhat would be an aggressive
war; that the United Stales would oppose' any attempt by South Vietnam to
release North Vietnam from chains, because thai would be an aggressive war;
and that the United States would continue to oppose the return of Chiang
Kai-shek for the same reason. Our former liberation policy, which the Europeans despise, was almost dead when
Mr. Eisenhower left the United Slate-.
He came to Europe to bury it where
the neutralists could cheer at lhe funeral.
It is little wonder that Mr. Eisenhower
won the popularity crown—nol only
from the Europeans but from the Communisls themselves. At one point during
the conference, the President turned to
the Communist leaders and said:
"I can assure the people in this con-
fe i iiiii- room that the United States will
not he a party to an aggressive wen anil
that under no circumstances would we
approve of an aggressive war."
Europe cheered, and the Communists
cheered. Since the- President had adopted
tbe Communists' definition — nol our
definition, of aggressive war—namely,
a war by dispossessed peoples designed
to recapture territories stolen l>\ tin'
Communists, his statement weis. to Communist ears, the sweetest music ever
heard. No wonder, the day the conference weis over. Premier Bulganin joined
the Eisenhower-for-Prcsident boom.
I ask the Senate: Would Senator Tail
or General Men Arthur, if one of llie in
were our president at this lime, have
received the accolades of Europe? Mo-1
certainly not. and for the very good
reason that neither Taft nor MacArthur
would have been seduced by the blandishments of Communisl propaganda.
They would have denounced the Soviel
peace offensive for lhe fraud il is.
There are some people, however, for
whom Dwight Eisenhower is not a gTeal
hero. These people are in such circumstances that their voices cannol be heard.
Thev are people who are now enslaved
by the Communists, and could hardly be
expected to cheer a pleasant social gathering between their oppressors emd those
upon whom their hopes for freedom
rest. The' enslaved | pies saw those
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