Keyword
in
Collection
Date
to
Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955
File 012
Citation
MLA
APA
Chicago/Turabian
Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955 - File 012. University of Houston Libraries. University of Houston Digital Library. Web. October 29, 2020. https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/69/show/11.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955 - File 012. Facts Forum News, 1955-1956. University of Houston Libraries. Retrieved from https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/69/show/11

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum, Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955 - File 012, Facts Forum News, 1955-1956, University of Houston Libraries, accessed October 29, 2020, https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/69/show/11.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

URL
Embed Image
Compound Item Description
Title Facts Forum News, Vol. 4, No. 9, October 1955
Alternate Title Facts Forum News, Vol. IV, No. 9, October 1955
Series Title Facts Forum News
Creator
  • Facts Forum
Publisher Facts Forum
Date unknown
Language eng
Subject
  • Anti-communist movements
  • Conservatism
  • Politics and government
  • Hunt, H. L.
Place
  • Dallas, Texas
Genre
  • journals (periodicals)
Type
  • Text
Identifier AP2.F146 v. 4 1955; OCLC: 1352973
Collection
  • University of Houston Libraries
  • Facts Forum News
Rights No Copyright - United States
Item Description
Title File 012
Transcript So as to this fir-i American objective, thai of enlightening the President about Communist objectives, it must be said that the conference not only failed lo enlighten him. but cemented his delusions and spread them to others. Nor did our second objective—that of bowling over the Russians from positions of strength—fare any better. Vi e heard a great deal of talk before the conference began to the effect that Russia was weak, that her economy had collapsed, that her empire was falling apart, that she was thus prepared to make concessions to the West in order to keep going. Secretary Dulles suggested we would be able to drive a hard bargain at Geneva, and could wrench some concessions from the Communists. The first day of the Big Four meeting demonstrated how pathetically wrong Mr. Dulles had been. The President made a stab at starting up a discussion of issues regarding which the Communists might make concessions—those of the satellite countries and international communism. In practical effect, the Communists simply laughed in his face; our delegation then dropped the subject like a hot potato. Neither were the Communists impressed with our strong positions when the subject of Germany came up. And so on down the line. Mr. Dulles' highly touted policy of negotiating from strength never got off the "round at Geneva. Today, it is utterly bankrupt. Not even State Department propagandists have dared suggest that in the coming negotiations with the Chinese Communists we are dealing from a position of strength. Now, of course, these facts make it difficult for the administration and its apologists to claim that we won a victory at Geneva. Nonetheless, the claim is made, and it is made more ronfi- dentlv and more vigorously than had we forced the Soviets to disgorge half their empire. America won a great victory, we are told, because President Eisenhower emerged from the Geneva conference the most popular man in Europe. The attempt to equate America's political fortunes with Dwight Eisenhower's ranking on a world-wide popularity roster began the day the conference opened ; today it is revealed truth that American diplomacy triumphed because Mr. Eisenhower-won the popularity contest. A more flagrant non sequitur can hardly be imagined. The argument assumes what I insist is demonstrably false— namely, that the views that made Mr. Eisenhower popular served the interests of the United States and the cause of an ti-communism. Of course, Mr. Eisenhower was popular with the European neutralists. Of course', thev loved him. He said precisely what thev wanted to hear, and did pre cisely what thev wanted him to do. He announced that Communists sincerely wauled peace. He sealed a friendship pact with the Soviel leaders. He changed America's policy from one of militant opposition to communism to one that comes \erv close to wanting peace at any price. His lines al Geneva would not have read much differently had the European neutralists dictated every word he spoke. Mr. Presidenl. let me cite a typical account of European reaction. This one is from the Washington Post and Times Herald, under the banner headline "Ike's Geneva Triumph Has Britain Cheering." Here is the story: "London.—Britain is in a mood of double cheering about the United States. For in British eyes. America has come around to a sensible approach toward liiis-ia and has begun to give ground from its obstinate stand against the Chinese Communists. Most Britons probably would agree that both changes amount to American acceptance of the British approach toward the Communist world." Then the article goes on to say: "I nquestionably, the summit conference was President Eisenhower's triumph. To Britons and Western Europeans in general, the President's approach to the Russians represented a revival of the kind of American leadership in the grand manner to which they had been so accustomed in the day of Franklin Roosevell." A revival. Mr. President, in Franklin Roosevelt's grand manner. I continue the quotation: "In a way the President's performance wrote final finis to the dreary period of McCarthyism which caused such revulsion among America's friend- in Western Europe" Mr. Eisenhower's performance was. indeed, a return to the grand manner of Franklin Roosevelt the grand manner of Teheran and Yalta. And it was. indeed, a repudiation of McCarthyism, which, in the eves of our so-called European friends, is the symbol for hard anti-rommunism. But before we rejoice any further over the fail that Mr. Eisenhower made a hit in Europe. Iel us think long and hard about how Jawaharlal Nehru would bene' been received, had he come to Europe as America's president, preaching his sell-out program. Or how the neutralists would have greeted Adlai Stevenson, with his very concrete plan for appeasement. The applause', if possible, would bene been even more deafening. Two years ago Mr. Eisenhower weis not so popular with the Europeans, for bis administration had adopted a policy of unleashing the forces eef free China. By 1955 all that bad changed. Mr. Eisen hower had become a hero, even before he arrived in Europe. For had he not said on March 2 that the United Stales would never support an attempt by China to recapture the mainland, because that would be aggressive war? And had not the Eisenhower administration already adopted, in practical effect. the policies lhat Secretary Dulles formally announced to the American people last week | July, 1955]—and I call this to the attention of every American who is interested in the enslaved peoples of the world—namely, that the United Sleili-s would oppose any attempt by South Korea to release North Korea from chains. because lhat would be an aggressive war; that the United Stales would oppose' any attempt by South Vietnam to release North Vietnam from chains, because thai would be an aggressive war; and that the United States would continue to oppose the return of Chiang Kai-shek for the same reason. Our former liberation policy, which the Europeans despise, was almost dead when Mr. Eisenhower left the United Slate-. He came to Europe to bury it where the neutralists could cheer at lhe funeral. It is little wonder that Mr. Eisenhower won the popularity crown—nol only from the Europeans but from the Communisls themselves. At one point during the conference, the President turned to the Communist leaders and said: "I can assure the people in this con- fe i iiiii- room that the United States will not he a party to an aggressive wen anil that under no circumstances would we approve of an aggressive war." Europe cheered, and the Communists cheered. Since the- President had adopted tbe Communists' definition — nol our definition, of aggressive war—namely, a war by dispossessed peoples designed to recapture territories stolen l>\ tin' Communists, his statement weis. to Communist ears, the sweetest music ever heard. No wonder, the day the conference weis over. Premier Bulganin joined the Eisenhower-for-Prcsident boom. I ask the Senate: Would Senator Tail or General Men Arthur, if one of llie in were our president at this lime, have received the accolades of Europe? Mo-1 certainly not. and for the very good reason that neither Taft nor MacArthur would have been seduced by the blandishments of Communisl propaganda. They would have denounced the Soviel peace offensive for lhe fraud il is. There are some people, however, for whom Dwight Eisenhower is not a gTeal hero. These people are in such circumstances that their voices cannol be heard. Thev are people who are now enslaved by the Communists, and could hardly be expected to cheer a pleasant social gathering between their oppressors emd those upon whom their hopes for freedom rest. The' enslaved | pies saw those Page 10 FACTS FORUM NEWS, Or/,,/., r, I«
File Name uhlib_1352973_v004_n009_012.jpg