Lenin and Stalin were dynamic leaders,
who had the vision and force to build
a complete tyranny. In order to consolidate and keep control, Stalin eliminated from authority and influence all
persons who showed any individual initiative or creative ability.
For example, at the 19th Communist
Party Congress in 1952. a special "Ideological Commission" was created with
Stalin as chairman, to prepare recommendations for long overdue revisions
of the Communist party program, which
had not been changed since 1919. It was
announced that this would he lhe main
item on the agenda for the 20th Con-
gress, which is now scheduled for Feb'
ruary I /. 1956. But the new Soviet lead-
ership considered itself so incompetent to
handle this important matter, that at the
meeting of ihe Central Committee in
July, 1955, it was decided to drop thi-
item from the agenda to the next Congress, and continue to build a bureaucracy on the same program that has
been followed for the lasl 36 years.
It i- futile to hope that the Soviet
regime will liquidate itself, or that any
sort of democratic government could
"develop" or "evolve" from the presenl
leadership. These men are so thoroughly
indoctrinated with communism thai they
cannot change. Nor do they have (Inability to create new ideas. They can
do nothing hut try to solve their problems l»v applying the precept*- of Lenin
and Stalin, whose plan of world domination is the absolute law of the Communisl world. But lacking the vision,
skill, experience, and authority nf their
dynamic predecessors, the present Soviet
leaders are extremely vulnerable.
These fact- are realized hv tlie men
in the Kremlin and by the Russian
people. Hut not by the West. Perhaps
the mosl dangerous fallacy in ihe " est-
era attitude toward lhe Soviet I nion re*
suits from the reports of self-styled experts and even sincere observers, who
fail to grasp the facl thai no Russian
inside the I SSK will risk arrest hv
exposing hi- true sentiments against the
regime to a foreigner.
RUSSIAN PEOPLE OPPOSE REGIME
There exists todav a concealed hut
steadily mounting civil war between the
people of Russia and the Communist
regime. This explosive siluation has developed as follows:
Stalin \ death activated latent resistance. From the beginning of Communist
rule, the massive Soviet terror machine
was necessary to bold in cheek the basic
opposition of the great mass of the
Russian people to communism (200,-
000,000 people vs. 6.000.000 Commu-
ni-ts today). Even under Stalin, this
passive resistance frequently broke out
into sporadic unorganized rebellions.
When the death of Stalin removed the
greatest symbol of terror, this resistance
began lo come into the open. Il gained
momentum after the spectacular fall of
Beria and lhe purge of the M\ I).
The large scale revolts al ] orkuta and
other major slave labor camps in Siberia
in August. 1953, initiated the new trend
toward active organized resistance,
which has been steadily growing
throughout the Soviet I nion. The demands of the prisoners confirmed the
fact that this resistance is based less on
economic causes than on the desire jor
individual freedom and respeel for per-
SOnal dignity. Tins essential need id the
human spirit has not been stifled by a
generation of Communist indoctrination
instead, il has had a rebirth under
RUSSIAN YOUTH SEEK DEMOCRACY
Communism is failing in Russia where
it mosl hoped to SUCCeed with tlle neiv
generation. Young people in the Soviet
I nion have learned hv experience the
contrast between Communisl promises
and performance. Young Russians today
are turning awav from communism,
which thev consider reactionary, and
are seeking real democratic freedom.
Evidence of thi- is found in student organizations jor liberation i including the
I niversities of Moscow and Kazan i. and
in the fact that the majority of the 15.-
000,000 inmates of slave labor camps
are between the ages oj 19 and 25.
The young sailor- from the Soviet
tanker. Tuapse, captured hy lhe Free
Chinese in July. V)o~l. exemplify the attitude of Russian youth. After a vear of
pressure from the Soviet goverument.
twenty of these all young men held
firmlv to their choice of freedom on
Formosa. The majority id the twenty-
eight who finally accepted repatriation
diil bo <>nlv because of ihe reprisals
against their families inside the I SSR,
Resentment aguinst the regime prevails throughout the Soviet armed jorces.
Seventv p'-r cent of these are peasants,
who are the most abused element in the
Soviet Union, and form the unrelenting
hard core of resistance to ihe Communisl
Widespread resistance in the armed
services became evident at the beginning
of World War ll. when more than
3,000,000 troops surrendered to the German-, whom they then believed lo be
liberators. Subsequently some 800,000
ROW's volunteered for the ill-fated
"'Russian \rmy oj Liberation" under
General Andrei VlasOV, whose plan of
revolution was thwarted hv both Hitler
and tbe Western Allies.
The continuing resistance of the
armed forces to the regime was dramatically demonstrated hv the refusal
of Soviet soldiers lo fire on rioting Get-
mans in the June. 1953, East German
Revolt. It is constantly being confirmed
by the testimony of men and officers
who seek refuge in the West.
During reeent years Soviet AnV.nil
eei|>ees have come ove'r singly. Ifest |<
July Jo. 1955, a group ol seven, Im Ih
ei sergeant, attempted lo readjtribui
\ im 11. et ii Zen f Austria from jkund
viet Army Camp near (.eelne'y*
Tracked down and ambushed by*! Wl
MVD troops, they fought de-l"
Realizing llie hopelessness ol l!'e
tion. llie sergeant killed himself, Weste
other si\ were captured. ''<'*''"
Tbe significance ol this incidefring i
lost on the West—but it was salt
realized hv the Soviet gover< Sovi
Alarmed ul lhe prospect oj p<* " >'s,
lections from Soviet occupation I ps)
in Austria, the Kremlin iiiitnfcetl p
ordered a drastic step-up ill scA<*4r<'ess
withdrawal oj troops. This 's e "I
propagandized eis ei "generous $*■ mi'
confirming lhe new "pcaceul •," "i
friendly intentions." hui is actghis
Soviel move lo prevent pros'***' " " "
fectors from having sufficient jkenui
complete preparations lee ""go \\'""''''"
The contact of Soviet oc^-'es I
troops with the Wesl in Cerr*i'Jnmui
\ustria heis also influenced their"*1 be
eiml Friends within the Sov if' ,e '•'
Since the end of World War I1'1"'!'
ilii-il- of ll -eunl- of these In*"1"? ''"'
been rotated. These men hi 'i*'?'■-'.'"'
firsthand reports theit give lh<"<'''all
Soviel anti-Western propaganda-- r"".('
sailors of the merchant marine- l*f lr
of sports mid other delegatio^F°y
heive personal contucl wilh '" .
Meinv of them eilso serve as * 1
for the Russian Liberation '/
on both sides of the Iron Curia'COW
Liberation Movement is. of i'0" .
del round within lhe Soviet I'n-Y* As
' . . . . I 1110
certain cniuire organization!
tbe frf '""
openly as u- outposta m u
EAGERNESS FOR WESTERN rC('. o"
Through such channels eis I".™,
" .(it. //,
bonajiile reports oj the trio
the Russian people. There is
resurgence oi religious feelinj
oul Russia, li permeates eell
Russian youth included. There
r r e e- rll' '"Ot
ii.-- tor news ..I lhe Irec u< .*..](.^.
ieillv of fellow-Russians who
as emigres und who heive eS| * ^, .
llu' workings eef democracy. I'10!-!- _
II 1 ' lie. S '"
seeks nioreil -uolioii eunl iiiel'i', „„
r i ■ er .-. ■ Itr"' °
tor achieving self-liberation
I lommunisl rulers.
nill is mlcnselv i".- i.
i ■ ■ l /.v" '"
country, lull he is convinced ['.' ni,.Mt-
experience that lhe Comtniini!' i yu-
Iruyers oj that country. He i~ i-shek
ready lo give lhe strength '" borls
of hi- allegiance lo the I'liss!'11* es ^.
lion Movement. ^onim
Such matters are discussed i^/- (f
tween trusted fellow-Russian*- p js
approached hv a foreigner. '' jei 1
Russian in lhe I'SSR vvill "jjeedo
words of the official line as a 1*5
caution for self-preservation. ^ :rrs F
Facts Foiwm News, Jum"'*