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Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1956
File 031
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Facts Forum. Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1956 - File 031. 1956-01. University of Houston Libraries. University of Houston Digital Library. Web. October 21, 2020. https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/209/show/170.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum. (1956-01). Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1956 - File 031. Facts Forum News, 1955-1956. University of Houston Libraries. Retrieved from https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/209/show/170

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

Facts Forum, Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1956 - File 031, 1956-01, Facts Forum News, 1955-1956, University of Houston Libraries, accessed October 21, 2020, https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/1352973/item/209/show/170.

Disclaimer: This is a general citation for reference purposes. Please consult the most recent edition of your style manual for the proper formatting of the type of source you are citing. If the date given in the citation does not match the date on the digital item, use the more accurate date below the digital item.

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Title Facts Forum News, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1956
Alternate Title Facts Forum News, Vol. V, No. 1, January 1956
Series Title Facts Forum News
Creator
  • Facts Forum
Publisher Facts Forum
Date January 1956
Language eng
Subject
  • Anti-communist movements
  • Conservatism
  • Politics and government
  • Hunt, H. L.
Place
  • Dallas, Texas
Genre
  • journals (periodicals)
Type
  • Text
Identifier AP2.F146 v. 5 1956; OCLC: 1352973
Collection
  • University of Houston Libraries
  • Facts Forum News
Rights No Copyright - United States
Item Description
Title File 031
Transcript vie ■V iel agents eef a man who sought free- In in the West was buried in a few fches on inside pages of a verv few Ipers. Another recent Soviet kidnap- g —that of the prominent anti-Corn- Inist German journalist, Kurt W. |cke, on April 1. 1955, in II est Ber- received no notice outside of Wesl [NOTE: 0„ August 22, 1955. the bimittee to Combat Soviel Kidnap- ks presented these two cases to the lilcd Xellions. with the' result that silent iws stories bene' beau carried in the S1V. press.) THE OVER-ALL PATTERN 'he global strategy of world commu- i"i today uiidcviatingl) follows Lenin's t'•'print. In brief: Attack where the "iv is weakest which is now in the '■ Retreat in order to advance later •'re the enemy is strongest which is Jh in the West. Tactics must be adapted 'cns5 „> 'hanging conditions to advance the ia>i V'"'r .levi'1"1'1 Communist revolution. Wherever behalj ol the fc**,],.. victories musl be gained bv in- M,,n free ""rati,,,,, subterfuge and deceit, rein- "•?" r l „,.«■'''■■■'•-' 1'lackmail and coercion, rather a,lbo(lbeo|i| ||y o|(n ]ihvs.(;|| |(||||j(| eleeeived, as" ^i,,. l)asi(. |m|||c, |s |n|. (he mM <>f '"'"■' T1' fae"' Tl"' h"s"' technique is a sort oj li'spile Ihe Jrchological jitjilsu. by which the vie- the' Soviet cllf ,, ,', inlluced t0 „,,. the force oj his II est is s"rr'.ji thinking to defeat himself. For ex- sion—the ill"- pic. this principle is currently being icir -pots. plied as follows: i''l|i'",s- *'"''''Jl"' de-ire of all peoples to avoid a .., "netcs llir^5|d war is being used by the Com- n ol the ho? Jiists to promote their "peaceful co- lorarily. in d^tencc" oflensive. the non-Sovie^hc "fri, n,IK atmosphere" between gaining li""' ': nip,- and Asiay lie morale of " ■el emd Western leaders is advancing j Communisl cause by undermining ate every Only he surfi f Co> he surface. *: r"""' on a f the next leveM Soviet I „i, ,erg. which <-"V!la- North Vi 'aith of the enslaved peoples .. ''in sincerity anel decency; by de- p "li'iiin anti-Communist public opin- bul strategy- '' in the free world: and hy gaining Uganda. undeWaniWy neede<l time respite for lhe ■led toward '"i'*t rulers. a1"' wishful thinking of Western lead- the tip- , 'haI communism can be dealt with 'I "ii a nationalit) basis—i.e.. lion. Yugoslavia, Red il"" 'lonn v iiliiain. etc. is being ..face. This >' T, '" divert attention from the on.lu.l.'el. rel''"''!1 strategy ,,f world communism '"'ii- il locally, exacting concessions begun in ll"' *, '""'I'loini-,-; appearance ""IV . **"■'• the ingrained hatred ..I „ counted "" ||,'"LI '-'" .mil Ihe dynamic forces of print lor woi'l" 0l,al'sm are being harnessed for fur- '"-I'linsion of lb,| control. Western dip'"'. . '';"' "f •'"tain countries to take it*"8 is bemg fostered by the Commu- jntfj who "re thus enabled rate if..IT On that sfr"'llh'" these "neutral" countries MVD agents ^ ';- and finally engulf them. lef.Tt.-d li t """l,:l"r": giancetono | ,„ Wesl l'''rl'...'a", "" "alionabty. no Cod only eel 111- ea.lll I lo Wesl l'"'rlr(,r;i ' """""ably, no God onl*. •ra..,i .i-i'hi;,, ,;,;;;n,;"ri1-'''- "> .■■■•«.•■■.. - in the Wc-""1' ' '""""'I l.ul required to li at. '-'" ""' kil1" "* F»«'M Xlvvs ,„„ ,«, free institutions and advance the Communist goal of world domination. There is no essential difference between a Russian Communist, a Chinese Communist, an American Communist, etc. Lenin set the pattern sonic forty years ago when he said, "I spit on Russia and the Russian people." lie chose his native country as the initial base of operations merely because il was "ripe" for Communist exploitation, as is Asia today. "The road to Paris," he wrote, "lies through Peking and Calcutta." Lenin's basic precepl thai "peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries is impossible for any length of time" remains unaltered and unalterable. The coexistence theme is used onlv when expedient, as now. to lull the alarms ol free countries and gain time to consolidate in preparation for the next ad- vance. BEHIND THE CURRENT SOVIET PEACE DRIVE The West has failed lo grasp the significant fundamental reasons for Moscow - peaceful coexistence campaign. Western military and economic resources acl as strong deterrents lo Communisl aggression, bul these are b) no means the primary reasons for the £row- ing panic in the Kremlin. An increasingly explosive si tint/ion is developing within the Soviet ( nion, the chief causes of which are infernal find psychological. These include: INSTABILITY WD WEAKNESS OF THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP Although the West is \a<ruely aware of this condition, the inside situation is ROl fully understood. A continuous struggle for power is going on. The totalitarian pyramid buill up for 25 years by Stalin concentrated power iii one man so firmly thai when he died there remained only an unwieldy system based on terror. near the top of which sal a group of "yes-men ' trained in deceit and betrayal. For self-preservation, Stalin's elosesi collaborators established a "collective leadership"" (officially called Council of Ministers, hut actually the Centra] Committee of the Communisl part) and ils presidium I. The immediate struggle for power began with the alliance of Khrushchev and Malcuhov againsl Beria who constituted a threal because of his MVD (Soviel Secrel Police i apparatus. \s soon as Beria was liquidated, Khrushchev, a veteran Communist organizer, started building his own power apparatus within the Communist part) and the security system. He established the KGB i <lommittee for State Security i. headed h\ the extremely able and ruthless General f ran Serov. \\ ith a rank equivalent to thai of Minister. Serov was made responsible i<> the "col- News, / anvPJk °m M News, January, 1956 lective leadership" which actually meant that Serov was responsible directly to Khrushchev, who. as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party, controlled both the party and the government (i.e., the "collective leadership"!. The M\D was thus made subordinate to the KGB. As a final step. Khrushchev succeeded in placing representatives of the KGB as ranking members of the local governments of the Sm iet Republics thus consolidating his control of the country through the party and lhe securit) system. After this, the elimination of Malenkov, in his dramatic abdication, was simple. Khrushchev, however, does nol have the experience, the authority, nor the power of Stalin, There is a long and treacherous road ahead for him or anyone who attempts to build up a strong persona] dictatorship. The holding oi anv position todav depends to a greal extent on the other top members of the Communist parly. The "collective leadership" not only exists <le facto, hut has a tendency to enlarge itself continuously, as each member tries to bring his own supporters into the circle. Al lhe second session ol the Central Committee, July 1-12. 1955, for example, a hot argument developed among the "lop brass,' with the resull thai two new members were added to the presidium for no apparenth logical reason. This session was also responsible for the inclusion of Khrushchev and Zhukov in the Soviel delegation to the Big Four "Summit" Conference in Geneva, where Khrushchev made it crudely obvious that he wauled to be considered "Number One." SOVIET AGREEMENTS ARE TEMPORARY In view of ihis continuing struggle for power, it becomes apparent that no agreements nor negotiations with the present Soviet leadership, even if it could be trusted, could be cither binding oi permanent. I he present leaders are playing for time. I hey fear the emergence of a single dictator, and they are equal]) afraid of the results of the "collective leaderships weakening grip on tin country. Today Communist control is weaker in Russia than in any other section of the Communist world. The Soviel "collective leadership" continues to demonstrate that it cannot cope with the Soviet system. The situation in agriculture is disastrous. Ihe slate plan is failing in industry. Even the "terror machine" of the MVD has lost its former efficiency and authority. The men in the Kremlin are floundering, because thev are the products oj a system which they have neither the ability nor the training to manage. Page 29 * ng
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