Subcommittee as being associated with the Communist
apparatus. The State Department gave official recognition
to the conference. Two months after the conference ended,
Alger Hiss recommended that copies of the conference
report be made available to each of the delegates at the
The influence of the IPR on American policy by no
means ended with the conclusion of World War II. Publications of the IPR were almost the only ones on the Far
East coming into the State Department. Alger Hiss became
head of postwar planning for the State Department, and
had access to every document, paper, and secret of the
United States Government. Hiss' connection with the IPR
was not a casual one. He left the State Department in
February, 1947, to become president of the Carnegie-
Endowment for International Peace. The following IPR
personnel were active in postwar planning: Esther Brun-
auer, Frank Coe, Lauchlin Currie, Harold Glasser, Alger
Hiss, Philip Jessup, William T. Stone, and Harry Dexter
White. The IPR not only influenced government policy
directly, but also through the intermediary of Soviet
Beginning in the summer of 1945, Owen Lattimore anel
John Carter Vincent helped steer American policy from
support of the Chinese Nationalist Government, to a
policy of treating the government and the Communist
rebels equally. This policy led, of course, to ultimate military victory for the Communists. As late as the summer of
1945, such anti-Communists as Joseph Grew, Eugene Doornail, ancl Joseph Ballantine wielded considerable influence
in the State Department's Far Eastern policy. By the fall
of 1945, these men were replaced by Acheson ancl Vincent. The departure of the anti-Communists came after
months of steady pressure against them by the IPR personnel anel the pro-Soviet ancl Communist press.
From November, 1945, through 1946 ancl 1947, John
Carter Vincent, as head of the Far Eastern Division, threw
his weight against the Nationalists ancl in behalf of the
Communists. A Vincent memorandum dated August 10.
1946. demanded that Chiang come to terms with the Communists. During this period, Philip Jessup opposed American aid to the Chinese Government against the rebels.
In 1947 Israel Epstein (identified as a Communist
agent) wrote a book called The Unfinished Revolution.
Published by Little, Brown, ancl Company, it brazenly
supported the Communist stand on China without reservations.
On December 2.3, 1949, the State Department sent out
a memorandum to all Far Eastern personnel emphasizing
that' Formosa was unimportant, and that its fall to the
Communists would be no serious matter. This came within
three clays after a military report declared Formosa was of
key importance to the defense of non-Communist Far
On January 5, 1950, President Truman announced the
end of all aid to the Chinese Government on Formosa, ancl
declared that Formosa should be returned to what he-
called "China." Shortly before this, Senator H. Alexander
Smith noted in his diary: "Lunch with Philip Jessup and
Ray Fosdick. They are leaning toward the British who
want to recognize Communist China."
Of all the persons who led the IPR into a position of
influencing the United States Government toward a favorable view of the Chinese Communists, Owen Lattimore
stands out as the most important. The fact that Lattimore
knew Outer Mongolia to be Soviet-controlled at precisely
the same time he described it as independent, ancl urged
American recognition, was one of the facts which led the
Subcommittee to conclude that Lattimore's several contradictions and memory lapses did not proceed from ignorance or confused thinking. Lattimore was unable to expLiin
his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Oumansky on June
18, 1941, or his meeting with Soviet agent Rogoff in January, 1944, or his associations with G. C. Dolbin of the
Soviet Foreign Office, ancl with General Feng Yusbiang, a
paid Soviet agent. On July 17, 1949, Lattimore gave his
famous recommendation for American policy in Korea:
"The thing to do is to let South Korea fall but not let it
look as though we pushed it."
For 1952, the Rockefeller foundation allotted $.50,000 to
the- IPR. As late as October, 1949, Lattimore and Rosinger
were invited by the State Department to give their advice
on China. In the winter of 1949-1950, the- Rockefeller Foundation paid Lawrence Rosinger $2,000 to enable- him to
attend an IPR conference at New Delhi, India, where the
sessions were primarily devoted to vicious attacks upon
the United States. The same Rockefeller Foundation
granted him $6,000 to write the book. State of Asia, published by Knopf under the auspices of the IPR, in 1951-
On January 29. 1952. Lawrence Rosinger re-fused to say
whether or not he was a Communist, when questioned by
the- McCarran committee. This refusal came alter he was
positively identified as a Communist by three witnesses
under sworn testimony.
The story of the Institute of Pacific Relations, anel the
disastrous influence' it has had on the United States ancl
freedom in Asia, is one of the most unhappy in our history-
THAT OLD DEVIL: PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
The most important question which we must answer, in
order to come to some conclusion as to what our policy
should be against Soviel Communism, is this: Is peaceful
coexistence between the free world anel the Soviet Union
possible? Stalin repeatedly asserted that true peace- cannot
be achieved until a world USSR is established. The essence
of the Soviet "peace policy" is that wars — both cold and
hot— must be- incessantly waged until all non-Soviet states
Soviet tactics have alternated between the frontal assault
ancl the united front, but Soviet strategy remains constant!
the doctrine of permanent wars ancl revolutions until all
non-Soviet states are eliminated. No serious or open-
minded student ol Soviet behavior can deny this Soviet
No matter what our views may be — the Kremlin wants
war; no matter how much we wanted peace in 1939 and
1941, Hitler and Tojo wanted war. It takes two to make
peace, and only one to make war. If emr opponent has
decided that he is at war with us, then then- is war, n"
matter how much we may want peace, beat our breast,
and sign peace petitions. Stalin wanted war; xve wanted
peace. The result? Korea.
Some Americans, who do not wish to be bothered, comfortingly assert: "Time is on our side." Has, in fact, tin"'
been on our side? In 1945, we had an atomic monopoly-
Today, we no longer have that monopoly. We have give"
(he Soviet Union time to build up a stockpile- of decis-V*
Another problem: Which is more important in over-a"
strategy, Europe or Asia? The answer most frequently
Facts Fouum News, October, 195"