ia, also all pi
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class, with i
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if the masse*
thus transformed a party of limited
dictatorship into an unlimited, absolute dictatorship. There emerged
under the Party's label a police state,
in essentials similar to the Nazi State
under Hitler. In short, communism,
with the cunning and ruthless assist
of a Stalin, was revealed as being fully
as totalitarian as fascism.
History also discloses that the managerial class comes to power led In-
totalitarian or semi-totalitarian political elites. Tbe managerial class, not
owning the enterprises they serve, exert their power through the State.
They are not necessarily a revolutionary class, but may become so.
A revolutionary political elite, Communist or Fascist, may use the "underprivileged" as political cannon fodder
to rise to power, but cannot rule without the managerial class.
In the first stages of tlie Managerial
Revolution, the totalitarian system of
government apparently agrees with
the interests of the "managerials." The
1936 "Stalin Constitution" appeared to
guarantee certain rights to "organized" individuals, and to express a
desire toward stabilization of the newly-privileged managerial class.
Stalinism Marches On
But Stalin, after he hael led the managerial class to victory over all other
classes, was not satisfied to be merely
their leader; he wanted to be absolute
master. The' purges which followed
Completed the annihilation of the "Old
Bolsheviks" ancl cut deeply into the
ranks of tbe managerials. thus antagonizing all classes. Abysmal hatred of
Stalin was expressed by the millions
in concentration camps, by tbe huge
mass desertions during World War II,
and finally by the unanimous repudiation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the .Soviet Communist Party.
As already indicated, Marxism-Leninism as an opposition theory served
effectively as a guide to Communist
action. Lenin's special contribution
(with help from Trotsky) was as the-
Party's political engineer in the struggle for power. After Lenin's death
(192.3) ancl Trotsky's e-xile (1927),
Stalin became the guide-. Although
forever quoting Marxist-Leninist scrip-
hire, he actually had to find his own
Way, having little if any precedent.
Civil war in Russia came to an end
Only in 1921. Stalin was in actual
Power for twenty-eight years, until
his death in 1953. Nearly all the technique and strategy which the present
leaders (his former lieutenants) know,
they learned from Stalin. The open
denunciation of Stalin may prod them
to a new start, but the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party
gives no such encouragement. From its
proceedings the following points are
1. The Congress was run Stalinist
fashion, all decisions being handed
down from the top ancl without dissent
"unanimously" adopted by the delegates. Fear of "heretical" dissent still
dominates, just as in Stalin's time.
2. Despite perennial food shortages,
Stalin's war-like policies against the
peasants continue; are even worse.
3. Concentration on heavy armament industry ancl modern military
hardware is not lessened, although
supplies of civilian goods are long
4. Except for some deceptive
maneuvering toward the outside (coexistence, etc.), the cold war con-
tiniies ancl intensifies.
Even Stalin's voodooistic methods
of encouraging critic-ism and then
punishing anel liquidating the critics
are unabated. The "new" leaders
"pulled a Stalin" on the late Beria.
head of OGPU, ancl then proceeded to
purge thousands of alleged "Beria
men," including members of the Central Committee of the Party. A purge
of "Stalin men" was begun some
months ago and is now gaining momentum, both within anel without the
Soviet Union. Thus Stalin's dictum
that "the best critic is a dead one" still
Real Reforms Needed
If tlie present temporary successors
to Stalin were shoved aside or should
yield to the heavy anti-Stalinist pressures from below, there would be not
a mere reburying of a dead man, but
the- burial of all things Stalin stood for.
The following reforms would come:
1. A switch from concentration on
heavy to light industry, in order to
provide civilian goods ancl raise the
standard of living.
2. Relaxing of agrarian policy by
abolishing compulsory collectivization, thus increasing the food supply
for the cities.
3. Demilitarization of the Communist Party and adoption of civil rights
inside and outside the Party.
4. Abolition of all slave labor camps.
5. Abolition of the entire apparat
(colleges, training centers, publishing
October, J" Facts Forum News, October, 1956
houses, organizing ancl communication centers, subsidies, etc.) aimed at
demoralization, subversion, and disruption of foreign countries.
6. Withdrawal of Soviet control
from the satellite countries.
7. Relaxation of tlie foreign trade
Tlie precise indicator of Soviet foreign policy has always been, not the
speeches of its leaders, but domestic
policy and practice.
When, in the mid-thirties, the war
against the peasants anel the blood
purges had debilitated Russia, Stalin
tried to secure an alliance with the
democratic West against Hitler, and
advocated the so-called popular front.
With the West "on the hook" and its
diplomats waiting in 1939 in Stalin's
ante-chambers, the "popular front"
went out the window and Stalin made
his deal with Hitler.
Hitler knew Stalin's weakness and
attacked after France's defeat in 1941,
with bis armies knifing through Russia
as if it were soft butter. The help of
America saved Stalin, and the popular
front was reborn as a "patriotic front."
Now, we have an entirely different
situation. During the last decade the
Kremlin has raced to build militarily
fast enough to take over the wrecked
capitalisms of Europe and Asia, but
has had to move forward deceptively
in face of atom-powered America.
The death of Stalin and the problems of succession have aggravated
the perennially-bad interna] situation
in Russia. Except for militarized manpower and some conventional arms,
the West lias the edge on the Soviet
bloc, technologically and economically. Moreover, the West's momentum
appears to be on the upswing.
From a Soviet point of view a
"pause" of some years is necessary to
catch up and consolidate internally,
and to give the China sector time to
build up power in at least conventional arms and other needed facilities. The "pause" is to be utilized for
"operation infiltration" on a scale
never before attempted. This idea was
put forward in one of the "Stalin Resolutions" at the Nineteenth Congress
of the Soviet Communist Party in
1952, but has gained cruising speed
only recently. Their purpose is to use
for propaganda the "contradictions
of capitalism" not primarily in the
(Continued on pane 38)