theory and production in tbe two countries.
The official version has not attempted
lo deny the pre-eminence of British nuclear science. Kapitza got his stent under
Rutherford at Cambridge, which weis
probably the leading prewar center of
nuclear research. All the Manhattan
Project scientists known to have given
war-time secrets lo lhe Russians were
British. But the galaxy of British scientists as a whole was far greater than
Fuchs. May, emd Pontecorvo. Hence,
even with lhe maximum allowance for
Ihe value of the knowledge transmitted
by this,' three, the British resources of
knowledge remain far greater than the
known Russian resources.
Indeed, the- British tradition in the
physical sciences and their ingenious
practical application is unrivaled. From
Newton to Lord Cherwell, from the
steam engine lo radar, from lhe spinning
jenny to the |el airliner, lhe island home
of the industrial revolution has produced or attracted a fabulous gallery of
scientific and technical genius, including—in lhe nuclear field—Thomson,
Rutherford. Chadwiek. Cockrofl. Wilson. Penney, and on and on.
Yet in spite of ihis acknowledged
superiority of British nuclear science,
in the face of obvious British superiority in access to the raw materials of
the Belgian Congo, and ignoring the
general superiority of Brllish auxiliary
technology, we have been asked to believe' that thc Russians beat the British
by three years in lln- race to manufacture an atomic bomb independently of
the United States, and thai they now
have em Atomgrad to rival Hanford.
That thev have exploded one or two
bombs of some kind we can creditif
*e remember lhal their entire' projeel
"as put under the supervision of Lav-
fenti Beria. chief of their secret police,
«ho mighl have arranged lo smuggle
°>it of ihe United Stales enough "nu-
'leeii' components" for ;i demonstration
"r so for the Soviet high command,
''nl lhal thev have em eilomic energy
Project which is serious, complete, and
°' a magnitude remotely competitive
with that of the United States, we cannot lightly accept.
OBJECTION AND REJOINDER
There is one objection lo concluding
quickly thai thc Soviets cannot have em
eilomic energy project which amounts
lo very much. The known occurrence of
atomic explosions in Soviet territory
is not such an objection, for, as wc shall
sec in lhe following pages, they have
in the past held a very real opportunity
to shed fissionable materials from the
United Slates. And as AEC Chairman
Gordon Dean heis said. "With fissionable material in hand, il is not a difficult technical job to make workable
Bul lax as our security system lias
undoubtedly been, we cannot suppose
lhat the number of atomic bombs which
mighl have been assembled in Russia
from items of fissionable material manufactured in the United Stales can possibly constitute a stockpile seriously competitive with our own. To credit lhe
existence of such a stockpile il is not
sufficient lo have at hand evidence from
lhe analysis of fission products in air
currents emd evidence from cryptic intelligence reports theit somewhere in the
Eurasian heartland two or three nuclear
explosions have undoubtedly taken place.
General Groves summarized this poinl
rather succinctly at the time of the
commotion over Truman's heresy. "All
we know." said Groves, "is there were
indications of nuclear explosions."29
Dr. Arthur Compton made' essentially
the- same point: "Scientists know." he
said, "thai there have been two atomic
explosions in Russia, but wc don't know.
of course, whether these explosions are
the resull of a workable A-bomb."'"' And
of course, if we don'l know whether
these individual explosive devices, whatever thev were, were "workable" A-
Itomlis. then we certainly don't know
from this evidence alone lhal (he Soviets
have a practical atomic arsenal within
their own boundaries.
No, the objection lo a low estimate
of Russian atomic production is almost
independent of our knowledge concern
ing actual explosions, valuable as that
knowledge is. The objection lies rather
in the well known fact that the Soviel
oligarchy mav use its executive authority to require an extraordinary concentration of Russiein eiml satellite resources
on the struggling Soviel eilomic energy
James Burnham made this poinl some
six or seven years ago. Having observed
theit "Soviet industry is for the mosl
pent incompetent, inefficient, emd qualitatively al a low level,"31 and having
pointed out the Communisl dependence
on eunl addiction tofoo/sa (confirmed, as
we have noted, l.v General Marshall).
Mr. Burnham proceeded, nevertheless.
10 warn us how "importanl. for strategic
purposes, is the economic concentration
which absolute political control makes
possible. This is of great significance in
Connection with the production of atomic weapons. Deficient as they are' in
almost all branches of economy, the
Communists can concentrate the most
and best of what they have both of
human and physical equipment on ei
task which they decide lo he dominant.
11 would, therefore', be el misleike In
judge' their eilomic performance bv their
general industrial level."
This objection is nol to be brushed
Dr. Compton, according to the Associated Press, seiid. "The difference between the United Steiles and Russia insofar as manufacture of A-bombs is
concerned is lhal the United States is
using only one per cent of its industrial
capeie'itv in the manufacture while Russia would have lo use eii leasl four per
This at otiee' accords with our previous general estimate of the relative
magnitude of Russiein industry, eunl eil
ihe same time suggests ei quantitative
paraphrase of Mr. Burnham's point regarding concentration. Granted that the
United Stales ought lo be able lo stav
ahead in an all-out race on both sides
(provided the' fight was "fair"), whal
if lhe Russians chose to devote, seiv. leper cent of their capacrt*, to alomie
(Continued mi Page nil
"The following is from the New Ynrl, Times
of June H. 1949 (p. 1) i "Washington, June
\ Federal Bureau of Investigation Re-
port disclosed today theit llu-siee received ei
shipment nf atomic research ele-viees from
tin- United State's in 1947 anil thai two
other shipments wen' blocked in I'll", and
1949.... Thr KHI reporl wee- brought Into
'lie open eel the espionage trial "I Judith
Coplon.... Roberl .1. Lamphere, em FBI
agent, testified In- had prepared the' document aleneit llie shipment ..1 eiti.mi.' implements te. Russia. Mr. Lamphere seii.l the
ri'lieert wees 'authentic'- eenel thus lint tee be
confused with ;i 'decoy* paper... deliberately |elein|ea| wll'l-' Mi— ' <>pl..ll weeeil.l
find it.... Mr. Lamphere's report said no
export license leeid been issiieal feer the
shipment of atomic equipment that reached
^ACTS FOKUM NEWS, June, 1955
Soviet Russia aboard tin- steamship Mik-
llelil Kutuzov ill August 1917. Tt seiiel a
shipment of .similar secrel instruments wees
leeiind eileoeirel the Bteamship Murmansk in
N'e'U Yeeik harlmr Sept. 2, 1918, llllt Amer-
[can authorities removed tin' shipment because it had not been authorized. Then s
third Bhipmenl wees feieiinl eni ;i eloe-k in
Claremont, N. J„ Jan. 11. 1919. em.I tlii-
eel-e. weis confiscated, tin' report seiiel. Am-
leerg liemglit tin- equipment thai reached
Kussiei from tin' 'Cyclotron Specialties Com-
leeiiiy.' tin- report continued...."
-■' Moori'lieeul. ,,],. eit.. p. 136.
25 Investigation Hearing, p. 292. Hr. Oppenheimer had previously st;inal. however (p.
284): "I ilo not know anything aliout
' Science Bulletin, American-Soviet Science
Society, October 1915. p. 4.
r Hearings Helm,- the Special Committee mi
Itomir Energy. 7"th Congress. 1st Session
Pursuant n, Semite Resolution IT') (hereinafter rated eis Hearings Pursuant to S. A',.,
17", IGovernmenl Printing Offiee, 1915-
16). |e. 1115
Washington Post, Jan. 31, 1953, p. 1.
'Washington Dail) Veins lUnited Press'
.Inn. 29, 195:!. p. r,.
II..11-1..11 /'.../ I Associated Press), lein .", I
1953. p. 8.
' James Burnham, The Struggle fur the
World (John Day, 19171. p. 93
'Ibid., p. 118.
1 Houston Post, Jan. 29, 1953, p. 12.