| Transcript |
(Continued frnm Page 36)
hv \e liicvi.mi-lit"—backed by the lineal
of Russian competition gained strength
daily so long as tbe fallacious nature
of its context was not exposed, for
in itself il makes the strongest kind
of appeal to em aggressively industrial
nation. There is in facl absolutely nothing wrong x\ i t li such a doctrine so long
as il is not used to exclude or obscure
the vital importance oj the complementary hind of security represented by [initial! concealment and firm exploitation
oj whatever monopolistic advantages the
I nited Slales mux have achieved or
been granted.
True achievemenl does nol consist
of energetically bailing water with a
sieve.
A painfully pertinent poinl is thai
when \chievement is emphasized nol
in connection with bul eil the expense
of Concealment, vou get an industrial
and scientific complex which, being ever
larger and looser, is ever more readily
infiltrated and milked of the information
and materials peculiar to ils processes.
More of thai in Chapter Four. Meanwhile, wheel of the credibility of Truman's statement, "I am nol convinced
they have the bomb"? Will il la- eill
right to examine lhal on its merits?
I know thai in a rare vou ought lo
"run scared"; so perhaps we should not
elo or say anything lo lower lhe common
estimate of Russian capabilities, mi the
ground lhal il i- gooel for us lo believe
the Russians are. breathing hoi on our
necks.
How about Irving lo gel the facts
straight? There is probably quite
enough to be scared about. But wouldn I
il be silly, ami dangerous, in be scared
of thc wrong thing?
I submit thai the Story of Russian
competition in atomic energy doesn t
stand up verv well, even under such an
amateur analysis as I can give il. 'lhe
following historical notes aboul Russian
industry would probably be stipulated,
as tin' lawyers seiv. hv mosl persons interested in I li is kind nf discussion:
FACTS ON SOVIET INDUSTRY
1. When the Communists leeeik over in
1917. Russian industry, always backward hv Western standards, weis badly
disorganized as ;i result of the traumatic
experiences of World War I. Four years
later lln- siluaiieen was worse. Sir Bernard Penes savs lhat "According lo
Bykov. Commissar for Industry, factory
output had fallen hv 85 per cent, emd
what was produced was looted by the
workers, and the plant to boot."3 This
wee- 1921. "We are a backward country," seiiel Lenin in the fall of 1922 (according io Valeriu Mann i ; "... our
technical efficiency is next lo nothing."4
2. Russian industrialization began
with the firsl Five-"} ear Plan, in 192:;.
At that time, while, the United Slate-
wa- producing ."3.(1(1(1.111111 automobiles a
year, there were' in Russia, according In
T. Zavalani, Albanian-born graduate of
ihe Marxist-Leninist academy in Leningrad, "no traditions ol mechanical production ami technical management of a
big-scale modern industry."'1
Nineteen twenty-eighl!
Frederick W. Taylor started "scientific management" in America in 1889.
Or mi they lell me. I can'l remember
that far back. Bul I can remember 1928
well enough.
'"The Plan, seivs Petri's, "had almosl
l.i starl from scratch."6 No wonder that
if you take 1928 eis ;i base ve'eir vein rein
pie.i trends emd cite percentages which
during lln- succeeding live- years make
the Soviel I nion look good. 11 heul nowhere lo go bul up.
The American Depression began one
year later. The Depression was a living
—Wide World Pholo
Leningrad industrial worker
time, bul the Okies wenl tee California
hv automobile.
I. Obviously ihe hist Five-Year Plan
ami lhe see eiml eenel the- others repfi'senl
work and lhe work had results. Russia
in 1938 musl liave- been ei formidable
industrial power, computed to llu- Russia oj 1928, or compared to India or
Afghanistan. But, as a student of baseball mighl say. il is nol jusl where vou
stand in lln1 league, it's wheel league
v e.u re in.
Possibly lhe mosl dramatically successful program of lhe Russiems weis that
..I "electrification." Thi- Dnieper Dam
m 1937 had 600.000 kilowatts capacity,
or almosl one-fourth ihe capacity of lhe
(.rami C.niler today. ^ el w ith this fabulous advance tlie Russieen output of
36.4 billion kilowatt-hours in ihe greal
■sii\i,i year 1937 was about one third
lhal of the I'nited States in lhe terrible
Depression year 1937.'
I In 1911 the Germans blew up the
Dnieper I lam. '! heel i~ only one of the
lings thai happened lo Sov iel industry
during World Weir il. Total destruction
hv ihe Germans, and ley the Russians
themselves in their "scorched-earth" pol
icy ol retreat, lias been estimated by
lhe Soviets themselves (according to
Zavalani i al about a third of the existing capital. The devastated area originally contained two thirds ol the heavj
industry.''
Much has been made of transfers beyond the I reds, but il is hard lo ihink
this can have- been verv efficient considering how transportation is always ;i
bottleneck in the vasl Russian land mass,
with one fourth the li.S. railway mileage1
in serve double the I .S. area, eiml no
help from the highway system worth
speaking of in the same breath with
I .S. highways.
5. Since World War II there has no
doubt been much reconstruction under
the fourth Five-Year Plan. And a greal
amount of goods has no doubl been
imported into the Soviet Union from
Germany although there is considerable doubt as to what shape it was in
when ii got in ii- destination, or wheel
productive use was made of it.
Al a Cabinet luncheon on April 28.
1917. General George C. Marshall, then
Secretary of State, reported on ;i Moscow conference ;is follows: "Two underlying motifs ran through all the conversations with the Riissiejns -first, money,
and second, reparations out of Germany,
i.e., in terms of production . . . The
Russians have found thai the taking "I
physical assets does nol gel than the
resull they want in terms of goods,
| Italics added.] Even taking of man
agemenl personnel with the plants does
nol suffice because the trained labor is
not available in Russia."
I his, from the Soviel poinl of view.
is a seni of bleak picture, don'l vou
think?
In emv case lhe- re-sulis of reparation
ami reconstruction combined seem I"
have lefl much lo be desired eis feir as
pulling the Sovie-I I niiin in a seriousl)
competitive position with the I nited
Sieeie-s is concerned. For a particularly
importanl example, the Soviet I nion's
planned electrical production for 1950
uees ,'12 billion kilowatt-hours.10 This is
indeed well over double lhe Soviel pro-
ilni'lie.u of 1937, hill il is s|i|| only aboul
a fourth the l.S. production for 19S0."
(Continued mi I'tige llii
Bernard Pares, Russia (Copyright, ley tin'
\ce, Vmerican Library of World Litera-
lure, In.-.l. p. 66.
Valeriu Men..,. Lenin (Macmillan, 1928),
p. 394. _
■' I. Zavalani, How Sinm^ h Russia? (Frederick \. Praeger, 1952), p. 1(1.
0 Pares, op. 'it.. |>. H°.
I lee capacity ol llie Dnieper Dam eunl tl"'
Soviel electrical energy output are from
Zavalani, Op. dt., p. 13 eeenl |>. .r>7 la'spe'i"
lively. Grand Coulee reapacit) i- inv.ai i"
lie.- I'):..', // inlil lltimtme. p. 185. U.S. OUt"
interpolated From ei table
1953 It mill Altitun,ie. p. 183.
' /enelleilli. e./e. i il.. |.|i. I 12-43.
'■ The Forrestal Unities, edited ley
\lillis I Viking. 1951 I. p. 266.
" /ee\ elleliei. "/.. • it., p. I 17.
" 1953 IVmill Aim,nine. p. 111.'!.
the
Pane ilS
FACTS FORUM NEWS, June, I"■'■''
|
