further international scientific collaboration was among the complex of emotions
Mu.,—fully played upon by those who
brought hinl itilo the espionage network.
Mazerall, whose testimony as to his
motivation seems to us lo have been
frank and sincere, stated in ev idence:
A. At tin- same time I elid nol like tier
idea e.f supplying information. It nee- nol
put to me so nilhli theit I wees supplying
information to the Soviet government,
either. It wees inure theit eis -cii'iili-t- wr
were pooling information, anel 1 actually
ei-keal llilel il we' e'eeeilel hope' to lillel this
Q. Di.l you ever have theit experience?
V I di.l not: no.
Q. lleive yon e'ver known of ill fill illation of einv kind being supplied hv Russia?
A. Very little.
A further objective, pursued through
'lie study group, is gradually to inculcate in the secret membership of the
Communisl party a habil nf complete
obedience In ihe dictates of senior members emd officials of the partv hierarchy.
'his is apparently accomplished through
;| constant emphasis, in the indoctrination courses, mi the importance of organ-
'zation as such, anel by the gradual creation, in lhe mind "f the new adherent or
sympalhizer. of an overriding moral
sense of "loveillv lo lhe party." This
loyalty to the party" in due course
'akes the place in tbe member's mind "f
'he earlier loyalty lo certain principles
Professed bv the party propaganda.
In view of ihe rigidly hierarchic organization nf the Communisl party, par-
ocularly in its secrel sections, the con-
'''I'l of "loyalty to the party" means in
Practice, rigid obedience of adherents lo
'hose party members who are recognized
'ls occupying a senior position in the
''''Tan-by. . . .
The indoctrination courses in the
"hielv groups are apparently calculated
I|"l onlv lo inculcate a high degree of
'oyttltv Iii the peirlv"' einel 'obedience l"
1"' party," hut in instill in ihe mind of
'"' adherent the view thai loyalty ami
"hcilione,. in the leadership of this or-
5*nization lakes precedence over hisloy-
j''lv in Canada, entitles him to disregard
''- oaths of allegiance and secrecy, eunl
^"s destroys his integrity as a citizen.
Hie case of Kathleen Willsher offers
striking illustration of the uses to
*"<ich this attitude of ''partv leeveellv"
|""1 obedience can he pul by unscrupu-
"l,s leaders, even when oth.r aspects of
"' indoctrination courses have nol been
( She heul Joined ee secrel "cell of the
.'""iniutiisi party and as early as 1935
''-'fi'eil tn ojye- secrel information, which
."' obtained from her work in ihe Of-
."''' "f lhe High < a.nuni—imii'i fur the
"'ted Kingdom in Ottawa. . . . Sh.' told
? thai she wa- given lo understand...
,''" this information was for the guid-
(""'' eef the Yilimial Executive of lhe
'"'"iiiuni-i partv of Canada.
'ACTS FORUM NEWS, June, 1955
She also said that when these requests,
which she recognized were improper,
were firsl pul to her . . . she had some
struggle with her conscience, bul that
after a few weeks' hesitation she decided
in comply because ets a member of Ihe
Communist parly she felt thai she vvas
expected to do what she was asked regardless of any obligation which she
mighl have in any other direction....
I felt that 1 should contrive to con-
triltlltc something tieueeia!- the helping of
thi- policy, because 1 wee- very interested
ill it. I found il very difficult, and vet 1
felt I should try to help.
Miss \\ illshei's evidence, taken as a
whole, -hows that she felt her tewn position in the Communisl party to be a
relatively humble one, thai her one importanl contribution to the cause of the
party lav in the transmission of the
secrel Information to which her official
position gave' her eiccess. and lhal il wets
expected of her that she should nol hesitate to make this information available
on request to the parly leadership.
• • •
In many eases prolonged membership
in the Communisl party seems lo have
resulted in a very high degree of discipline and lo have induced a semi-military habil of largely unquestioning
obedience lo "orders" and "partv policy." Such habits, once developed, naturally marie the task of lhe espionage recruiting agents, who are senior members
of that partv. relatively simple.
ll appears lo he an established principle of tit leasl the secrel "cells'" seclion
nf tlie Communis! parly thai rejection of
"party orders" entails automatic resignation or expulsion from the party. This
principle in itself nssisls in inducing
obedience from members who might
otherwise lee inclined lo welveT. hut wlm
have become habituated over a period
of months or years In membership.
• • •
...I.eadeis nf lhe Fifth Column
solved whal would appear at firsl sight
to be their mosl difficult problem—that
of motivation, or finding capable anil
well-placed Canadians who would be
willing lo engage in espionage against
Canada fur a foreign power hv means
of a widespread svsli'in of propaganda
and in particular by organizing a system nf intensive study groups. This sys-
tein has leea-n functioning fur years anel
weis already ei going concern used for
espionage in 1935.
• • •
A further technical advantage, which
this system heis provided lo lln- leading
organizers of lhe espionage ni'lwe.rk. has
been a surprising degree uf security
from detection. I!v concentrating their
requests to assist in espionage within lhe
membership of secrel sections of lhe
Communisl party, the leaders were ap
peiii'iillv able lu f.'l quite confident
and apparently with reason based on ein
experience in Canada over a period of at
least eleven years--thai even if lhe adherent or member should refuse lo engage in activities so clearly illegal ami
which constitute so clear et betrayal of
hi- ier her own country—such adherent
or member would in any case not consider denouncing lhe espionage recruiting agent lo lln- Canadian public or to
thc Canadian authorities.
| For a significant example, Kathleen
Willsher was firsl eiskcel in 1935 lo supply secrel information at a regular meeting of her study group. For four years
she transmitted such information orally
at the study group meetings. While the
conversations were private. Aliss Will-
sher teslified that no particular precautions were taken againsl being overheard "as no one else would hate been
It is significant that not a single one
nf the several Canadians, members or
adherents of lhe Communisl parly (Labour-Progressive party), who were approached hy senior members of thai
party to engage in espionage on behalf
of the Soviet Union, reported this approach to thc agencies, departments, or
armed forces of Canada in which thev
Not one even of those who have described, in evidence before us. serious
hesitation and struggles with their consciences which they underwent before
they agreed lo acl as spies against Canada, ever suggested to us that they contemplated laking the one loyal or legal
course of action—i.e. reporting the
criminal request lo lhe Canadian authorities.
This is a striking illustration of the
efficiency of thc Communisl sludv
groups in inducing a motivation for
clearly illegal parly assignments directed
What appears from lhe evidence to be
the' real purpose of lhe study group or
"cell" organization—as a wide and ever-
expanding base for the recruiting, psychological development, and organization of a Fifth Column operating in the
interests of a foreign power—would
have been frustrated if rank and file
members of these groups or junior ail-
herents of the Communist parly of Canada had been aware of lhe real ob-
je a -lives and policies of [ihe organizers]
and tbe other senior members of lhe
The evidence we have beard shows
lhal al each stage of "'development" the
adherent is kept in ignorance of the
wider ramifications and real objectives
nf Ihe organization, to one of the fringes
of which be has allowed himself to be
Indeed ii appears from ihe evidence
that some al leasl of the adherents res
■ initial to study groups are not lold that
these groups are in reality secret "ti-lls"