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UNIMPORTANT TERRITORY?
Jusl as. before' the second we,rid war
emd their defeat, the French used lo say.
"W'liv die for Danzig?" we now have
Walter Lippmann and olhers of his kind
proclaiming that il would be folly to
risk war over "such unimportant territory" as the Quemoys and Alatsu.
Neither Air. Lippmann, nor other
Sophists of his kind, realize lhat wars
are neither waged, much less won or
lost, according to an accountant's estimate of the value of a particular piece
of real estate. Nor is victory assured to
lhe side which has the most "hardware"
to throw at the oilier. "Wars are won
or lost in the hearts of men."
No American who knows and understands the' origins of his country is
likelv to question the truth of this remark, made to me recently in Harris-
hurg by a Russian who had managed to
escape the fate of the thousands of his
displaced countrymen in Germany
whom we handed over to Stalin to be
shot, or sent to slave labor camp- after
our victory in the last world war. Rut
loo main of us today, having inherited
lhe blessings of liberty, have' no conception of what il means to be without
them and no realization lhat the price
of freedom is readiness lo die for it.
A year ago hardly anyone had heard
of the Quemov and Matsu islands. Today they have become our Rubicon. The
decision lo cross it or lo retreat lies
with President Eisenhower alone. This
al least i- clear from the wording of
the resolution passeel hv Congress on
January 28 at the President's request,
which authorizes him to secure and
protect "such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly
hands, and the taking of such other
measures as he judges lo he required
or appropriate in assuring lhe defense
of Formosa and the Pescadores."
CAMPAIGN PROMISES VANISHED
No one knows the mind of Presidenl
Eisenhower; or rather no one knows
who w ill make up his mind for him
when the choice between peace or war
in the Formosa Strait can no longer be
avoided. One thing only is certain. The
Republican campaign promises of 1952
have vanished like sM(,vv upon the
desert's Face. There is no longer any
question of "rolling back" the Iron Curtain in Europe or Asia, or of liberating
anv one anywhere in the world. Far
limn abandoning the sterile "containment" policy of the Truman-Aehi'son
era. as promised in the Republican plat-
form, the administration now- aims only
at peaceful "coexistence" with the So-
vie-i empire based, at best, on the
status quo, and al worst on further retreats in Asia.
Few today seem even to remember
that President Eisenhower was ilea teal
on a Republican platform which promised lhal:
Paste fill
It will murk lhe end ol lhe negative,
futile, eiiul inune,red polic] ,,t "containment" vs li teli abandons countless human
beings tee ee despotism eiruI a.i.lle-s lerrnr-
i-m which in turn enables the rulers to
Eorge the captives ill!" el sseei(...ll for our
destruction.
For a few months this wise' anil
courageous proclamation of Republican
policy seemed le. be more than campaign oratory. Mr. Dulles speeke' <>I em
"agonizing reappraisal" of ..ur foreign
poucy which foreshadowed an end lo
our unconditional aid to those who. like
the French, could not In- counted upon
lo fight even lo defend their own
liberty, much less anyone else''s.
—Wide World Photo
Chiang Kai-shek (left) toasts Syngman
Rhee at reception at Nationalist Headquarters, Taipeh, Formosa, in November, 1953.
Man between is Sampson Shen, Chiang's
confidential secretary.
CAPTIVE PEOPLES REGAIN HOPE
'Ihi' captive peoples of lhe Soviet
emniie in Europe, together with the Chinese under the iron heel of communism.
regained hop,- and strengthened the resistance forces, thanks to Mr. Dulles'
statements concerning their liberation.
The workers of Easl Germany revolted
in the summer of 195',. and even lhe
slaves in Russia's concentration camps
went on strike that same year in large
numbers,
Chiang Kai-shek's forces were temporarily "unleashed" whim Eisenhower
countermanded Truman's order lo tbe
Seventh Fleet to protect the tear of our
enemy in Korea "hy neutralizing Formosa. And on February 25, 1953,
Dulles told Congress that the United
Stale- "would never be a parly lo any
international deal fixing despotism on
pea,pie- in Europe anil Asia. On that
occasion he also seiid that lhe peoples
behind lhe Iron Curtain "have' no
ground to -ar that the administration
would sell I ii down the river for our
advantage."
For a brief moment the clouds lifted.
and il seemed as if. at long lasl. America would have the wisdom and courage
lo win the battle for the world withoul
war instead of waiting for the' Communists to acquire the "positions ,,l
strength" they need before they can
atteick lis wilh the certainty of victory.
Soon the bright prospect fa.led. First,
the Republican administration "settled
the Korean war on terms so Favorable
to the Chinese Communists thai they
had been rejected a year earlier by the
Democratic administration. Next Indochina weis given up because lhe I nil''"
Steele's dared neither lo intervene nor
lo compel France lo take the measures
necessary to defend the colony oul of
which she had derived great profit, but
to which she refused either to give' self-
government or lo defend with adequate
forces.
During Ihis same period, in spile "f
McCarthy's efforts In slop Stassen. the
security harriers against trade with the
enemy were lowered even while American prisoners of war were being starved
and tortured in Chinese Communisl
prisons.
Under British pressure and because
lhe administration nurtures the illusion
that trade with Communisl oountries
can promote "friendship" anil "peaceful
coexistence," wc started permitting our
"allies" to export more and more of lb''
sinews of war lo China and the rest of
the Soviet empire.
Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek was 1"'"
ing more effectively "leashed" than ever
before, and Syngman Rhee's army w**
being rationed to a two day's supply "'
ammunition for fear it might attempt
to liberate North Korea.
In Europe, according lo lhe same pat'
tern, we gave our blessing lo the Paris
agreements, which were acceptable to
France only because they are design*"
to ensure lhat the West Germans shell'
neither raise nor equip sufficient fores'
I,, ensure a viable defense of F.tirop1'-
nor attempt lo liberate East Germany.
SOVIET RUSSIA—NO. 1 'ALLY"
According to Walter Lippmann. ;'
"const, ne live" reading of the Pari'
agreements offered "an excellent ha-1."
for negotiations with lhe Soviel Union
because they provide "for the limitation
of armaments in Western Europe.
Without agreeing that his adjectiv'e
"constructive" is well chosen, one ea"
agree with Lippmann's view that ''''
Soviet Union should have been hapl's
to negotiate, since, according to Dull'"
statement of November 30, the puip""''
of lhe London-Paris accords was """
merely to create defensive strength ■•'
but to limit ami control thai strength «°
that II can never hi' an aggressi'1
lot'ec."
Since any attempt to liberate lhe rap'
live people's could no doubt he <'""',
sidered as an "aggressive" action, ""'■
contrary to the' principles and aim- °
lhe United Nations al ils foiiiiibili""
Iwhen Soviet Russia ueis our dea
"ally"), the Paris accords, like the F°f
mees.i treaty, constitute in effect •''
assurance to the Communisl tyrant*
that they have nothing to fear so I'"1'
.is they content themselves with the ''"
joymenl of their ill-gotten gains.
Sk
FACTS FORUM N'EWS, April
l9*s
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