RUSSIANS HATE COMMUNISTS
(Continued from Page 24)
other peoples behind the Iron Curtain
hate, as well as fear, the Soviet government. The trouble is that no one has any
hope of overthrowing it without outside
help. The fact that so many millions of
Russians went over to the Germans in
the first stages of the war is a proof of
what I have always contended concerning the attitude of the Russian people.
Tbe Germans might have retained or
won the support of the overwhelming
majority of the Russian people had it
not been for the stupid and cruel be-
havior of the Nazis.
We should take care that we do not
ourselves make the mistake of forcing
the Russian people to support their Communist government by regarding them,
instead of communism, as the enemy.
Today many of the very same people
who have been most sympathetic to
communism in the past are busy telling
us that we should hate the Russians.
They are today, wittingly or unwittingly, furthering the Communist cause by
diverting our enmity away from communism as such to Russia. This kind of
upside-down Communist propaganda has
been so effective that Dr. Ward V.
Evans, in his minority report on Dr.
Oppenheimer. cited as "evidence" of Dr.
Oppenheimer's loyalty the fact that '"he
AMERICA HELPED STALIN
I consider the breaking off of diplo-
matic relations with the Soviet Inion
would put fresh heart into the forces of
resistance to Communist tyranny behind
thc Iron Curtain. It would help to wipe
out the impression we created during
and after the war that we approved of
Communist tyranny. It is a true but
tragic fact that at the war's end America
and her allies helped Stalin to re-establish his dictatorship in full force over
the Russian people. By the many pronouncements of our government leaders.
by the attitude of our newspapers and
radio commentators, we made it all too
clear that we were behind Stalin and
that we gave him, instead of the Russian
people, the credit for the heroism of the
By turning back uncounted numbers
of Russian deserters, displaced persons,
and others who knew that they would be
shot or sent to concentration camps when
returned to the Soviet I nion, we must
have helped establish the belief in
the hearts of the Russian people that
there was no hope to be expected from
the West. It is necessary that we do everything possible to wipe out the impression given in the war and postwar
periods tbat we are ready to support
Communist tyranny so long as that tyranny does not menace us. And nothing
could be better calculated to achieve this
purpose than implementation of the Jen-
I could quote many statements lev
past ami present representatives of the
American people showing their misunderstanding of the nature of communism, of its aims and its methods, and of
the basis of its terrible power. The past
two administrations made repeated statements implying thai we believed that
Soviet communism is a progressive pow-
i \s late as July 16, 1950, President
"By making possible tbe formulation
and execution of liberal reforms such
as the nationalization of certain industries and land redistribution, which are
desired by a majority of Koreans, this
policy should also help to broaden the
basis for an understanding with the
I hr only possible meaning which can
be read into this statement of Mr. Truman's is lhat the Communists are liberal
and progressive and that if we emulate
them we can get along with them. In
other words, the basic assumption upon
which the Truman-Acheson foreign policy was based was that America could
insure world peace if we showed evidence thai our economic, social, and
political policies are as progressive' a-
those of the Communists.
The second great illusion about communism which has distorted our policy
is a corollary of the first. It is the belief that communism conquers not by
fonc and terror, but through popular
support. For instance, Mr. Acheson, on
January 12, 1950, declared that the best
way of stopping communism in Asia
was to "develop a soundness and administration of these new governments and
to develop their resources and their
technical skills so that they are not subject to penetration either through ignorance or because they believe the'se-
false premises, or because there is real
distress in their areas. If we can help
lhat development, if we can go forward
wilh it, then we have brought about the
best way that anyone knows of stopping
this spread of communism."
In other words, the Acheson school
of thought believes that good works and
the redistribution of wealth can stop
OUTSIDE HELP NEEDED
The third great illusion which formerly permitted the State Department to
view Communist conquests, such as lhat
of China, with complacency, is thc belief that once the Chinese or any other
people learn that communism does not
'jive lhe benefits expected, they can discard it. The fact is, however, that it is
impossible for a nation which has col
under Communist tyranny to find a «<
of overthrowing it without outside hdf
It would seem that in spite of all *
lessons of the past few years our thin1
ing and our policy are still permeatf
with the old illusions. For instance, *
June 16, last, President Eisenhower,'
opposing the breaking off of all tr**
with tbe Iron Curtain countries, staf
lhat the satellite countries would W
have no place to go but Russia for a"!
thing they needed. He further staf
that it should be our objective "to *
courage the centrifugal forces," ana'
implied that this could be done by "J
tinning to trade with the Soviet Emp'f
The plain fact is, as the Jenner-''
Carran resolution recognizes, that bi"e^
ing off diplomatic and trading relal"*
with the Soviet countries would P*
weaken the Soviet empire and strenfS"
en, not weaken, the ties between us &
the Russian people. For it would ?'
them hope that the tyrannical i'e$
which rules over them could collar
thanks to our pressure. And far fj;
hurting lhe people of the Soviet I
pire materially, it might help "a
The Soviet government is able to ew.
only by squeezing ils subjects and
priving them of food and other nfl
sities while using imports almost
clusively to build up ils war potcn"'
Consequently, the Russian people
those of the satellite countries, far I
deriving any benefit from mere**
trade with tbe free world, would ■"'
probability be hungrier than ever n°
It will be fatal should wc listen
the contrary advice given by Sir *,
ston Churchill and the Americans
°f the ]
as '' die
share his illusion that thc .
eminent represents the Russian I"'1"
and that we can have peace and sefl]
by appeasing the Communists eitM
the Far East or in Europe.
RUSSIAN MASSES VOICELESS
Those who like and those who
the Russians are equally wrong i
ining that the Russian people haV* .
say in determining Soviet policy ,
equally dangerous as advisers a- I"
American policy should be. e;
When I read'Sir Winston Chuf«j
statement last summer to lhe N8.'1
Press Club, I was appalled at bis ''
ance and tbe bad advice which
giving, thanks to lhat ignoranCfj
based his plea for a try at "pea"'1'
existence" with the Soviet l.ii'l1".'
"lhe mood of thc people of Russia
on "the great wish in Russia to ",;
better time among the masses
people." He urged us to "make 1
lhat the Russian people would n<TJ
that they might gain far more \ r-f?nSth b
quarter of a century of peaceful de e pena
untry" ** to opp0se
quarter ol a century
ment of their own
war. And be
FACTS FORUM NEWS, Februam